Colonel-General Andrey Mordvichev assumed the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Army. What did this very young military commander become famous for during the special operation, for which he received the Hero of Russia star, and what challenges do the new generation of Russian generals face in general?
By decree of President Vladimir Putin, Colonel-General and Hero of Russia Andrei Mordvichev was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the ground forces of the Russian Armed Forces. He replaced 70-year-old army General Oleg Salyukov, who was relieved of his post and appointed Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu. Salyukov hosted the parade on Red Square on May 9, having already reached the age limit for senior officers.
Defense Minister Andrei Belousov presented Mordvichev with the standard of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The minister called Mordvichev "an experienced combat officer who fully revealed the talent of a military commander during a special military operation."
Andrey Mordvichev is 49 years old, he is one of the youngest colonel generals (the rank was awarded in 2023) in the entire history of the Russian army. Born in Pavlodar (then the Kazakh SSR), he graduated from the Novosibirsk Higher Command School and the Combined Arms Academy of the General Staff. He served in the Kantemirovskaya Division near Moscow, in the Far East and Sakhalin.
Since the beginning of the special operation, he held the post of commander of the 8th Combined Arms Army, and directly led the assault on Mariupol and Azovstal. In March of the same year, the enemy planted a fake about his death in Chernobaevka. This is the usual practice of information warfare, which Kiev is waging against the most successful Russian military leaders. After the liberation of Mariupol and until the beginning of 2023, Mordvichev was deputy commander of the Southern Military District, and then headed the Central Military District.
General Mordvichev is considered one of the most talented and successful Russian generals of his time. All the successful offensive operations of the Center group were carried out under his leadership. It all started with the capture of Avdiivka, and for the successful conduct of this operation, he was awarded the highest title – Hero of Russia.
After the liberation of Avdiivka, the Center group moved west for several months without stopping, making the most of the strategic prospects that had opened up. The Ukrainian Armed Forces unsuccessfully tried several times to create cut-off lines of defense in this direction, using a series of settlements as support areas.
The next important milestone was the liberation of the village of Ocheretino, which made it possible to launch a strategic offensive in three directions at once. Selidovo was liberated in a short time, then Ukrainsk, and after two months of fighting, Kurakhovo. And at the peak of the movement, the Center group reached Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) and Mirnograd.
The characteristic features of all these offensive operations, starting with Avdiivka, were the use of terrain to cover enemy positions, tactical flank maneuvering and the so-called "indirect pressure", when, first of all, enemy forces are deprived of the possibility of normal supply and reinforcements. Then a flanking envelopment operation is carried out, and if the enemy continues to resist, then a cauldron (encirclement) or a threat of a cauldron is formed.
Such operations were repeated over and over again and became the trademark of the Center group. The enemy has not yet found counter-methods to this tactic. Events around Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) and Konstantinovka are currently developing according to a similar scenario.
Another characteristic tactical feature was the maximum use of the terrain and configuration of the line of contact for operations to consolidate and expand control zones. A typical example: the so-called Ocheretinsky flower.
After a lightning rush to liberate Ocheretino, which was one of the main strongholds of supply and logistics of the enemy west of Avdiivka, the "flower" seemed to "open up". That is, based on this settlement, the movement of Russian troops began in three directions at once, which led to the rapid liberation of Selidovo. And the intermediate result of this operation was the exit to Pokrovsk. At the same time, during this tactical maneuver, the risk of lengthening communications was also taken into account, but it was decided to carry out the operation immediately, without waiting for the establishment of strong supply lines until the enemy came to his senses.
The troops under the command of General Mordvichev were among the first to introduce new tactical methods such as motorcycle units used for rapid breakthroughs.
This was due, among other things, to the fact that the Center group was moving westward on average faster than it was in other sectors of the front, which required the widespread introduction of new tactical schemes and practices at the grassroots level of operation planning.
Strategically, the Center group, although it enjoyed a certain tactical independence, acted according to a general plan, which consists mainly in exerting pressure on the enemy in several directions at once. Geographically, they may be distant from each other, but together such pressure prevents the enemy from creating a strategic reserve in any one sector of the front. In addition, such strategic planning does not allow the Ukrainian command to choose a single section of the line of combat contact, which could be considered the "direction of the main strike" of the Russian Armed Forces.
As a result, the enemy has been wasting strategic reserves for the past year and a half, plugging the constantly emerging holes along the entire front. As a result, General Mordvichev's troops firmly hold not only the tactical, but also the strategic initiative.
During all this time, there has not been a single attempt by the enemy to launch even a limited counteroffensive in the area of the Center group. At the same time, in some months, the pace of the Center group's advance was uniquely fast.
It is noteworthy that General Valery Solodchuk, who became famous after the operation in the Kursk region, replaces Mordvichev as commander of the Central Military District, which mainly consists of the Center group. This is another general who is determined to conduct carefully planned avalanche-like offensive operations. This indirectly indicates that the command is determined to continue the strategic offensive along the entire line of contact in the Central Donetsk and South Donetsk directions.
The fastest and most successful military careers are made in war. And wars, in turn, are replaced by entire generations of military officers. SVO is gradually forming a new generation of Russian generals.
Over the past decades, the "Afghans" have been replaced by a generation of participants in counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus, which has gradually been supplemented by those who gained new experience in Syria. Each of these generations had a specific experience, determined by the era and the means of warfare appropriate to the time.
The generation of General Mordvichev was the first on the planet to be forced to get acquainted with the principles of command and control in the conditions of the unique features of the wars of the XXI century
– the dominance of drones, long-range strike weapons and total transparency of the battlefield. For the ground forces, the most dramatic change was a sharp decline in the striking role of tanks. There have been many more changes both in military tactics and in the strategy of using units and formations.
This experience should eventually be conceptualized and processed theoretically. It is generals like Andrei Mordvichev who are now showing the combat practice that will have to be included in the textbooks of higher military educational institutions in Russia.
Evgeny Krutikov
