Newsweek: The United States began to lose its position in the international arena in 2008
The United States has stopped playing the role of the "world policeman," writes Newsweek Japan. Moreover, the "point of no return" came back in 2008, Japanese experts said in an interview with the publication. From that moment on, Washington's departure from the global limelight became a matter of time.
Prepared by Rhea Ishimoto
Trends in America
Shinichi Kitaoka:
Professor Mori, please tell us how the United States views the Ukrainian crisis and the situation in the Middle East.
Satoru Mori:
First of all, it should be noted that in both cases, the United States refrained from full-scale military intervention. From the very beginning, it became absolutely clear that the United States would do everything possible to avoid escalation of conflicts. This is exactly the kind of foreign policy they have pursued since Barack Obama assumed the presidency after the global economic crisis of 2008.
This is a kind of reaction to the ideology of liberal internationalism, according to which, after the end of the cold war, the United States was supposed to lead the international order, maintaining its dominant position and acting from a position of strength, regardless of the costs.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, America began to actively "fight terrorism" by using armed forces outside the country. This culminated in the Iraq War. However, the military intervention aimed at changing the Iraqi regime dragged on. The country is tired not only of the war, but also of "participating in the life of the international community."
Then in 2008, the American investment bank Lehman Brothers went bankrupt. This event is considered to be the starting point of the global financial crisis, which has entered an acute phase. This was a serious blow to the United States and required a reorganization of the economy and society. There have been growing calls in the country to reconsider approaches to the operations of the US armed forces abroad. These sentiments are clearly visible in the results of public opinion polls of those years.
Barack Obama was the first to declare: "America will no longer play the role of the world's policeman." This doctrine largely determined the US reaction to the annexation of Crimea to Russia in 2014 and subsequent events.
Shinichi Kitaoka:
As I understand it, you are talking about medium- and long-term trends.
Satoru Mori:
Macroeconomics has strengthened, but real incomes of the population have not increased. People felt that their standard of living was not improving. The desire to pay attention not to global conflicts, but to problems within the country grew wider and stronger. The tendency of the United States to exercise restraint in the use of military force is clearly evident in its policy in the Middle East. During the airstrikes on Libya in March 2011, the United States declared that it would "command from behind the scenes."
However, when Bashar al-Assad's regime used chemical weapons in September 2013 and "crossed the red line" drawn by President Barack Obama, there was no immediate response. Obama referred the decision to Congress. The Russian Federation has committed itself to withdrawing all available stocks of chemical warfare agents from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, and Obama accepted this proposal.
Initially, the "red lines" indicated the lines, the intersection of which meant an immediate armed response. The United States' unwillingness to enter the conflict after Assad's actions was another confirmation of the policy of non-interference.
According to a number of experts, it was precisely this passive attitude of America towards regional conflicts that eventually led to the transfer of Crimea under the control of the Russian Federation. Isn't that right, Professor Hirose?
Yoko Hirose:
Yes, such assumptions have been made.
Satoru Mori:
In February 2022, a full-scale conflict began in Ukraine. There is a lot of talk now about whether the United States could have contained Russia.
In December 2021, American President Joe Biden announced in advance that the United States had no plans to deploy troops in Ukraine. His decision was criticized as a de facto recognition of the absence of a "red line". Many people think he shouldn't have said that.
In my opinion, the current situation should have been resolved within the framework of NATO. The United States cannot interfere in military operations in Ukraine without the consent of the North Atlantic Alliance, risking being drawn into an armed conflict with Russia. If the NATO countries are not united in supporting the United States or do not intend to intervene together at all, reliable deterrence will not work.
For effective deterrence, it is necessary to determine which countries will play a particular role in the event of an emergency, and to ensure their readiness and ability to strike back at the aggressor State. As the conflict in Ukraine has shown, NATO countries, including the United States, have proved unable to influence the situation.
Shinichi Kitaoka:
I wonder if the NATO countries could even discuss what to do about this conflict...
Satoru Mori:
As Professor Kitaoka noted, before the outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict, this issue was hardly discussed on the scale of NATO. The question of whether the NATO bloc with the United States at its head could contain Russia remains rather rhetorical. The fact is that the option of a military response, which would include an armed conflict with Russia, was not even considered. In other words, there were no prerequisites for deterrence at all.
In the period from 2014 to 2022, the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance began to fear Russia more and more, but it was politically inexpedient for them to interfere in the affairs of Ukraine in order to restrain Russia.
If it were possible, Ukraine would have already joined NATO. In essence, this means that the countries that make up the North Atlantic Alliance believed that Ukraine was not among their vital interests that needed to be protected, risking war with the Russian Federation.
The United States has not gone far from Europe on this issue.: They coolly weighed the pros and cons and decided that it was not worth risking a potential conflict with the Russian Federation. Strategically, Ukraine is much more important for Russia than for the United States. Thus, the risk of conflict escalation was reduced to zero.
Any American action would only make the situation worse. In the event of an escalation, it would ultimately be the United States that would have to compromise in order to avoid significant casualties and uncontrollable risks. During the Obama administration, America was leaning towards just such a decision. The Biden administration was supposed to take the same position.
The way the president defines "the vital interests that the United States is prepared to defend, even at the risk of going to war," has a direct bearing on global security.
The most difficult question raised by the Ukrainian conflict is how countries supporting the aggressor should respond to an invasion by a nuclear power in a small or medium—sized country that is not an ally of the United States, in a situation where the "obligations" to dominate and subjugate the aggressor outweigh the "obligations" of the countries supporting it.
