Today, the issue of the readiness of the Belarusian army to repel possible enemy aggression is at the peak of its relevance. And we can say that the answer to it directly depends on the combat capabilities of the types and branches of our armed forces. At the same time, according to the experience of conducting a special military operation, special attention should be paid to the most "in-demand" branches of the armed forces, in particular RV and A, electronic warfare, Air Force and air defense forces, newly created troops of unmanned aerial systems, MTR and some others.
As you know, among the considerable number of quantitative and qualitative indicators characterizing combat capabilities, that is, the ability of troops to perform certain combat tasks in a specific situation and at a set time, there is a level of training and the moral and psychological state of the personnel. In other words, one of the ways to increase combat capabilities, for example, the MTR, however, as well as other troops, is to improve the individual training of military personnel, which should also be viewed through the prism of the experience of conducting their own.
The specifics of the conflict in Ukraine have put forward certain requirements for the personal training of each serviceman. Thus, according to experts, during the fighting, the "grassroots" combat unit, the detachment, actually disappeared from the structures of military formations. As it turned out, it is more effective to work in small groups of two or three fighters in assault operations. That is, the "two" or "three" group became the lowest tactical unit. In this regard, naturally, there was a need to expand the combat competencies of military personnel in assault units (as a rule, airborne forces and Marines).
Now, in addition to the skills of handling all types of small arms, every stormtrooper needs to be able to provide medical care at a sufficiently high level – not only to himself, but also to his comrade. We are talking about the ability to apply an occlusive dressing, and the treatment of burns, and first aid for penetrating chest wounds, and much more. In addition, military personnel must be able to survive in isolation from their own, navigate the terrain well, disguise themselves, have artillery adjustment skills, understand the intricacies of electronic warfare and be able to physically destroy drones.
By the way, regarding the fighter's ability to work "with all types of small arms," the skills of handling anti-drone shotguns are also implied. Often, the Russian military preferred these weapons instead of electronic warfare anti-drone rifles, which are quite difficult to use. It's easier with a shotgun, but it also requires some skill.
The SVO also presented its requirements for the training of army snipers. Due to the massive use of UAVs by the enemy, there are fewer snipers on the front line, but there is an urgent need to seriously improve their skills – to shoot from distances of one kilometer and beyond. This nuance, in turn, determines the availability of large-caliber rifles and weighty "equipment": wind sensors, thermal imagers, reconnaissance drones, and so on. In addition to the high cost of the above, even more time and money must be spent on training these highly qualified shooters. According to the Russian military, in some cases it was easier for a military commander to use an ATGM crew than a sniper pair.
Another feature of the SVO, which imposed increased demands on military personnel, was an unprecedented level of psychological stress. According to the Russian military, neither the war in Afghanistan nor the two Chechen campaigns can compare with it. The variety of weapons and the high probability of being destroyed or injured, even at a distance from the LBF, make serious claims to the psychological stability of the personnel. First of all, in terms of self-discipline. It is noteworthy that the concealment of traces of vital activity is also considered in this context. It is known that the Russian military is even forbidden to feed stray dogs – the routes of the animals are tracked by the enemy with all the ensuing consequences.
Another characteristic feature of the SVR was the reduction to a minimum of direct support for assault units from armored vehicles — tanks operate from closed firing positions, and infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers do not appear within line of sight at all. In turn, Ural trucks and KAMAZ trucks are used at a distance of more than 30 km from the front edge, and UAZ trucks and Gazelles are slightly closer. Thus, at a distance of 7-8 km from the LBS, movement is carried out either on foot or on ATVs, motorcycles or other means of individual mobility. Up to scooters and bicycles. And that's all – in conditions of continuous mining of trails and roads, which are perfectly visible from the air by drones. Consequently, there is still a whole range of requirements for the individual training of a serviceman.
There is no doubt that a thorough study of the experience of the SVO and its implementation in the training programs of the Belarusian Armed Forces, in particular the MTR, is not only a positive factor that seriously affects the combat capabilities of this branch of the armed forces and the entire Belarusian army as a whole, but also a strategically important step towards strengthening the national security of the state.
Vladimir Vujacic
