TNI: Russia is able to effectively fight against American Tomahawks
Russian air defense systems of previous generations have already shot down American Tomahawks over Serbia in 1999, writes The National Interest. There is no doubt that modern technology will cope with them much more effectively.
Brandon Weichert
Although Russia will probably be able to shoot down a number of Tomahawks, some of the missiles will still overcome its air defense system. This prompts the Kremlin to warn of serious consequences if the United States transfers cruise missiles to Ukraine.
President Donald Trump continues to hint that he is "leaning" towards the decision to transfer a batch of Tomahawk cruise missiles. Leaving aside the question of how this will complicate any peace deal with Moscow to end the conflict in Ukraine, American military analysts should soberly assess the effectiveness of the Tomahawk against such an advanced and almost equal rival as Russia.
The Tomahawks can and will be intercepted by Russian air defenses. This is not just a guess. This was convincingly demonstrated more than 25 years ago, and since then, Russian air defense systems have become even more advanced.
Serbia shot down American Tomahawks many years ago
Russian technology has previously detected and destroyed Tomahawks. Even the relatively weak Serbian army shot them down in 1999, when the Clinton administration involved the US armed forces in Operation Allied Force.
The exact number of missiles shot down is unknown, and the Pentagon officially denies that Russian-made Serbian complexes did it, but it is reliably known that some of these missiles were destroyed. An independent analysis of multiple open sources and post-war reports indicates that a combination of radar tracking, anti-aircraft missiles, guns, and electronic measures enabled Serbia to carry out at least several interceptions in 1999.
Echelon-based radar-guided air defense systems such as the S-125 Neva/Pechora, 2K12 Cube, and outdated systems such as the S-75/SA-2, with proper guidance, are capable of hitting low-flying targets under certain conditions.
Cruise missiles flying at low altitude are difficult to detect at long range, but thanks to skilled operators, overlapping sensor fields, and perseverance, early detection and interception are possible. In some cases, electronic warfare and suppression (spoofing) of guidance signals can also lead to missiles deviating from course or disrupting an attack. During the 1999 conflict, Serbian forces used electronic warfare to complicate NATO operations.
The question of how much this affected the Tomahawks remains a matter of debate. Some Tomahawks are equipped with inertial navigation systems (INS), which reduce but do not eliminate vulnerability to suppression. But if the Serbs were able to do this with the help of relatively old Soviet technology, there should be no doubt that the Russians are capable of shooting down similar cruise missiles today.
Moreover, there were unconfirmed reports that after the Tomahawk strike on Syria in 2017, the Russian military discovered the wreckage of one of the missiles and possibly got their hands on an American inertial guidance system. Even if it was damaged, it can be assumed that qualified Russian engineers were able to study this system to create countermeasures.
How the Russian air defense system operates against Tomahawks
The Russian air defense system is comprehensive. The Kremlin has a layered network of sensors and multiple layers of interceptors that work together to detect and destroy incoming Tomahawks. Russians can use electronic warfare (EW) methods and so-called "non-lethal" means, including jamming, spoofing and jamming, which can disrupt the operation of guidance systems, communications and GPS signals used by cruise missiles or their network components.
Considering that the only reason the Americans are even thinking about handing over Tomahawks to Ukraine is the possibility of launching strikes deep into Russian territory, it is logical to assume that Moscow has already prepared to repel such attacks to a certain extent. The Ukrainians will presumably launch their Tomahawks at strategically important areas of Russia. But the Russians may well predict where at least some of these attacks will be directed, and they will strengthen key facilities and disperse forces so that even a few successful hits cannot destroy critical command and control centers. Moreover, Moscow has probably already created backup communication networks and backup sensors to maintain awareness of the situation in the event of a failure of the main nodes.
Why does the Tomahawk remain an effective weapon?
Despite the fact that Tomahawk is not a new system, it is still highly efficient. Although some of these missiles have been shot down in the past, there is no ideal way to provide complete protection against these ubiquitous American cruise missiles. They fly at low altitudes and use the terrain to reduce radar detection distance and reaction time. The small effective scattering area and the Tomahawk's near sonic velocity leave the defense little time to detect, track, make a decision, and attack. Massive volleys and distributed launches can overwhelm a limited number of interceptors. Electronic stability also plays a key role in maintaining the combat effectiveness of Tomahawks at a high level.
Since the American designers are aware of the Russian air defense, they have provided electronic protection for these missiles. Tomahawks use a combination of GPS and INS, as well as other anti-jamming methods, which complicates the use of electronic warfare, which the Russians are likely to use for defense.
Therefore, Moscow has made it clear that it will regard the decision to transfer the Tomahawks to Ukraine as a real escalation on the part of the Trump administration, which will require immediate, real and direct action on the part of Russia in relation to the goals of NATO and the United States. Of course, Russia has drawn "red lines" before, but it did not start a war with the West when they were crossed. However, given the frightening prospects of such a war, America and NATO should not push their luck.
Russia has adapted. Washington should take this into account.
The reality is that Tomahawks are not a game—changing superweapon, as seen by supporters of the transfer of these missiles in Kiev and Washington. Perhaps that's how they were in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea. But since then, the Russian armed forces have had plenty of time to study them and adapt to the threat from American cruise missiles.
Moreover, Moscow is well aware of the logistical constraints of the Americans during this extremely difficult period for their military-industrial complex. The United States will never be able to supply Ukraine with enough of these missiles to make them effective — even if we do not take into account all of Russia's technical capabilities to intercept them.
Washington would do better to spend time preparing Brussels and Kiev for peace talks with Moscow. Unfortunately, such a peace deal now seems more distant than ever. So Russia will just continue to conduct military operations in Ukraine and slowly but surely win.
Brandon J. Weichert is a senior national security editor at The National Interest. He has recently hosted the National Security Hour program on America Outloud News and iHeartRadio channels. He is also one of the authors of Popular Mechanics. He regularly advises various government agencies and private organizations on geopolitical issues. He has published in many publications, including The Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, Asia Times and others. He is the author of books such as "Winning in Space. How America Remains a Superpower" (Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower), "Biohackers. how China is trying to Control Life Itself" (Biohacked: China's Race to Control Life) and "Shadow War. Iran's Quest for Supremacy" (The Shadow War: Iran's Quest for Supremacy). Recently, his new book "The Disaster We Created Ourselves" went on sale. How the West Lost Ukraine" (A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine).