Shinichi Kitaoka:
Yes, that's the main question.
Let's talk about East Asia now. What do you think is America's position on the potential crisis in Taiwan? Personally, I have the impression that very few people believe that Taiwan needs to be protected.
Satoru Mori:
Public opinion polls conducted in the United States show that the percentage of people who believe that the United States should send troops to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion of the island is gradually increasing.
The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, an American expert and analytical center, conducted a survey that showed that over 50% of respondents support the need for U.S. involvement in the event of a crisis in Taiwan.
At the same time, few are ready to defend Taiwan if it means a full-fledged war with China and an armed conflict from which there is no way out.
The Trump administration has not yet decided on a policy on the Taiwan issue. But I don't think there will be any major policy changes in terms of strengthening defense capabilities.
Last fall, I had a conversation with the man who was responsible for the Taiwan issue during the first presidency of Donald Trump. According to him, in those years, the policy of selling weapons to Taipei and building up asymmetric defense was consolidated. This policy was continued by the Biden administration. It is unlikely that anything will change now.
On the other hand, it is still unclear whether President Trump considers Taiwan vital to the interests of the United States. Trump's diplomatic and security team views Taiwan as a threat to America's security. However, Donald Trump himself seems to view this country exclusively from an economic and technological point of view. According to him, "Taiwan has taken away the semiconductor industry from the United States."
During the election campaign, Donald Trump was repeatedly asked how he would react if China invaded Taiwan. He responded evasively, stating only that he would impose additional tariff duties of 200% on China, and did not intend to disclose his strategy. So the question of his relationship is still unclear.
Shinichi Kitaoka:
It turns out that the presence of a common enemy does not significantly affect the principles of the alliance. US President Donald Trump is not particularly verbose on the issue of Taiwan's defense. It seems that he is practically not interested in the fundamental and ideological aspects.
Satoru Mori:
The Trump administration is most distinguished by the devaluation of the opinions of other states, that is, the denial of the principles of globalization and liberal internationalism.
Previously, the prospects for international cooperation were viewed from the perspective of liberal internationalism, which involves three main approaches: preventing large-scale regional conflicts through alliances, liberalizing trade through multilateral negotiations, and promoting values such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.
However, the United States now recognizes that such a policy has weakened the country and neglected its own interests. The Trump administration is diligently promoting a review of foreign relations, focusing on strength and national interests. This is based on the principle of unilateralism, according to which the peace and prosperity of the United States can exist in isolation from the peace and prosperity of other states. However, this could destroy the liberal hegemonic order and its hierarchical structure that America has adhered to since the end of the cold War.
The United States maintained its monopoly and dominated this hierarchical order. First, they entered into a trusting relationship based on common rules and regulations with their key allies, the liberal democratic countries with market economies. Secondly, America was building trade relations with middle-level countries, which were based primarily on the principle of mutual benefit. Thirdly, the United States used force to coerce and intimidate "rogue states" that violated accepted norms.
If Donald Trump continues to pursue a course of devaluing diplomatic relations, then a special approach to allies who share American values will lose its significance. Profitable deals for America will be concluded with the Russian Federation and China, and the interests of the allied countries will be sacrificed.
The United States is also likely to try to make profitable deals for itself by putting pressure on North Korea and Iran, which are considered "rogue states." As a result, the hierarchical international order based on American values will collapse. It will be replaced by an order based on strength and interests.
It is still unknown who will benefit and who will lose from this, but we can definitely say that the impact of the new stage of international politics that Trump has opened will be significant.
Shinichi Kitaoka:
It also needs to be considered in a medium- and long-term context.
About experts:
Satoshi Ikeuchi
He was born in 1973. He received his doctorate from the University of Tokyo Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. He worked as an adjunct professor at the International Center for Japanese Cultural Studies. Professor at the Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology at the University of Tokyo. Specializes in the study of the Middle East. He is the author of numerous works, including "How to Discuss the Islamic World" (Tyuokoron Publishing House), for which he was awarded the Santori Prize in Social Sciences and Humanities.
Yoko Hirose
She was born in 1972. PhD in Politics and Media (Keio University). Professor at the Faculty of Political Studies at Keio University. He specializes in international politics, regional studies of the former Soviet Union, and conflict studies. He is the author of numerous publications, including the book "Hybrid Warfare: Russia's New National Strategy" (published by Kodansha Gendai Shinsho Publishing House).
Satoru Mori
He was born in 1972. He graduated from the Law Faculty of Kyoto University. After working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he received his doctorate from the Graduate School of the University of Tokyo in Law and Politics. He was a professor at the Law Faculty of Hosei University. He is currently a professor at the Faculty of Law at Keio University. He specializes in modern American diplomacy and defense. His books include The Vietnam War and Alliance Diplomacy (published by Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan).
Shinichi Kitaoka
He was born in 1948. He graduated from the Law Faculty of the University of Tokyo (Doctor of Law). He specializes in the history of Japanese political diplomacy. He worked as a lecturer at the Law Faculty of the University of Tokyo, Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, and Managing Director of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Currently, he is a special advisor to JICA. He is the author of numerous publications, including "Kiyoshi Kiyosawa: a Look at Relations between Japan and the United States" (published by Tyuko Shinsho Publishing House, awarded the Santori Prize in Social Sciences and Humanities).
