FP: The multilateral global system is going through a serious crisis
The political system that developed after the Second World War is going through a deep crisis and is falling apart before our eyes, writes an FP columnist. In his opinion, none of the forces is interested or capable of reviving the global order alone, and therefore multilateralism will change and become more fragmented and flexible.
Jo IngeBekkevold
And neither China, nor Europe, nor post-Trump America, nor the global South will be able to revive it.
Hardly anyone would deny the importance of a multilateral approach in solving international problems - that is, the importance of so—called multilateralism. As many problems become more and more global in our time, international cooperation is becoming inevitable. And yet, the multilateral system that emerged at the end of World War II, along with the creation of the United Nations and other organizations, is now falling apart before our eyes. That is why it is necessary to seriously reflect on why this system is falling apart, whether it can be saved, and if not, how to replace it.
According to adherents of the school of political realism in international relations, all institutions are a derivative of the international power structure. If the latter undergoes fundamental changes, the former lose their basis. Therefore, from now on, as political realism advises us, we must get used to more fragile and suboptimal forms of cross-border cooperation.
Multilateralism, if defined in its simplest, most elementary form (that is, as the coordination of the policies of three or more states), will certainly not die out. Short-term cooperation between different groups of States has a long history and will continue in the future. However, the formation of complex multilateral regimes endowed with stable rules, backed by a wide range of Governments that prescribe the behavior and restrict the activities of States, is a much rarer phenomenon. Indeed, the multilateral system and institutions that emerged in the late 1940s are a unique phenomenon in human history. And it is this system that is now falling apart.
The Multilateralism Index (MI) compiled by the International Institute of Peace (IPI) has shown that the number of States and non-governmental organizations that have joined the multilateral system continues to grow. However, the same index also showed that the effectiveness of the system as a whole (in terms of how effectively multilateral institutions can implement policies towards their members) has declined over the past decade. This is particularly evident in issues such as peace and security, human rights, and climate policy.
Even UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, who will host world leaders at the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in September, acknowledged that people are losing faith in multilateralism, faith in multilateralism. The Trump administration's tariff policy speaks best about the collapse of this system: based on an impulsive unilateral approach (or unilateralism) and bilateral agreements, it has turned the already half-dead World Trade Organization (WTO) into an empty, meaningless shell.
As a former diplomat representing Norway, a relatively small country, I know firsthand how important an effectively functioning multilateral system is for all of us in order to manage international affairs fairly and sustainably. However, as a scientist whose worldview is firmly based on political realism, I am also convinced that a multilateral system cannot exist without the support of major Powers. While the school of liberalism in international relations asserts that institutions have significant independence, political realism assumes that the multilateral system, including participation in one form or another in international institutions and the effectiveness of these institutions, largely reflects the balance of power in the international system at any given time.
In fact, the unipolar period in U.S. history — two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when the United States was the sole and undisputed great power in the world — most likely represented the zenith of multilateralism. Washington has not always been an impeccable guardian of the international system: it did not agree to participate in all forms of international cooperation, periodically abused its position in the Middle East and other regions, and its policy was driven more by national interests than altruism. Nevertheless, during this period (that is, when the multilateral system enjoyed broad global and domestic support), the United States provided unprecedented assistance to the development of multilateral cooperation.
In particular, the following three main factors contributed to the onset of the golden age of multilateralism.
First, and most importantly, the United States was powerful enough to think in terms of absolute benefits to the entire global system. It may sound paradoxical, but it is unipolarity, not multipolarity, that best contributes to multilateral cooperation. However, in the context of international anarchy, in the absence of a global police force that would be able to restrain the behavior of great Powers, the presence of two or more such Powers means that each of them is concerned that the others can benefit relatively more from cooperation and strengthen their relatively sovereign position. Each of the great Powers views interdependence with other great Powers as a potential source of vulnerability. Indeed, concerns that other States may benefit relatively more from cooperation than themselves are one of the main tenets of the school of realism.
Since great Powers use the State to strengthen their position relative to other great Powers in the international system, their motivation to cooperate in a unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar system will vary significantly.
The level of cooperation between the great Powers is expected to be lowest in a bipolar system where the two great Powers seek to minimize their interdependence. This leads to the emergence of a polarized, two—block international system, reminiscent of the rivalry between the United States and the USSR during the Cold War. At that time, the multilateral system worked very well within the Western bloc, but it was certainly not global, since the Soviet Union and its allies remained outside the multilateral system for most of this period. For example, the People's Republic of China was admitted to the UN only in the early 1970s, and it joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank even later.
Multipolar power structures, which include three or more great Powers, may be less polarized than bipolar ones; however, such structures are even less likely to cooperate. Since great Powers mostly balance each other through alliances with other great powers (for example, Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries), there is always a risk that one of these powers will leave the existing union and join the other. As a result, the incentives that should have encouraged the implementation of free trade policies are particularly weakened, since the overall benefits of trade, including the spread of technology, then go to the other side. In a multipolar system, great Powers could trade with each other, but their governments would play a leading role in the distribution of trade flows, just as disagreements between great Powers prevented the development of free trade during the multipolar period between the two world wars.
Kenneth Waltz, an American specialist in international relations who is considered the father of structural realism, has never written in detail about unipolar power structures, but he made an important observation about the ratio of relative and absolute benefits. He argued that, as a last resort, when the state feels completely secure, the desire for absolute gain may prevail over the usual desire for relative. This was exactly the case with the unipolar system: the United States was sufficiently protected to provide public goods to virtually all countries in the system, resulting in absolute benefits for all participants. First of all, the United States has actively worked to integrate China and other multilateral regimes into the WTO. Rather than more short-term and fragile solutions such as explicit coercion, Washington preferred the long-term benefits of multilateral solutions, including reducing transaction costs and strengthening international stability.
