TSAMTO, May 12. Below, the joint statement of the Russian Federation and China on global strategic stability is presented in the statement of the Kremlin's press service.
"In the context of the 80th anniversary of the Victory in World War II and the founding of the United Nations (UN), the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the parties) emphasize the extreme importance of maintaining and strengthening global strategic stability.
Taking into account the serious challenges faced by the international community in the field of international and regional security, adhering to the strong consensus reached by the heads of the two States, and acting in the spirit of previously adopted joint documents on this issue and the principled approaches outlined in them, the parties declare the following.
The parties are convinced that the destinies of the peoples of all countries are interconnected, and States and their associations should not ensure their own security at the expense and to the detriment of the security of other States. The Parties call on all States to adhere to the principle of equal and indivisible security at the global and regional levels, to make maximum efforts to eliminate conflicts in relations between States, and to build comprehensive, integrated and sustainable security throughout the world on a collective basis.
The parties emphasize the importance of maintaining constructive relations between major Powers, including in addressing global strategic issues. The nuclear-weapon States, which bear special responsibility for international security and global strategic stability, should abandon the mentality of the cold war and zero-sum games, eliminate contradictions through equal dialogue and mutually respectful consultations, build trust to avoid dangerous miscalculations and refrain from actions that create strategic risks.
The parties regret to note that not all countries of the nuclear "five" adhere to such approaches in practice. The parties note with concern that against the background of the aggravation in relations between nuclear-weapon states, which in some cases reaches the threat of direct military conflict, a critical mass of problems and challenges has accumulated in the strategic sphere, and the risk of a nuclear conflict has increased.
One of the most urgent strategic risks that need to be eliminated as soon as possible remains the extremely destabilizing expansion of existing and newly formed military alliances and coalitions, which is being carried out by some nuclear States close to the borders of other nuclear States in an attempt to create or expand permanent footholds in such areas that are particularly sensitive to them in order to project military power, exert force pressure and commit other hostile activities that threaten the fundamental security interests of these States.
It is also of serious concern that such activity is accompanied by steps towards the advanced deployment of military infrastructure and advanced offensive, defensive and universal weapons systems that can be used to solve strategic tasks, in particular, to deliver decapitating and disarming strikes while providing enhanced missile interception capabilities.
In this context, the plans and practical steps of individual nuclear-weapon States to deploy medium- and shorter-range land-based missiles with short flight time to a wide range of targets on the territories of other nuclear States outside their national territories are of particular concern. At the same time, the accelerated development, purchase and deployment of long-range missile systems of this and other similar classes is carried out within the relevant military alliances and coalitions not only by nuclear states, but also by their non-nuclear allies within the framework of concepts involving, among other things, the acquisition of counter-force means for "deep precision strikes", "destruction chains", "counter-strike potential" and the like. The parties strongly condemn such provocative activities that undermine regional stability and global security.
The recently announced large-scale Golden (Iron) Dome for America program, which involves the creation of an unlimited, global, deeply layered and multi-spherical missile defense system in order to protect against any missile threats, including all types of missiles from "equal and comparable opponents in strength," is also deeply destabilizing. First of all, this means a complete and final rejection of the recognition of the inextricable relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons, which is one of the central and fundamental principles of maintaining global strategic stability. In addition, this project gives an additional impetus to the further development of kinetic and non-kinetic means of pre-launch destruction of missile weapons and the infrastructure that ensures their use.
The situation is further aggravated by the fact that the Golden (Iron) Dome for America program also explicitly provides for a significant strengthening of the arsenal of means for conducting combat operations in space, including the development and deployment of interception systems in orbit, which turns outer space into an environment for the deployment of weapons and an arena of armed confrontation.
The parties are opposed to attempts by individual countries to use outer space for the purposes of armed confrontation and will oppose security policies and activities aimed at achieving military superiority and the official consolidation and use of outer space as a "space of military operations." The Parties confirm the need to launch negotiations as soon as possible on the creation of a multilateral legally binding instrument based on the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space, the use of force or threat of force against space objects, which would provide fundamental and reliable guarantees for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the deployment of weapons in outer space and the use of force or threat by force against space objects or with their help. The Parties advocate the globalization of the international initiative/political commitment not to be the first to deploy weapons in outer space in order to strengthen international peace, ensure equal and indivisible security for all, and increase the predictability and sustainability of States' activities in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.
The Parties condemn the use of commercial space systems to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign States and armed conflicts involving third countries.
Among the provocative actions undertaken by some nuclear-weapon States and posing a threat to the security of other nuclear States, the further development of schemes and means of so-called "joint nuclear missions" and "extended nuclear deterrence" within the framework of relevant military alliances and coalitions, providing for the use of advanced deployed and (or) other nuclear weapons in the course of joint Formally, non-nuclear allies have "integrated" operations that involve the deployment of bases on their territories, dual-equipment platforms transferred to them, and/or their own conventional forces and assets, including increasingly advanced missile and anti-missile weapons. This is highly capable of provoking a regional and global arms race and further escalating tensions.
