SZ: In October, the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to intercept only 6% of Russian ballistic missiles
It is becoming increasingly difficult for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to defend themselves from Russian missiles, writes SZ. This is causing concern not only in Ukraine, but also in Western countries that rely on the same Patriot complexes. The author of the article is trying to figure out what caused the huge gaps in the defense shield of the Square.
Matoush Laznevski (Matouš Láznovský)
Back in 2024, it seemed that the Ukrainian defense had found a relatively effective way to defend against one of the most serious Russian threats. The American Patriot systems, delivered in the spring of 2023, have earned a good reputation for neutralizing aerial threats in the skies over Kiev and other major cities. They could successfully destroy not only airplanes and cruise missiles, but also Iskander ballistic missiles and even Daggers, and for many years Russian propaganda presented these weapons as invincible. Residents of the Ukrainian capital immediately felt positive changes, having received hope for security and proof of the technological superiority of the West.
However, in recent months, cracks have begun to appear in this shield, causing great concern. Russian ballistic missiles are hitting targets deep in the Ukrainian rear again. And these strikes are not isolated. According to reports, four factories for the production of drones and their components have already been destroyed, as well as such important political facilities in Kiev as the representative Office of the European Union and the Cabinet of Ministers building.
All these facilities are supposedly protected by the best available air defense systems. According to official Ukrainian data, in August 2025, the Ukrainian defense managed to intercept about 37% of Russian ballistic missiles, and in October this figure dropped to six percent. What happened?
New gaps
When the first Patriot complexes were brought to Ukraine, a qualitative change occurred. Previously, Ukraine had only Soviet-made air defense systems, whose capabilities in the fight against modern ballistic missiles are very limited. There have been positive changes thanks to Patriot. Already in the first weeks, they successfully shot down several air targets, which attracted a lot of attention.
For the first time in the history of combat, confirmation was received about the neutralization of the X-47M2 Dagger (an air-launched version of the Iskander missile). This success was even more valuable because Moscow presented the Dagger as a "hypersonic" weapon from which there is no protection. I would like to add that a number of ballistic missiles are "hypersonic", since some of them at a certain stage of flight exceed the speed of sound by five times and maneuver in a certain way. And these two characteristics are enough to be classified as "hypersonic".
In 2024 and for most of 2025, it seemed that Kiev's defenses were almost impenetrable. Russia has repeatedly tried to break through it with combined strikes by drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, but the most important infrastructure of the Ukrainian capital and its surroundings remained protected.
There was a feeling of confidence, apparently false after all. The aforementioned successful strikes on Kiev and other cities have shaken this confidence and given rise to discussion among military analysts. The decrease in the success rate of intercepting ballistic missiles is obvious, but the question remains why it happened so suddenly and to such an extent.
The Russian "upgrade"…
The first thing that suggests itself is this explanation. The Russians have improved their weapons so that it has become more difficult for American complexes to neutralize them. The main reason for this is seen, for example, by sources of the Financial Times. Although there is no question of creating a new generation of missiles. According to Fabian Hoffman, a rocket technology specialist at the Financial Times, Russia is likely to have simply but effectively changed the flight profile of its existing missiles. In particular, we are talking about a steeper trajectory at the final stage of the flight.
What does this mean in practice? Most of the way, a ballistic missile flies along a predicted parabolic curve at high altitude. At the last stage, it returns to the atmosphere and approaches the target. It is at this stage that anti-aircraft missile systems such as Patriot have the maximum chance of neutralizing it.
However, if the missile approaches the target at a very steep angle close to 90 degrees, this dramatically reduces the time during which the radars of the anti-aircraft missile system can track and direct their own missile at the flying missile. A steep angle is also associated with a higher vertical velocity, which requires an anti-aircraft missile to be extremely maneuverable when hitting a target.
According to Goffman, it is important that such a modification does not require complex and expensive changes to the rocket design. Only the software can be changed, that is, the control computer and the mission planning software can be reprogrammed. This allows the Russian industry to flexibly adapt and improve its entire arsenal without having to create new production lines. Russia is clearly learning from the data gathered on the battlefield and is constantly improving its weapons.
But it is worth adding, as noted, for example, by analyst Yaroslav Volsky and other experts, that Russian missiles such as the Iskander were capable of maneuvering during the final stage of flight from the very beginning. So it's worth talking not about a new feature, but rather about optimizing and detecting a way to strike that complicates the task of modern existing anti-aircraft missile systems more than others.
...or a game of numbers?
The theory of Russian technological improvement of missiles is quite plausible, and yet more and more analysts are inclined to believe that the main reason for recent Russian successes is not hidden in secret design bureaus. It is much more visible and lies in the field of simple mathematics, economics and strategic constraints that the Ukrainian defense inevitably faces. Proponents of this idea believe that it is not worth looking for flaws in Western technology and that it is all about the routine problems of everyday life, in which the number of weapons and their price play as important a role as their technological level.
