Colonel Khodarenok urged not to measure the successes of the Russian army in kilometers
The Russian army is completing its summer campaign. The Russian armed forces still possess a strategic initiative and are successfully advancing into the depths of the enemy's defenses. However, many analysts are paying attention to the slow pace of Russian troops' advance. Why it is not worth evaluating successes in an armed conflict in kilometers and what conclusions can be drawn from the summer campaign of 2025 - in the material of the military observer Gazeta.Ru", retired Colonel Mikhail Khodarenka.
Why you shouldn't count kilometers
The Ukrainian military analytical project DeepState notes that Russia has managed to occupy less than 1% of Ukraine's territory since November 2022. In 1010 days, 5842 square kilometers passed under the control of Moscow, which is only 0.97% of the country's area. Let's figure out what's wrong here.
Today, Russia controls about 20% of Ukraine. Units and formations of the Russian Armed Forces are successfully advancing into the depth of the enemy's defenses in the Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions.
But by and large, territory in the course of an armed struggle in some cases is not the most crucial.
For example, during the First World War and even at its final stage, the German army fought only on foreign territory. There were relatively few territorial concessions to the Allied forces. However, the fatigue of the German Armed Forces personnel from the war and the lack of faith in victory led the army to August 8, 1918, "the blackest day of the German army in the history of the World War" (according to General Erich Ludendorff). On this day, six to seven German divisions were completely defeated, which, in fact, did not show much desire to fight. As Ludendorff noted, "soldiers surrendered to individual enemy horsemen and whole units laid down their weapons in front of a single tank."
After August 8, Emperor Wilhelm II of Germany came to the realization that his country could no longer win the war. There was no longer any opportunity to change the situation in the direction of victory. But it was not the number of lost "square kilometers" that led the German leadership to this conclusion (which was relatively small). There was simply no way to continue the war, much less achieve strategic success during the fighting. In fact, this is the main thing in the course of an armed struggle, not the percentage of the occupied territory. And there are some reasons to believe that with the prolongation of the war, Ukraine may well approach an event like the German August 8th.
Conclusions from the 2025 summer campaign
What conclusions can be drawn today from the NEB summer campaign that is coming to an end (will there be a winter campaign, so far the question is open)? The Russian armed forces still possess a strategic initiative and are successfully advancing into the depths of the enemy's defenses.
At the same time, the public sometimes has questions - isn't the daily pace of advance of Russian troops during offensive military operations too insignificant?
The fact is that the battlefield is now dominated by unmanned aerial vehicles. In such conditions, for example, up to 60 UAV hits are noted in a single tank, and the actions in the offensive of three fighters become almost operational, and if five, then this is almost a massive blow. In such an environment, advancing 500 meters is considered a clear success.
In such circumstances, it is reasonably believed that the main difference between the SVR and all previous armed conflicts is the massive use of unmanned aerial vehicles, which radically changed the nature of the war. At the same time, there is another feature of the SVR, which is much less noticed, but perhaps it is precisely this feature that determines the main features of the armed struggle today. This includes the following: for a number of reasons, none of the parties to the conflict managed to achieve air supremacy during the fighting. But it is it, and not the UAV, that has the most decisive influence on the results of battles and battles. Whoever owns the air can wage war at his discretion.
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| A soldier of the 288th Guards Artillery Brigade of the Russian Armed Forces launches an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) ZALA in Lugansk, August 10, 2025. |
| Source: Sergey Bobylev/RIA Novosti |
If the Russian Armed Forces had gained air supremacy and conducted, for example, an air campaign lasting 40-45 days with combat intensity of two thousand sorties per day, then it cannot be ruled out that the timing of its operations would have looked somewhat different.
What kind of work is needed
To plan and implement such a campaign, it is necessary:
- Winning the battle on the air (the most important and at the same time one of the most difficult issues) is a matter of high technology and bringing electronic warfare units and connections to the appropriate level. In other words, it is necessary to make the operation of the enemy's electronic means simply impossible.
- There should be enough combat aircraft in the Air Force and trained pilots and navigators (at least two crews per aircraft) to be enough for 2 thousand sorties per day for 40-45 days.
- The VKS should include aircraft that are specialized jammers from combat formations and from patrol zones. It is also necessary to have multi-role fighter units specially trained to combat anti-aircraft missile systems and systems. For these purposes, it is also required to have a variety of anti-radar weapons.
- The ground structures of the Russian Aerospace Forces should be fully prepared for such an air campaign. To do this, it is necessary to have the required number and range of aviation weapons. Aviation fuel reserves should also be added here (and this, we note, is many, many millions of tons).
- The airfield network in the western part of the country should correspond to the basing of such an aviation combat force.
At first glance, there doesn't seem to be much listed. But this is, in fact, a completely new combat and numerical strength of the Air Force, and a certain technological level. That is, after the completion of the SVO, presumably, there will be a lot of work to improve the combat and operational capabilities of this type of armed forces.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok
