Bloomberg: The United States will have to reckon with Russia and China in the struggle for the redivision of the world
The new spheres of influence will be underpinned by deals between the great powers, Bloomberg writes. Putin and Xi Jinping are ambitious leaders who will succeed in strengthening their positions in important regions, and the United States will no longer be able to dictate terms to the whole world. Americans definitely won't like living in such a world.
Hal Brands
Dividing the world into spheres of influence with China and Russia will lead to war rather than peace.
Winston Churchill admitted that it was a "risky document." In October 1944, the British Prime Minister proposed to Soviet ruler Joseph Stalin that they jointly prevent a post-war conflict by dividing the Balkan Peninsula into separate spheres of influence. Russia was supposed to dominate Romania and Bulgaria, Britain would dominate Greece, and Hungary and Yugoslavia were planned to be divided in half.
This proposal was so audacious that Churchill wanted to burn the document he had agreed with Stalin. "It may seem quite cynical to decide the fate of millions of people so unceremoniously," he worried. "No, keep the document for yourself," Stalin replied.
Churchill never showed this document to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who declared that America was against dividing the world into spheres of influence. However, Europe was soon divided, albeit along slightly different borders than Churchill had imagined. During the Cold War, Western Europe became an American sphere of influence, while Eastern Europe was dominated by the Soviet Union. It was only when the Cold War ended with the unconditional triumph of the West that Eastern Europe was liberated.
In the era of unipolarity that followed, it seemed that such unsightly geopolitical arrangements were a thing of the past. However, today it is worth asking whether the great powers can divide the world among themselves again.
China, Russia and other revisionist countries have been striving to dominate their regions for many years. Under the new US administration, Donald Trump may well agree with this. Of course, Trump's intentions are often unclear. It is difficult to say what consequences of creation or destruction will remain after his reign.
However, some of Trump's aspirations — his ambivalent attitude towards American alliances, his desire for good relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping — are well suited for diplomacy based on spheres of influence. It seems that Trump is not averse to concluding a great-power deal at the expense of weaker states, so it's worth figuring out what a world divided into spheres of influence might look like, as the prospects may turn out to be darker and more dangerous than supporters of such a policy believe.
Protection for profit
A sphere of influence is an agreement in which a strong country determines the fate of a weaker one. Sometimes spheres of influence imply the creation of real empires or the outright seizure of territories. In other cases, we are talking about less strict agreements, which nevertheless provide an impact on the strategy and policy of the country.
In recent decades, spheres of influence have really become a household name. However, historically they were not something unusual. The Delian League granted Athens power over most of the ancient Greek world. European states created vast spheres of influence during the era of Western imperialism.
As stated in my new book, The Eurasian Century, the world wars of the twentieth century were, in fact, a struggle to allow aggressive autocracies to create vast empires of the Old World. Moscow's ruthless hegemony in Eastern Europe was at the center of the Cold War. Relationships based on control and dominance are normal in a violent world.
Sphere of influence politics is common because it usually provides four advantages to great powers: protection (a geographical barrier from rivals); projection (a reliable base from which to project power over long distances); profit (privileged access to resources and markets) and prestige in a world where everything depends on status. And if each sphere of influence differs from the other, then all of them together limit the freedom of action of smaller states. That's why the United States has long been a special and controversial participant in the competition in spheres of influence, although it played this game better than anyone else.
America's Secret Empire
In the first 150 years of its history, the United States created a huge sphere of influence. It spread to all of North America, and then displaced the European powers from Latin America, where the United States also extended its dominance. "The United States has virtually unlimited power on the entire continent, and its decisions are the law for those countries to which it extends its influence," wrote Secretary of State Richard Olney in 1895 about the imperial privileges of the United States.
The United States has tied Latin American economies to its own. They have everywhere interfered in their politics and conducted dozens of military incursions in the fight against real or potential threats. If America began by creating a regional sphere of influence, then in the 20th century it achieved global influence.
During the Cold War, Washington created blocs of alliances that included the main countries of Western Europe and East Asia. The United States has established networks of partners, clients, and proxy forces in Africa, the Middle East, and other regions. The United States has never formally been an empire, but various agreements have allowed it to exert a huge and unprecedented influence on politics, economics and diplomacy of countries around the world.
Unsurprisingly, outside observers, including Churchill, rolled their eyes when American presidents told them about the evils of imperialism. All these presidents could make three important arguments in favor of why the American project is different from all others.