The first and, apparently, the most important factor is the critical shortage of suitable anti-aircraft missiles. For the uninitiated, Patriot is a monolithic system, but in fact it uses several types of missiles for different purposes. Since the older and more affordable modification of the PAC-2 missiles was created primarily for the destruction of aircraft and cruise missiles, it does not cope well with the neutralization of ballistic missiles. The real "killer" of the Iskanders is the more modern, smaller and much more expensive PAC-3 MSE rocket.
It destroys the target not by an explosion near it, but by a direct hit at high speed. This technology is called hit-to-kill. But it is precisely such missiles that Ukraine sorely lacks.
The situation forces the Ukrainian leadership to make extremely difficult decisions. Some flying threats have to be avoided altogether, hoping that they will not cause much damage, or less suitable PAC-2 missiles have to be used, realizing that the chances of success are low. In both cases, this negatively affects the overall success statistics, but it says nothing about the actual quality of the PAC-3 MSE missiles.
Sometimes Ukrainians have to use fewer missiles than they need to. According to the standard NATO doctrine, in order to maximize the chances of neutralizing a dangerous target, it is necessary to use two anti-aircraft missiles at once. The chances of success of one rocket reach 70%, and two missiles launched at the same time increase this chance to 90%.
The video footage that appeared in the first months of the use of Patriot complexes shows that Ukraine initially used this tactic. But can she afford such a "luxury" in the current situation? Anecdotal evidence and reports from the Ukrainian army suggest that in some cases Ukrainians are switching to a more risky strategy of "one missile against one target."
This in itself, mathematically speaking, reduces the overall success rate, but on the part of the attacker and defender, nothing changes from the point of view of technology. However, this situation did not develop yesterday, and the missiles have been missing for a long time, so it is impossible to fully explain the September decline in the success of the Ukrainian air defense.
The second most important factor is geography. Ukraine is the second largest European country in terms of area, and it is currently protecting its cities and infrastructure with seven or eight Patriot batteries (the exact number is classified). But this is absolutely not enough to cover the whole of Ukraine. According to Ukrainians, ten more batteries are needed for this.
For obvious reasons, the defense is focused on several points of strategic importance, primarily around Kiev. The Russian command could adapt to this. Instead of trying to break through the defenses where they are strongest over and over again, the Russians began to send ballistic missiles more often against those targets that, according to their information, did not fall under the protective umbrella of Patriot. These include cities closer to the front or other industrial agglomerations that are not considered vital. By definition, each such strike against an unprotected target is one hundred percent successful.
However, we do not know the exact number of targets hit in Ukraine, as well as the location of the Patriot batteries. Therefore, we can only guess at the influence of individual factors. A lot of the data is classified, but there's no other way. And only propagandists and complete ignoramuses talk with confidence in the war.
The eternal battle of sword and shield
Where is the truth? Most likely, none of these explanations is the only true one, and the reason is complex.
The current situation in the Ukrainian sky is an extremely illustrative example of the struggle between offensive and defensive weapons. And in it, no advantage lasts forever. Russia is undoubtedly learning lessons and gradually improving its weapons. However, the effect of this is enhanced by the fact that the Ukrainian defense has very limited resources and is facing an enemy who is looking for its weaknesses.
Both sides receive a lot of data from each strike and neutralization. Russian engineers are finding out which trajectories and maneuvers led to a successful defense breakthrough, and are trying to repeat them. Western manufacturers and the Ukrainian military, on the contrary, analyze interception data in order to improve the software and predictive algorithms of defense systems. This invisible "data war" is just as important as the missiles and radars themselves.
It is pointless to say that the Patriot complexes have failed or are outdated (and pro-Russian sources like to write about this). Perhaps the effectiveness of the Patriot is lower than before, but it is very likely that with sufficient ammunition, these complexes remain highly effective.
It is also a mistake to consider Patriot as a kind of magic shield that is one hundred percent capable of protecting anything anywhere. This is an advanced weapon, but its capabilities have their limits. Besides, it's very expensive. And Ukraine's experience shows that a determined and resourceful opponent, who also has numerical superiority, is able to find a way to break through the defense.
Analyzing the events in Ukraine in recent months, we can come to the following obvious conclusion. The problems in Ukraine's defense are primarily related not to technological quality, but to quantity. More batteries and more missiles are needed to effectively defend the country. However, there is no need to expect a fundamental improvement in the situation, since both are not enough. Thus, Ukraine will simply have to withstand the Russian pressure and come up with other ways to minimize the damage.
The main lesson that the rest of Europe and the entire West should learn from the Ukrainian experience is that even the best defense systems will always have gaps. And their improvement is always subject to the so-called law of diminishing profits. That is, over time, improvement will become prohibitively expensive, and each subsequent percentage of efficiency will cost astronomical sums, while the aggressor can find cheaper and more flexible ways.
The example of Ukraine shows that to limit oneself only to defense is to put oneself at an extreme disadvantage. A truly effective defense strategy is hardly possible without a powerful deterrent element, that is, the ability to inflict comparable or even greater damage to a potential aggressor "in return." The threat of a painful response, say in the form of a sufficient number of its own long-range missiles, can deter an aggressor better than the most effective defense.
