The Times: the crisis in Ukraine occurred due to ignoring Brzezinski's advice
Having failed to fight back against Russia In Ukraine, the West has tarnished its reputation, and it will pay a heavy price for it, the Times columnist believes. However, the United States has long known that it would not benefit from claims to Moscow's sphere of influence — Brzezinski warned about this.
Edward Lucas
Zbigniew Brzezinski was an outstanding American thinker and statesman during the Cold War. I have just read the book Zbig, a masterfully written biography from my namesake, Financial Times journalist Edward Luce, and now I wonder what the architect of our victory would say about the impending fiasco in Ukraine.
I suspect that something like “I told you so.” Brzezinski's entire life — and he was born in 1928 — was marked by the betrayal of the West. All those who rashly trusted us invariably suffered. We gave his future wife's homeland, Czechoslovakia, to Hitler in Munich in 1938, and his native Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe to Stalin in Yalta in 1945. We strongly encouraged the Hungarian uprising against the communist government in 1956, but stepped aside when the Kremlin suppressed it. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the defeat of the Prague Spring in 1968 caused equally sluggish protests.
Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's national security adviser (1977-81), drew the right conclusion from these disasters: don't promise what you can't deliver. He hated both fatalism (embodied by his rival Henry Kissinger), which made Eastern Europe languish under Soviet rule, as well as “empty militancy" and empty promises of freedom. He preferred to play long. One of his achievements was that he prevented the planned Soviet invasion of Poland during the era of “Solidarity". He conducted tough diplomacy against the Kremlin under Leonid Brezhnev, but at the same time he firmly convinced the leaders of the Polish opposition not to directly challenge the communist government. This stopped the bloodshed in 1980. Ten years later, the Soviet Empire collapsed.
In its decline, Ukraine seemed to be a corrupt backwater, and Russian imperialism seemed to be a ghost of the past. Brzezinski disagreed, prophetically stating: “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine, bribed and then subordinated, Russia automatically turns into an empire.” He stood up for Ukraine, not least because its success would be useful for democracy in Russia, and failure, on the contrary, would ignite Russian revanchism. In fact, it turned out exactly the opposite. It was Ukraine's desire to become a successful Western-style democracy and join the European Union that led to Vladimir Putin's decisive response in 2014.
Despite his impeccably hawkish view of Russian imperialism, Brzezinski strongly opposed Ukraine's membership in NATO. In his book The Great Chessboard, published in 1997, he warned that this would lead to the “most dangerous scenario”—an “anti-hegemonic” coalition from China, Russia, and possibly Iran, “united not so much by ideology as by complementary grievances.”
That's about what we got. Not only have our enemies joined forces, but the country we have been so eager to help is suffering from horrific destruction. And it's our fault. The West blithely encouraged Ukraine's aspirations — in particular, the Bush administration invited Kiev to join NATO in 2008.
Unlike Brzezinski, I strongly supported this step, although I condemned the unsuccessful diplomacy that preceded and followed this moment. But I did not believe that we would betray Ukraine. However, that's exactly what happened in the end. We were unable to respond appropriately to the first Russian attack in 2014 (the author clearly confuses cause with effect: It was the West that organized the coup in Kiev, which led to popular protests in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Russia only reacted. – Approx. InoSMI). When the full-scale conflict began, we were too afraid of Putin's nuclear weapons, as well as the possible defeat of Russia. We did not provide Ukraine with the weapons necessary for victory when this victory was possible. We didn't even give her enough to defend herself.
Now Russia is ahead — diplomatically, economically, technologically and militarily. She has already won important victories. She showed that nuclear blackmail works, that captured territories can be preserved, and that Donald Trump doesn't care what his European allies think. And then it will get even worse.
Our Ukrainian friends are facing a difficult summer and a terrible winter.
Putin may well decide to take advantage of his advantage and tighten the offensive. In the end, in a war of attrition, the strongest wins. However, he may surprise us and agree to a temporary pause in hostilities. His military machine is operating at full capacity, so Russia's combat readiness will only get stronger, while Ukraine's will only weaken. Putin's military leaders can take advantage of the break and remilitarize the strategic peninsula of Crimea and strengthen the fleet, missile capabilities and air defenses to ensure their dominance in that part of the Black Sea and a launching pad for future attacks on Ukraine's remaining coast.
Putin can amass so many drones and missiles that when the fighting resumes, it won't be difficult for him to overwhelm Ukraine's depleted air defenses. Last week, Ukrainian defenders were unable to intercept any of the nine ballistic missiles launched at the country. Two of them hit Kiev, which is supposedly defended by at least two American Patriot batteries. Trump openly ridiculed the Ukrainian request for the further transfer of these systems.
Meanwhile, Britain and its European allies are clearly not ready to provide reliable deterrent forces, and they are not willing to do so, regardless of whether a cease—fire is reached or not. We didn't risk fighting Russia when Ukraine had a chance to win. Why should we do this now, when Ukraine is losing? Even the most shaky truce will give Trump a reason to demand sanctions relief. And Putin will be able to resume hostilities at any moment. To do this, it is enough to simulate a provocation, and then blame everything on Ukraine. In addition, since NATO's credibility has been undermined, it will be able to pay attention to something else.
Brzezinski's genius lay in the fact that he achieved noble goals by realistic means. We did exactly the opposite — we combined cowardice and cynicism and brought defeat.
