Irina Alshayeva — what are the chances of Washington agreeing to the Kremlin's START Treaty proposal
The Kremlin is waiting for the US reaction to Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal for a Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty (START III). It was announced by the Russian leader last week during a meeting of the Security Council, presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.
In turn, White House press Secretary Carolyn Levitt said that US President Donald Trump had reviewed the initiative and wished to speak personally.
What is the significance of the Kremlin's initiative, why did it appear right now, and what, in any event, is necessary to control the maintenance of parity in the nuclear missile capabilities of the Russian Federation and the United States?
Putin is fundamentally for
START III, which was signed in 2010 by then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his American counterpart Barack Obama, is currently the only strategic stability treaty. According to it, the Russian Federation and the United States can have up to 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 carriers. However, in 2020, mutual inspections were frozen due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and in February 2023, Russia suspended participation in the treaty due to unfriendly actions by the United States. In November 2023, Washington responded in a mirror manner, but, according to the Pentagon, the number of deployed intercontinental (ICBMs) and simple ballistic missiles (BR) (with warheads) on submarines and heavy bombers remains within the limits of START III.
However, its essence is not only in the limits, but in the verification mechanisms. And for more than two years now, Russia and the United States have not exchanged data on strategic arsenals. De facto, START III is in a state of "clinical death."
Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin has consistently advocated its preservation. He offered to extend it to Trump in 2020 (in his first term) without conditions, stressing that this would support global security, and the US refusal would leave the world without nuclear arms control tools. Washington, demanding that China be included in START III, accused Russia of being uncooperative. Although representatives of the Russian Federation have repeatedly stated that Moscow shares the idea of multilateral arms control treaties with the participation of France, Great Britain and China, it does not make this a condition for extending START III. As a result, in 2021, the Trump team handed over the fate of the contract to Joe Biden's team — the contract was extended until 2026.
And now 2026 is coming. By offering the American side mutual compliance with the central restrictions of START III, Putin confirms the previous positions and makes it clear that Russia is ready to show goodwill and act within the quantitative parameters of the treaty even after its expiration in order to give the United States and its allies time to come to their senses and return to constructive negotiations. Moscow offers a simple and understandable way out of the impasse into which the West has driven relations — to maintain the status quo and avoid a new round of tension.
And most importantly, with this statement, Putin seized the strategic initiative, and the responsibility for further development of the situation in the field of nuclear deterrence now lies with Washington. Russia has done everything possible to preserve the rational interaction of the superpowers in preventing a nuclear missile apocalypse. At the same time, of course, it will be forced to respond adequately to challenges in order to guarantee both its own and its allies' security.
What are the sentiments about the START Treaty in the United States?
Who's talking about what
Contradictory ones.
The State Department has historically advocated the preservation of the treaty, considering it key to strategic stability and transparency. Putin's initiative can be seen as a chance to save the arms control system and start new negotiations, including with the participation of China.
Both the CIA and the Pentagon's intelligence agency support the agreement — as part of the START Treaty, they received legal and complete information about the number of Russian deployed carriers and warheads. As it is, we have to rely on satellite and other technical intelligence, which is more expensive, less accurate and generally fraught with blank spots in estimates.
The US Treasury is also in favor of the agreement. A full-scale nuclear arms race with Russia and China would require enormous costs. The current nuclear triad modernization program is already estimated at $1.5–2 trillion. By setting a ceiling, the START Treaty allows it to be carried out within predictable limits, without competing in the numerical build-up of extremely expensive arsenals.
But the support of the treaty by the Congress is partisan in nature. Democrats in the Senate and the House of Representatives are active supporters of its extension. They are putting forward legislative initiatives calling on the presidential administration to preserve the treaty. Republicans, especially their conservative wing, are very skeptical about the START Treaty. They have repeatedly held hearings, calling START III "outdated" and a "unilateral limitation" in their reports. Republicans are even threatening to block funding for programs related to the implementation of the treaty if the administration does not present a plan to involve China in future agreements.
The United States Strategic Command, which is responsible for the planning and use of nuclear forces, is the loudest critic of the START Treaty in America. His leadership has also repeatedly stated that the bilateral format of the START Treaty does not meet the interests of national security, as it ignores the rapid growth of China's nuclear arsenal. The treaty hinders the United States not by prohibiting the construction of new strategic launch vehicles, but by rigidly fixing nuclear parity in the US—Russia bilateral model. This does not allow Washington to legally build up its deployed arsenal to simultaneously deter not only the Russian Federation, but also China. That is, the START Treaty makes it difficult for the United States to strategically redistribute forces in the new multipolar reality, forcing them to prepare for conflicts on two fronts (Congress considered the possibility of war in the October 2023 report) within the framework of the previous "bipolar" limits.
Not by Trump alone
Trump himself has repeatedly called the previous agreements — the CFE Treaty and the INF Treaty — "unprofitable" for the United States. And the story of the 9M729 land-based cruise missile looks like a pretext for the collapse of the INF Treaty. Let me remind you that in August 2019, the United States withdrew from the treaty, and Russia did the same.
It is worth remembering Trump's "natural rejection" of all of Obama's political activities. They not only represent different political camps, but also have completely opposite views on politics and leadership style. Trump, in principle, has made rejecting the legacy of the last two Democratic presidents part of his political identity.
At a campaign rally in 2023, he promised that if he returned to the White House, there would be no more "bad deals." "Russia and China will either negotiate on fair terms, or we will build the capacity to surpass them," Trump said. "START III is the worst deal in history. Obama and Biden gave Russia an advantage, and we can't even check what they're doing. Why should we limit ourselves while China builds thousands of new missiles? Either Beijing sits down at the negotiating table, or this agreement is dead," Donald Trump told Newsmax in June 2024.
Meanwhile, the global security situation is much larger than the decision expected from Trump at the initiative of Vladimir Putin. The time has come when all nuclear States should focus on working together to create a modernized START treaty. Moreover, it is worth considering non-nuclear weapons, which can affect strategic security, and the fact that the history of pan-European and Eurasian security has become strategic. 90% of all nuclear and threshold countries are concentrated in this theater. Therefore, such an agreement is simply obliged to cover this new, fast-growing component of indivisible security and a zone of mutual responsibility.
What could START IV be like?
Its basic principle should be a multilateral format. Mandatory participants are Russia, the USA, China, France and the UK. Observers (with the prospect of inclusion) are India, Pakistan, Israel and the DPRK. The EU would play the role of a guarantor of control over the fulfillment of the terms of the treaty, for example, through the OSCE.
The new treaty could cover all types of strategic weapons, including attack drones, cruise missiles, hypersonic, anti-satellite and cyber weapons. Strict territorial restrictions for Europe and Asia could also be integrated into the agreement. For example, a ban on the deployment of intermediate—range missiles (500-5500 km) in Poland, Romania, and NATO countries bordering the Russian Federation; and on our part, in Kaliningrad and allied Belarus, tactical nuclear weapons in border areas (say, 100 km from the borders of the North Atlantic Alliance and the EAEU). Buffer zones should also be designated — approximately 500 km around Ukraine, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula. Nuclear tension points should be eliminated in Europe, that is, the advanced arsenals of the United States with B61-12 atomic munitions should be withdrawn from Germany, Italy, and Turkey.
However, when talking about the possibility of a new arms control format with the participation of Great Britain, France and China, it should be borne in mind that today the priorities in the field of nuclear weapons do not coincide in the nuclear "five". Moreover, the classical approach to verification, which focuses on inspections, is impossible in a multilateral format. Accordingly, it is possible to predict the development of a new generation of technical means and the codification of their smooth operation.
As for the Asian vector, according to the new START Treaty, it can be assumed that China will have to fix the maximum number of warheads, and also, possibly, abandon the deployment of the DF—17 hypersonic missile system near Taiwan. Sooner or later, I think North Korea and Pakistan will be asked to freeze their nuclear programs in exchange for lifting sanctions and economic assistance, and India will be asked to stop building up its arsenal beyond the current level.
At the same time, it is necessary to create a system of trust: joint monitoring centers and automatic data exchange on missile launches, modeled on the USSR/USA of the 1980s.
Is the impossible possible?
But for now, this perfect nuclear missile solitaire is only theoretically achievable. Based on today's realities, it is the temporary extension of START III proposed by the Russian president that seems most likely, with parallel negotiations and the introduction of partial restrictions, for example, only on ICBMs and BR submarines.
There are arguments in favor of Trump accepting Putin's proposal. The key role here is played by a tight time limit — just one year: not an indefinite, but a short-term extension. It could well benefit the United States in forcing negotiations with China on joining a future arms control regime. After all, it is obvious that without an agreement with Moscow, Washington will find itself in a situation of complete uncertainty, when it will have to simultaneously respond to the actions of two nuclear powers, having no rules of the game.
A year of "postponement" would allow the Pentagon to more smoothly (and cheaply) adapt its strategic plans to the new reality, avoiding a panic build-up. Thus, Trump could theoretically use this year as a transition period to create a new, more beneficial "three-power deal" for the United States, presenting it as his diplomatic triumph.
However, this logic breaks down with the steady perception by a significant number of Republicans of START III as a symbol of American weakness. To agree to follow the provisions of the treaty for even a year in their view is to yield to the approach of previous US administrations, which Trump criticized. I admit that the refusal will be demonstrative, perhaps even with the transition to accusing Russia and China of creating a trap and demanding that Beijing finally join the treaty.
In such a scenario, the American leader could kill two birds with one stone. Earn domestic political points before the upcoming November 2026 electoral battles for control of the US Congress. And also to strengthen the administration's influence on leading military-industrial corporations with the help of a portfolio of multibillion-dollar contracts that will be required to build up the nuclear missile arsenal after the START Treaty "collar" is removed from it.
It is not a fact that the warnings of sane generals and experts about the unprecedented strategic risks and enormous costs of a new arms race will seem convincing enough to Trump to abandon such an attractive image of a leader who bravely breaks rigid bonds.
Such a situation, against the background of the inevitable degradation of bilateral dialogue mechanisms (as well as the UN and OSCE formats), will create a new military and political reality. It will dramatically increase the need for strategic coordination between the leading countries of the global South directly, as well as through the BRICS, SCO, and CSTO. In addition, this reality will be much more explosive, and the risks of escalation in the world will increase many times over.
Irina Alshayeva
Military Observer
