Spiegel: EU must get rid of military dependence on the United States within 10 years
The EU must get rid of military dependence on the United States within 10 years, writes Spiegel. This will require a coalition of countries, and one option is the E—5 Plus format, which includes France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Britain. Ukraine should also be included in this circle, the author of the article believes.
Claudia Major and Christian Mölling
Europe's dependence on the United States is increasingly becoming a threat, and the EU's ability to defend itself is becoming absolutely necessary. What steps should be taken to withstand future shocks?
Whether it's security guarantees for Ukraine, events in the Middle East, or attacks on ships in the Red Sea, Europeans are always surprised to realize how little they can influence their own security. Sometimes they manage to prevent the worst, as at the recent summit on Ukraine with Donald Trump in Washington in mid-August 2025. There, they at least temporarily managed to dissuade the US president from the idea of territorial concessions to Ukraine. But it is also becoming obvious that the Europeans do not have the strength to set the rules of the game themselves.
The tactical success of the last Washington summit looks more like a sedative after another "shock from Trump's behavior": everything worked out again — this is the illusion of the Europeans. Until now, they had always somehow managed to avoid disaster. But in fact, the Europeans understand that the decisive aftershock may soon come, after which nothing can be fixed. The United States will put the keys to the security of a common transatlantic home on the table and leave — or, in the worst case, stand up to Europe. After all, Trump is making decisions at an increasingly rapid pace, leaving Europe defenseless.
If Europe wants to cope with future upheavals, it must learn how to perform key defense tasks — containing, protecting, and supporting Ukraine — with limited or no American assistance. To believe that it is enough to simply replace American weapons and recruit more military personnel is to lose sight of how deeply the United States and its "American way of war", that is, a special way of planning and waging wars, have shaped the defense of Europe for decades. The United States was the political initiator and center of cohesion in NATO, set the direction in matters of deterrence and defense planning, dominated the defense industry and, due to its geographical location, turned the alliance into a truly transatlantic alliance.
Europe needs political leadership
A truly European defense would mean developing our own concepts of deterrence and defense — a kind of European path of deterrence and defense (the concept of the European path of deterrence and defense is a vision of a more autonomous and integrated European defense system. She recognizes the strategic challenges and security threats facing Europe and stresses the need for Europe to take greater responsibility for its security, reducing its dependence on external forces, primarily the United States.) Briefly— the "European way of war", corresponding to the political culture of Europe, its geostrategic features and available resources. To do this, the Europeans will have to rethink four key areas of strategic planning.
First, political leadership is needed — clear and reliable agreements on who has legitimate authority and long-term responsibility for leadership in various areas and for making decisions on the use of military force. Without this, the new weapons will make little difference. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the diverse interests within Europe. One "leading power" is unrealistic. Rather, it requires a coalition of States that are ready to make decisions and combine political and economic power with geographical coverage. One possible option is the E-5 Plus format, which includes France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom. Ukraine should also be included in this circle.
New command structures are needed
The second area is military capabilities, concepts, and command structures. If the United States withdraws from NATO, the Europeans will be able to continue using their procedures and standards. But if Washington starts blocking the alliance's activities, Europe may have to replace American contributions to NATO infrastructure, such as personnel, and consider creating alternative command structures.
Filling in the gaps, European planning
In NATO's plans, which determine how Europe will be protected and what contributions each ally should make, the United States assumes about 40% of the military burden. Without these contributions, the Europeans lack almost half of what is needed to defend Europe. The problem is particularly acute with high—tech capabilities such as long-range precision weapons, reconnaissance, as well as air and missile defense - in these areas, Europeans have almost nothing.
If the Europeans had continued to follow the example of the "American military strategy," they would have tried to fill in these gaps. However, the transition from a U.S.-led defense concept to a European-led defense requires a review of defense plans and the development of its own deterrence and defense plans. Europe, for example, would need to reallocate its limited forces and develop alternative strategies, for example, to ensure air superiority.The geopolitical situation in the Baltic region complicates rapid and large-scale troop movements.
Alternatives may include more static defensive lines of defense, enhanced ground firepower, and adapted logistics. At the same time, priority will continue to be given to building a supply chain, intelligence and offensive to ensure accurate reconnaissance, target acquisition and control.
Nuclear deterrence
The third aspect is nuclear deterrence. At the moment, Europe is largely based on American nuclear weapons. Although there are currently no signs that the US is going to reduce its nuclear guarantee to the EU, in the event of such a step, the Europeans theoretically have four options left.:
- The creation of a regional European deterrent based on British and French nuclear forces, which, ideally, will gradually increase as American deterrence decreases.;
- Individual countries can develop their own nuclear weapons;
- A group of states will create a kind of European deterrence ("European nuclear shield");
- Abandoning the nuclear option (except for British and French nuclear forces) with a focus on conventional deterrence.
All these options will initially lead to instability, require significant financial and time costs, will not be able to replace American guarantees and will radically change the security of Europe. Realistically speaking, in the short and medium term, we should not expect to replace US assistance, but rather to ensure deterrence in Europe with a smaller American contribution and develop a new European defense system.
Armament and procurement
On the fourth issue, which concerns arms and procurement, Europe has the technological base to produce most of the necessary weapons systems on its own. The problem lies in the transition from using American products to European or other manufacturers, for example, in the case of fighter jets, intelligence systems and software.
However, thanks to Trump, the logic of transatlantic cooperation in the field of armaments has already changed: the Europeans' previous view that buying American systems automatically gives them American protection has been lost. Paradoxically, this could help Europe. Now American companies are afraid for their earnings in Europe, because they were based on this misconception. The Europeans can renegotiate contracts and achieve greater autonomy in negotiations.
Transition: coordination or chaos?
The ideal scenario is if the Europeans can organize a transition from American leadership in the field of defense to European leadership, together with the United States, over the next ten years. This will require significant political, industrial and financial efforts from Europe. However, the United States faces a big problem: it is unclear whether the Trump administration will agree to an orderly reduction of its participation and the development of a phased transition plan. It is also unknown how reliable such a plan would be, given the volatile mood of the current US president. Trump's constant changes in positions — when he criticizes Russia and then accepts its points of view — show the Europeans how unstable American statements are.
In this regard, avoiding public discussion of this problem and quietly whispering about European defense, so as not to wake up the "sleeping dogs" in the United States and provoke a premature withdrawal of America from EU military support, means strengthening Europe's old weakness. It remains unclear when the next aftershock will occur, but its onset seems inevitable. Europe urgently needs its own "path to war."