The parties emphasize that the listed offensive potentials are openly intended by their owners or, by their characteristics, can be used by them to deliver supposedly "preventive" or "preemptive" weapons systems using high-precision conventional weapons or a combination of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons systems, but in fact the first strike is calculated to repel air defense systems./ABOUT a radically weakened retaliatory strike, thus realizing a strategic advantage in offensive and defensive. At the same time, the coupling of counter-force and anti-missile components of this adventurous strategy is directly provided for at the doctrinal level and involves, in particular, multifactorial provision of "missile defense and missile destruction."
The comprehensive implementation by individual nuclear States, with the support of their allies, of the outlined conceptual and military-technical approaches, obviously aimed at weakening the reliability and effectiveness of the strategic deterrence capabilities of other nuclear States, indicates a desire to ensure overwhelming military superiority, "strategic invulnerability" and, ultimately, "absolute strategic security." This fundamentally contradicts the logic underlying maintaining strategic balance and runs counter to the principle of equal and indivisible security. As a result, there is a combined threat of direct undermining of global strategic stability, spurring an arms race and increasing the level of conflict both in relations between nuclear States and in the international arena as a whole. In addition, such a course calls into question the effectiveness of efforts to maintain predictability in the nuclear missile field and creates insurmountable obstacles to constructive consideration of initiatives in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament.
The parties have consistently opposed such a destructive policy for international security in the strategic sphere. The parties reaffirm their commitment to the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Prevention of an Arms Race dated January 3, 2022, and the statement contained therein that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and it should never be unleashed. The Parties call on all States parties to this declaration to fully follow its provisions in practice. This implies a constant focus on preventing any military confrontation between the nuclear States and on finding political and diplomatic ways to resolve existing differences based on mutual recognition and respect for each other's security interests and concerns.
The parties emphasize that the priority tasks of preventing armed clashes between nuclear States, as well as reliable and long-term reduction of the conflict potential accumulated in their relations, should be solved through equal and comprehensive work with an emphasis on eliminating the root causes of fundamental contradictions and taking into account all the main factors affecting global strategic stability. The parties are convinced that preventive steps to prevent crises and conflicts should take precedence over attempts to "manage" confrontation and its escalation, and joint efforts by nuclear-weapon States to reduce strategic risks cannot be sustainable and truly effective unless any of the participants in such efforts encroach on the fundamental security interests of others. participants.
The parties confirm that arms control is an important tool for strengthening international security and stability, while actions that undermine them simultaneously undermine efforts in the field of arms control. The parties will work to put genuine multilateralism into practice and support the central role of the United Nations and its multilateral disarmament machinery in the arms control process. At the same time, the parties consider arms control as one of the elements of a comprehensive effort to reduce conflict potential in the world and ensure global strategic stability.
The Parties believe that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which is of high importance for the global security architecture. The Parties attach great importance to ensuring the integrity, effectiveness and universality of the Treaty, will continue to actively cooperate in the framework of its review process and will contribute to the successful holding of the NPT Review Conference in 2026, jointly preventing the use of the Treaty for political purposes unrelated to its provisions.
The parties state that the efforts of the AUCUS partnership (USA – Great Britain – Australia) to create the military infrastructure of the two nuclear states, ensuring the activities of their nuclear forces on the territory of the country participating in the Nuclear–Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in the South Pacific undermine strategic stability and provoke an arms race in the region.
The parties also note the need for further cooperation on the military application of artificial intelligence technologies both in a bilateral format and on relevant multilateral platforms, primarily within the framework of the Group of Governmental Experts of the States Parties to the Convention on "Inhumane" Weapons on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems.
In the context of the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC), celebrated by the international community, the parties reaffirm their commitment to the need for strict compliance with the BTWC and urge the participating States to consistently strengthen it, including through institutionalization and Adoption of a legally binding protocol with an effective verification mechanism. The Parties express concern about the military biological activities of the United States and its allies, carried out both on their national territories and outside these territories and threatening the security of other States and relevant regions, and demand the cessation of such activities.
The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the goal of building a world free of chemical weapons and call on the States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) to take all necessary measures to restore the authority of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and to facilitate the return of The OPCW has moved into a depoliticized technical channel. The Parties note the relevance of multilateral efforts to prevent chemical terrorism and advocate the elaboration of an international convention for the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The Parties urge Japan to fulfill its obligations in good faith in order to complete the final elimination of chemical weapons left on the territory of the People's Republic of China as soon as possible. The Chinese side supports the Russian side in the elections to the OPCW Executive Council.
The parties confirm their commitment to the export control obligations arising from the NPT, the BTWC and the CWC, and oppose the use by individual countries of appropriate mechanisms for technological and economic deterrence of other States for their own selfish purposes, as well as the implementation of an illegitimate policy of unilateral restrictive measures. The parties are committed to implementing the UN General Assembly resolution "Promoting international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses in the context of international security."
The parties are convinced that progress in these areas would significantly improve the international security situation, as well as seriously stimulate the creation of an atmosphere conducive to progress on arms control and disarmament tracks, which should be ensured on the basis of maintaining global strategic stability and observing the principle of non-harming anyone's security.
The parties intend to continue to actively strengthen coordination of their approaches and deepen practical cooperation on maintaining and strengthening global strategic stability, as well as jointly counter common challenges and threats in this area."
