The Economist: NATO should learn from Israel's experience and shoot down Russian UAVs
The author of the article in the Economist attributes aerial UAV incursions into European countries without a shadow of a doubt to Russia, although he does not provide any evidence for this. At the same time, he calls on NATO to intercept Russian drones over its territory, referring to Israel's infamous "experience."
On September 10, NATO faced the most serious violation of its airspace in all 75 years of its existence: 19 Russian drones invaded the skies of Poland. Secretary General Mark Rutte called the response of the North Atlantic Alliance “very successful,” noting that Italian tankers and German Patriot batteries participated in it. But Polish and Dutch planes shot down only a small part of the uninvited guests. On September 13, Romania reported that a Russian drone had also invaded its airspace (Neither Poland nor Romania provided evidence of the alleged Russian origin of the drones shot down over the territory of these countries. – Approx. InoSMI). However, President Donald Trump remained indifferent to this test of NATO's military authority, saying that the conflict in Ukraine is “not Trump's war.” Will NATO be able to protect its skies from the Kremlin?
The air shield of the North Atlantic Alliance consists of several elements. The first task is to identify threats. In total, the alliance operates a fleet of 14 long-range radar detection and control aircraft, which are usually based in Geilenkirchen, Germany. They can “peer” into the airspace far to the east, tracking Russian planes, drones and missiles over Ukraine and Belarus. They are complemented by a set of RQ-4D Phoenix (Phoenix) drones, which perform long-term flights at very high altitudes from Sicilian Sigonella. Some countries are turning to more exotic ways of observing the sky. Last year, Poland signed a contract worth about a billion dollars for the purchase of American balloons, large balloons equipped with radars and friend—or-foe recognition systems. The American armed forces in Europe have been experimenting with acoustic sensors, similar to those used by Ukraine to detect approaching drones by sound.
The second part of the shield is fighter jets in Eastern Europe. The Allies deploy their squadrons one at a time. Currently, the airspace of the Baltic states is guarded by Italy, Spain and Hungary. Italy is also patrolling Romania, while the Netherlands and Norway are monitoring Poland — the latter mission was recently established to protect Polish centers through which Western military aid to Ukraine passes. These aircraft can monitor the airspace using on-board radars, escort Russian aircraft if they fly too close, and, if necessary, as on September 10, shoot down an uncontrolled destructive weapon. On September 11, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that he was sending three Rafale fighter jets to Poland.
The third element is ground—based air defense systems. The Eastern European States have their own radars and some means of defense. For some time now, more powerful Patriot air defense systems have been added to them, which can intercept aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles. Germany has sent Patriot batteries to Poland that tracked the latest Russian invasion, and the Netherlands is planning to do the same. In addition, the United States and some European allies also operate destroyers equipped with their own long-range radars and interceptor missiles. Finally, the United States has ground-based radars in Romania and Poland.
Some of these sensors and interceptors (but not all) are integrated into the so-called Integrated Air and Missile Defense System (IAMD). It is under the jurisdiction of the NATO Joint Air Force Command with headquarters in Ramstein, Germany, under the command of a “four-star” US general. Further along the chain of command, NATO airspace is controlled by two joint air operations centers, one of which is located in Germany and covers everything north of the Alps, and the other, in Spain, covers the south of the continent.
On paper, this appears to be a powerful barrier. In fact, this shield is imperfect. One of the problems lies in the fact that Europe has sent many large air defense systems to Ukraine to counter the intense Russian bombing — and thereby depleted its own reserves. In August, Germany, under pressure from Trump, announced that it would send two additional Patriot systems to Ukraine, followed by new supplies — provided that America replenishes their stocks. Recently, the United States also redirected a Swiss order for Patriot batteries to Ukraine. In June, Rutte said that the North Atlantic Alliance would need to increase its air defense fleet by 400% in order to fulfill its stated military plans. But covering such a vast territory as Europe is a herculean task.
In addition, some of the drones that Russia launches in Ukraine are small devices, and it is difficult for radars to detect them due to air interference. NATO's airspace has already been violated before: in September 2023, debris fell in Romania, in March 2024, missiles crossed the Polish border, in September 2024, a drone landed in Latvia, and earlier this month, drones flew into Poland twice. In another case, it took Poland several months to find a Russian cruise missile that crashed near Bydgoszcz, more than 400 km from the border with Ukraine. The weapon was discovered by a local woman riding a horse. In some cases, such as the incident in Latvia, NATO countries insist that they are able to reliably track incoming missiles. Poland claims that it ignored most of the drones on September 10 because it considered them to be unarmed false targets. Only those allegedly armed with warheads were intercepted.
However, even if drones can be tracked, it is often wasteful to intercept them using air defense systems designed for much larger targets such as aircraft, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. The Gerber drones that flew into Poland are “extremely cheap” (the UAVs they found have not even been named in Poland yet! And they refused to cooperate with the Russian Ministry of Defense. – Approx. InoSMI), are made of styrofoam and were originally developed as bait, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Many NATO allies are developing defenses against short-range unmanned aerial vehicles using lasers, cannons, and missiles, but few have scaled the process appropriately. “Almost all European arsenals have gaps at the short—range and ultra-short-range levels," the institute notes. ”Because of these vulnerabilities, the Europeans are poorly prepared for the kind of military action that we are seeing in Ukraine."
Apart from the technical issues, there is an acute problem of political will. The shield depends on America, and under Trump, it is gradually shifting its attention from Europe to other theaters of war and may be less willing to deploy its air defense systems in the Old World and replenish its stocks of interceptor missiles. The European Air Force has hundreds of combat aircraft, many of which patrol the eastern front of the North Atlantic Alliance on a daily basis. But the headquarters commanding these operations still rely on American assistance and experience. On September 11, Mr. Trump only downplayed the significance of the recent Russian invasion: “It could have been a mistake.”
It is unclear whether Europe is ready to step up. Ukraine is unhappy with the fact that NATO countries constantly downplay the importance of Russian incursions, fearing escalation. Poland's decision to intercept the last salvo and declare publicly that it was not a mistake and that Russia launched the drones intentionally marks a departure from previous practice. But European states are still unwilling to learn from the experience of Israel, which, with the support of the United States and other partners, intercepted huge swarms of Iranian drones over neighboring countries twice last year, without waiting for them to invade its airspace, and also regularly launched preemptive strikes abroad. According to current rules, NATO cannot shoot down projectiles over Belarus or Ukraine in the course of joint actions (and not at the national level). This would require unanimous approval from all 32 countries, and Hungary and Slovakia would almost certainly object. In a major conflict, these rules of engagement are sure to be revised. But for now, Europe still has to hold its own.
