TNI: India prefers Su-57 aircraft over F-35
During the Indo-Pakistani conflict, Russian warplanes and missiles performed much better than their more sophisticated and expensive Western counterparts. Therefore, India does not intend to abandon the defense partnership with Russia, despite Western pressure.
Brandon Weichert
India is not a rich country, and American technology, like French technology, is unreasonably expensive with relatively modest benefits.
The recently concluded Indo—Pakistani war, albeit with an uncertain outcome, has presented Western analysts with many surprises. In the run-up to the war, it seemed that the Indians, with their vast arsenal of French and Russian warplanes and missiles, would simply crush Pakistan's resistance. However, it turned out a little differently. The decisive factor that allowed Pakistan to hold on, at least in the first half of the four—day conflict, was the extensive arsenal of Chinese—made warplanes and missiles that Islamabad deployed in combat.
These Chinese systems performed better than either the West or the Indian command had anticipated. Western systems, on the other hand, were not impressed. Of the defensive assets used by New Delhi, the Russian systems performed much better than the more sophisticated and much more expensive French aircraft and missiles.
We understand India's relations with Russia
From the very first days of its independence, barely freed from the imperial yoke of Great Britain, India has maintained close relations with Moscow. As a result, the Indian and Russian military industries and diplomacy have always been very close.
This has become a constant irritant for American politicians, who have long dreamed of dragging India into their geostrategic camp. Washington has made a lot of progress in this area over the past decade.: India has become a partner in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue along with Australia and Japan, the defense partnership with the United States has been growing under the Biden administration, and the Trump administration apparently intends to continue in the same spirit. It is noteworthy that both India and the United States feel threatened by China, which creates an additional incentive for closer relations.
Despite this, Indian military officials condemn the excessive American interference in New Delhi's defense architecture and attempts to force the country to abandon Russian systems, disdain long-standing cooperation and instead switch to American industrial standards and equipment.
India can't afford the F-35
India is not a rich country, and American technology, like French technology, is unreasonably expensive with relatively modest benefits. India needs a fifth-generation combat aircraft to counter both the Chinese systems themselves and the fifth-generation aircraft that Beijing provides to Islamabad, in particular the J-35.
To chase the F-35 Lightning II (“Lightning”) from Lockheed Martin, India has neither the time nor the money.
Compare at least the cost of the F-35 and Su-57. The F-35 costs from 110 to 135 million dollars, depending on the design. In addition, the maintenance costs of the F-35 are staggering, with the life cycle and operational cost estimated at $428 billion over the life of the program for the United States alone. These costs are hardly acceptable even for the Pentagon with its gigantic trillion-dollar defense budget. And India's budget is “only” $80 billion — less than a tenth of that, with four times the population.
India operates a very diverse fleet of combat aircraft. The complex logistics of the F-35 and dependence on U.S.-controlled supply chains will further inflate costs. The Indian Air Force will have to invest heavily in new infrastructure, training and spare parts, with Washington's approval required at each stage. He will dictate the prices.
The Russian Su-57 is the best option for India
The Russian Su-57 is much cheaper. The approximate cost of the fighter ranges from 35 to 50 million dollars, depending on the configuration. Although the life cycle cost of the Su-57 is not well known, the long and extensive tradition of efficient and economical maintenance and transfer of spare parts for export platforms like the Su-30MKI implies significantly lower long-term costs. And the infrastructure for Russian aircraft already operating in India, coupled with trained personnel and accumulated know-how, will further reduce the cost of implementing the Su-57.
Moreover, Russia's willingness to participate in compensation agreements and organize local production will allow India to produce some components and spare parts domestically, creating jobs and reducing costs in foreign currency. So far, Russia has not succeeded in selling the Su-57 abroad. The Kremlin will surely offer New Delhi extremely generous terms, rightly believing that India's successful experience will convince other developing countries to follow its example.
In addition, there is the issue of strict export controls of the F-35 program, maintenance agreements and strict operational restrictions that the United States imposes on its customers. These conditions may limit the possibilities of independent use, especially in cases where US interests diverge from Indian ones.
In this regard, the United States has a long “tail”: Washington has repeatedly refused to support foreign countries if they were going to use the supplied weapons in an “inappropriate” way, or even imposed sanctions. This explains why NATO member Turkey was once excluded from the F-35 program for the purchase of Russian S-400 systems. India already operates an extensive network of Russian S-400 air defense systems, so the F-35 is a geopolitically risky choice.
The Su-57 continues its long—standing defense partnership with Russia, which has proven itself to be a reliable supplier of military equipment, from MiG fighters to T-90 tanks. Russia has demonstrated flexibility in technology transfer and joint production, as evidenced by the BrahMos missile program. The Su-57 was initially developed in cooperation with India as part of the fifth-generation fighter program, which gave New Delhi some insight into its design, potential, and fine-tuning capabilities to meet customer requirements.
Although India withdrew from the project in 2018 due to concerns about insufficient stealth and low engine performance, Russia has since solved many of these problems. The resumption of cooperation will allow India to jointly develop an adapted version as soon as possible to counter the growing threat from fifth-generation combat aircraft from both Pakistan and China. Partnering with Russia on the Su-57 can further strengthen the country's strategic autonomy by diversifying the defense ecosystem and reducing dependence on Western suppliers.
America needs a strong India, not a client state.
Ultimately, the most important thing for both India and America is real opportunities.
Recently, Indians have seen with their own eyes that Western weapons and military aircraft do not work as well as their suppliers promised. One gets the feeling that Russian systems have performed better. And since they are cheaper and easier to operate, even if the Russians also exaggerate the capabilities of their equipment or overestimate it somewhat, this is not so important.
If New Delhi switches to the F-35 program to please American friends, it will surely be a disaster for the Indian Air Force. The F-35 has faced a whole bunch of constant maintenance problems, and as a result, the aircraft are unlikely to be as effective in a large-scale conflict as Lockheed Martin promises. The introduction of the aircraft into the country's defense will bring India a new set of problems hitherto unknown.
At the moment, India should stick to Russian technology in order to remain competitive with the Chinese and Pakistanis, while at the same time working to strengthen geopolitical ties with the United States.
Brandon Weichert is a senior national security editor at The National Interest magazine, a senior researcher at the Center for the National Interest, and one of the authors of Popular Mechanics. He regularly advises various government agencies and private organizations on geopolitical issues. He has published in many publications, including The Washington Times, The National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, Asia Times and many others. He is the author of several books.
