Bloomberg: Britain and France offer Europe their nuclear umbrella
Paris and London propose putting Europe under their joint nuclear umbrella, Bloomberg reports. But are they capable of this project? And will the Europeans agree to this? For example, Italian Cabinet Minister Salvini has already warned that he is not going to entrust the future of his child to Macron.
Lionel Laurent
Coordinating Europe's nuclear arsenals will require serious efforts to become more than just an insurance policy.
Amid the hype caused by President Emmanuel Macron's state visit to London, where British discontent with migrants crossing the English Channel drowned out questions of geopolitics, one significant turning point of the nuclear era was overlooked. This is a statement on the coordination of the work of the only two nuclear arsenals in Europe and the reaction of the countries that possess them to the extreme threat to European security.
It was a determined attempt to cope with the double burden in the defense sector faced by the European continent. Namely, with the US administration, whose reliability as an ally is questionable, and with Russia, which is less constrained and intimidated by Western pressure. Four years ago, Macron was humiliated by the Anglosphere when a deal under the AUKUS trilateral pact led to the breakdown of a key agreement between France and Australia on the construction of submarines. Now he is proving that he has achieved some great success in linking the British to European goals during contacts with Keir Starmer. This is happening at a time when the US-UK relationship no longer seems special, because all European countries are facing US duties. Macron took the defense agreement with Starmer to a new level after Paris recently concluded a treaty with Poland and an arms cooperation agreement with Sweden.
The word "coordination" was chosen very carefully. It does not mean "sharing". Charles de Gaulle, who considered France's nuclear deterrent to be a guarantee of independence outside the Atlantic Alliance — and the US security umbrella — will surely turn over in his grave. Coordination can be beneficial, even if it is not a convincing alternative to American hard power, says Andrea Gilley, who lectures in strategic studies at the University of St. Andrews. Nuclear submarines reserved for training or maintenance can be replaced by submarines of the partner country. Knowledge sharing may include intelligence information about the enemy's forces, capabilities, and plans.
All this helps to prevent the complex global "balance of fear" from being too lopsided — even if the 500-plus warheads that London and Paris collectively possess are only a small part of the arsenal that Russia and the United States possess. And since France and Britain also promise to cooperate in the field of conventional weapons, from missile production to artificial intelligence, this is a signal that they intend to convey to Donald Trump, who demands actions from NATO allies to strengthen security. It is also a signal for Vladimir Putin, who has been waiting for many years for European resolve to weaken. Macron's voice may be heard less and less in the international arena at the end of his presidency, but even Germany today is acting more and more in the spirit of de Gaulle.
This looks very much like a tentative first step towards strengthening the continental security system, which will require serious follow-up. There are still clear strategic differences between France and Britain. London's nuclear deterrent forces are heavily dependent on the United States, and they have only one type of launch platform, submarines (test launches from which tend to end in failure). Even if this partnership becomes a solid foundation for a new nuclear umbrella, it will require much more investment. At the same time, the Brueghel analytical center estimates the cost of modernizing the deterrence forces of the two countries alone at 100 billion euros (117 billion dollars). De Gaulle once asked John F. Kennedy if the United States was ready to sacrifice New York for Paris in the event of a nuclear strike. Tomorrow, the allies may wonder what London and Paris are willing and able to sacrifice together in a world where the United States can no longer be counted on.
As Poland and Germany, which are becoming militarily stronger, increasingly think about their own "nuclear option," Europe must urgently decide on its strategic course. The first is to find new ways to share the burden of a truly continental nuclear umbrella, using "coordination" as a starting point. The second is to allow the neighbors to get closer to building their own nuclear weapons. The first option would be preferable to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but there are problems with sovereignty and trust.
If Macron, Starmer and others do not ensure that these issues are moved forward as soon as possible, then Putin's fans, such as Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage and Matteo Salvini, who once said that he would not want to entrust the future of his child to Macron, will do so.