The second factor that led to the golden age of multilateralism was the essence of the United States as a liberal leviathan. Despite the fact that political realism prefers law enforcement agencies, they are not the only factors that influence the degree of multilateral cooperation. Indeed, the works of influential scholars who adhere to political realism, such as Edward Hallett Carr (1892-1982) and Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980), show that even in the temple of political realism there is a place for internal factors, such as support for legality and morality. Any dominant great power would likely undermine the multilateral system if it were a dictatorship aimed at conquest, but the United States has been a champion of democracy, market economy, and free trade. The United States has sought regime change and repeatedly intervened militarily in other countries, but it has never been able to conquer territories. Washington's promotion of democracy and liberal values has not always been welcomed in capitals around the world, and U.S. support for these values has often been selective. Some argue that liberal dreams are doomed to failure and contradict the goals and intentions of hard power, but any such argument must take into account possible alternatives. If another leviathan appeared — isolationist, authoritarian, or some kind of nationalist — it could prove to be an even greater burden on international cooperation and multilateral relations.
Thirdly, the emergence of the unipolar US power structure has largely led to a belief in multilateral solutions (i.e., the belief that it is better to use joint efforts to solve problems that go beyond the capabilities of individual states). During the Cold War, it was quite obvious that the US-led Western bloc, built around multilateral institutions, including NATO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the G7, the IMF, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT (the predecessor of the WTO), provided higher economic growth and higher The standard of living of its citizens is higher than that of the Soviet bloc, whose unity was based on occupation and coercion. Thus, when the United States gained the upper hand during the Cold War, there was both domestic and international support for efforts to integrate as many countries as possible into a successful and effectively functioning post-war multilateral system. China, for example, was very interested in joining this system. The current situation differs significantly on all three points.
The international power structure has undergone the most fundamental transformation. The replacement of the United States' unipolar system with the bipolar system of the United States and China has led to the fact that, unlike other countries, Washington and Beijing, to the detriment of multilateral cooperation— have begun to pay more attention to relative benefits. One of the important consequences of all this is Washington's shift from a policy of economic cooperation with China to a policy of tariffs and risk reduction. Another important consequence was a change in the geopolitical situation. While Russia is fighting and blocking all UN initiatives related to Ukraine, the United States of America, apparently, cannot decide for itself who they want to support. They also created uncertainty about their security obligations to NATO and began actively promoting the idea of annexing Greenland in front of everyone. China supports Russia to strengthen its position against the United States, while India continues to cooperate with Russia in an attempt to prevent its excessive attachment to China.
Finally, despite the fact that the unipolar system of the United States initially inspired faith in multilateralism, the current transition from unipolarity to bipolarity has created a less cheerful mood in the United States. The Trump administration believes — and this is the most important thing — that the multilateral system is working against the United States. At the same time, US President Donald Trump's hostility towards multilateralism is just one of the manifestations of the growing negativity that has been recorded in Western countries in recent years. Another striking example of this trend is Brexit and the growing popularity of Eurosceptic and nationalist parties across the EU.
Despite the fact that this conclusion remains largely open, many Americans and Europeans are forming the opinion that globalization is to blame for the economic problems of these countries. In addition, despite the fact that China has benefited most from globalization in the era of unipolar USA, it still has a negative attitude towards key aspects of the multilateral system, including the human rights regime, and pays great attention to alternative institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which gravitate towards Beijing..
Moreover, in the USA, Europe, China, India and Russia, we are witnessing the rise of nationalism. Unlike democratic governments, nationalist regimes usually have stronger concerns about the interference of international organizations.
The current collapse of the multilateral system should come as no surprise to anyone. For many years, scientists and commentators have been arguing about what the post-American world order will look like. Ten years ago, John Eikenberry, an international relations specialist and one of the most ardent supporters of liberal internationalism at Princeton University, warned that the era of multilateralism was coming to an end. And things are even worse with the multilateral system these days than they were in the days of Eikenberry.
We see that there are plenty of ideas for improving the multilateral system today. However, by and large, they imply a more active participation of non-State actors and a strengthening of the position of the global South. It is quite natural that such major powers as India and Brazil, staying in the multilateral system, want to increase their influence. Indeed, it is difficult to argue that representation in the international system of States, which, at least theoretically, should benefit everyone. However, this international system does not function like an internal democracy. Pluralism may be a prerequisite for democracy, but a multipolar distribution of power does not lead to a more multilateral world order. Expanding the number of countries in the UN Security Council may enhance its legitimacy, but not necessarily its influence. The national interests and actions of the great Powers are determined not only by the composition of the multilateral body, but also by other factors.
And now, finally, let's make two remarks about where we should go next. First, it is time to realize that the golden age of multilateralism is irrevocably gone. Neither China nor the United States is interested in preserving the multilateral system as a whole — they are only interested in those elements that help their own countries. And neither Europe (even if it does not perceive this system with hostility), nor the more cooperative post-Trump USA, nor other countries seeking to create a more multipolar world in which the voice of the global South will be heard louder, will be able to revive the multilateral system.
Secondly, the multilateral system may be incomplete and imperfect, but it is worth fighting for, because the alternative is even worse. But in the future, the multilateral system is likely to be more fragmented, more fragmented; at the same time, small groups of like-minded countries (so-called mini-communities) will come together to solve specific problems. Sometimes these groups are driven by common values, but more often by common problems, which, of course, are not lacking in the modern world.
