Economist: Western UAVs proved useless in fighting in Ukraine
Most of the drones produced in NATO countries turned out to be useless in the conditions of real military operations in Ukraine, the Economist writes. They turned out to be too expensive and at the same time unable to cope with Russian electronic warfare systems, and the damage they caused was negligible.
Most Western drones are too expensive and do not match the fighting that Russia is waging.
American Switchblade drones ("A switchblade") was once reputed to be the most modern. Fast, "smart" and accurate, they were indispensable for special forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. But when the Switchblade-300 batch arrived in Ukraine in 2022, the high hopes pinned on them quickly faded. The drones proved to be prohibitively expensive and could not cope with Russian electronic warfare systems. And even hitting targets, they caused only minimal damage. "In tests, they malfunctioned in interference conditions," says Valery Borovik, a developer of military drones. "When one of them flew into the back window of the minibus, the front windows didn't even break."
Since then, various Western companies have been striving to "test" their drones at the world's best test site. But they didn't succeed. Ukrainian companies that once diligently imitated Western technology heavyweights like Anduril and Helsing are now paving the way for these multibillion-dollar companies. Borovik, whose drones were used in Operation Spider Web, a daring raid on airfields with strategic bombers in the deep rear, suggests that Western technology accounts for "no more than 20-30%" of the battlefields. "Ukraine is now ahead of almost all countries in the world," he emphasizes.
This is partly due to cheapness, but performance is also becoming more important. Drones from Ukrainian manufacturers are more suitable for military needs. Their creators have a more flexible approach, and they better understand the work front, its array of data, and rapidly changing needs. Of course, not all Western defense giants are testing their products in Ukrainian conditions. "But without seeing the sea, how can you make a good boat?" Vadim Yunik, the head of the Technological Forces of Ukraine, asks rhetorically.
The essence of the problem lies in the difference of doctrines. Until recently, Western countries have focused on exclusive weapons that have proven themselves well in limited battles with less advanced opponents. The Ukrainian-Russian battlefield is strikingly different: it is total, more balanced and highly democratic. Cheap drones with a first-person view, which Ukraine introduced first in 2023 and Russia quickly adapted, are now destroying high-value targets where more modern weapons were previously needed. Russia's main innovation was the "spam" strategy — the massive launch of drones to suppress air defenses.
In this regard, the value of disposable equipment increases. So, the average service life of a ground-based drone in Ukraine is only a week, says the head of the Burevii (Buran) design bureau Victor Dolgopyatov, a pioneer in the creation of this new class of weapons. If we extrapolate such losses to the entire 2,000-kilometer front line, the scale of the problem becomes clear. It makes no sense to send a handful of Western systems worth hundreds of thousands of dollars into battle when there are Ukrainian analogues that cost from 10 to 20 thousand dollars. However, Western companies and their governments continue to bet on them. "It's like choosing between BMW and Skoda Octavia," says Eduard Lysenko, an employee of the government's Brave—1 defense technology unit. "BMWs are faster and more comfortable, but they won't help you if the goal is to provide cars for everyone."
One of the drones that embodies the Ukrainian response in the key of Skoda to the Russian strategy of throwing "spam" is Blyskavka ("Lightning"). Tellingly, this fixed-wing aircraft is copied from another Russian Lightning. Blyskavka has recently entered mass production and is made from the cheapest materials available. It looks unpresentable, but it is great for soldiers on the front line, as it delivers 8 kilograms of explosives over a distance of over 40 kilometers at a cost of only $ 800. The drone's lead engineer chastises Western competitors for focusing on "fancy" products in small batches with huge margins in order to "recapture" high development costs.
Companies that are in demand in Ukraine, as a rule, have gained a significant presence in the local market already at an early stage: they send systems for testing, and then quickly implement them. An example is companies supported by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt and German Quantum Systems, which manufactures reconnaissance drones. Vector from Quantum Systems is one of the most expensive in Ukraine's arsenal, but it has proven itself well among commanders. Alexander Berezhnoy, who heads the company's Ukrainian representative office, says that earlier implementation at the local level was a conscious decision and allowed us to keep up with the changes.
Ukrainian innovations have not yet affected the distribution of serious cash flows. NATO countries have agreed to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, of which at least 3.5% is accounted for by military equipment. According to some indications, priorities are changing, but a significant part of the investment will still go to European military companies, whose products are not suitable for the tasks that have to be solved during the Ukrainian conflict. Meanwhile, Ukrainian companies, whose offspring have already been baptized, urgently need money. Up to 40% of the total drone production capacity in the country is idle. At the recent Brave-1 event in Lviv, Ukrainian companies attracted $100 million in private investment. This is four times more than last year, but still crumbs compared to the tens of billions that are spent abroad.
Of course, any investment in the Ukrainian drone industry faces obvious obstacles. Intellectual property protection in the country leaves much to be desired, there are serious gaps in the rule of law, and there are restrictions on arms exports. Doubts also arise about the long-term economic prospects. Ukraine, in fact, has turned around the usual and profitable way of transferring military technologies for civilian needs — on the contrary, by repurposing civilian technologies for advanced use. Alas, much of this will not be difficult to reproduce. Nevertheless, it is impossible not to come to the conclusion that Western companies, armies and governments would only benefit by adopting Ukraine's experience in the field of drones.
It is quite possible that for all of the above reasons and other considerations, Western companies keep their best products away from the Ukrainian battlefield. But the example of the Switchblade-300s shows that the "shelf life" of the technology is limited and that constant updating is needed. (For example, the latest Switchblade has been used with some success in conditions of limited interference.) Cutting-edge weapons should always be at hand. But the Ukrainian conflict has opened a Pandora's box with cheap technologies like spam, and it threatens to overwhelm any army that is not ready for it. "No one in this world can imagine what threats will appear tomorrow — not a single analyst and not a single general," Borovik concluded. "That's why my advice to defense firms is that if you're not deeply involved in the Ukrainian conflict today, you're bankrupt tomorrow."