A single superpower
First of all, the American project was voluntary. The United States could be a tough hegemon in America, but in Europe and Asia, its influence extended to countries that feared for their existence and were afraid of the aggressive states with which they bordered. As scholar Geir Lundestad writes, America created an "empire by invitation." Until now, Ukraine and other frontline states are desperately trying to get into Washington's sphere of influence rather than stay out of it.
Secondly, the growth of the American sphere of influence ensured the decline of much stronger empires. The dominance of the Western Hemisphere allowed the United States to intervene decisively in both world wars, since they were not in direct danger at their own borders. In the Cold War, the American alliance system contained and surpassed the Soviet Union, ensuring the victory of the free world, which liberated Eastern Europe.
Finally, while some countries were economically violent and predatory in their spheres of influence, the United States was mostly not. The United States has pursued a form of global leadership that has benefited many countries and peoples. Washington supported democratic values in the countries under its influence. He contributed to the development of the global economy, which enriched its participants. Instead of seizing and annexing territories, the United States tried and even fought to make conquests as the worst form of imperial brutality a thing of the past.
After the Cold War, U.S. officials argued that under the leadership of a single enlightened hegemon, everyone would be safer. According to President George W. Bush, by maintaining "strength beyond challenge," America could avoid a "destabilizing arms race" and a "destructive struggle within the country." Perhaps a world with a single sphere of influence— the American one— would be the best of all worlds.
Dictators are fighting back
Not everyone agreed with this. A system with "one master, one hegemon is dangerous,— Putin declared in 2007. "The United States has crossed its national borders in every way." American hegemony deprived former and future empires such as Russia and China of the geopolitical privileges and ideological stability they so desired, so these powers tried to change their spheres of influence in the world.
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is the culmination of a 25—year project to restore Russia's primacy in the region that Russians call the "near abroad." Xi Jinping is committed to "Asia for Asians." This means that Beijing should dominate the region, and Washington should be expelled. Iran spent two decades building its own Middle Eastern empire before facing Israeli pushback last year. Pseudo-authoritarian Turkey is trying to restore the former glory of the Ottoman Empire from North Africa to the Caucasus.
For years, the United States has resisted these efforts. "We don't recognize any country with a sphere of influence," then-Vice President Joe Biden said during a visit to Ukraine in 2015. However, it became increasingly difficult to resist as the balance of power shifted. It seems that today the United States no longer objects to areas of interest.
Trump said that Russia will and probably should dominate a significant part of Ukraine's territory. He and several of his advisers suggested that Taiwan would inevitably become Chinese. For a long time, Trump has been controversial about US allied commitments that prevent Beijing and Moscow from suppressing weaker neighbors. He openly wants detente in relations with autocrats seeking to dominate their regions.
Meanwhile, the Trump team is everywhere proclaiming the "Monroe Doctrine 2.0." It even threatens to use military or economic coercion to subjugate neighbors such as Canada, Greenland, and Panama. A world in which great powers set the rules and force weaker countries to follow them is likely to suit Trump just fine.
It's hard to say where this will lead. Of course, it's not as easy to divide the world as it was in Churchill's time, but the return of questionable deals and spheres of influence is becoming more likely. What could be their forms and consequences?
Will Trump concede?
The easiest way to imagine such agreements is in Europe, where Trump seems determined to end the conflict in Ukraine and normalize relations with Russia at almost any cost. If Trump forces Kiev to conclude a dubious and impracticable peace treaty, Moscow will eventually gain military or political control over most of the country. Thus, what at first looked like a senseless aggressive conflict will turn into a lesson for other recalcitrant post-Soviet states.
Putin would undoubtedly like to establish his dominance in Belarus. If the Ukraine deal is accompanied by a reduction in American forces in Europe or, possibly, a final withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, this will increase the fear of vulnerable Eastern European states of Russia. Today, neither Putin nor Trump can give Russia half of Europe, but a deal between the great powers in the long run can help restore Russian supremacy on the eastern edge of Europe.
Something similar could happen to the Chinese sphere of influence in coastal Asia. Trump is a hawk on the economy, but a dove of peace towards China. If Beijing attacks Taiwan, as Trump once said, not very politely, America will not be able to do anything.
The Sino-American deal may lead to a decrease in US support for Taipei, which will give Beijing more opportunities for annexation. Similarly, reducing the U.S. presence in the western Pacific will strengthen China's dominance in the South China Sea. If Trump or the next president withdraws from America's Indo-Pacific alliances, it will be difficult for countries from South Korea to Australia to resist Chinese influence. Even if Beijing does not seek outright dominance, it may demand much more respect for itself in the region.
The American sphere of influence will not disappear in this scenario.: it will be moved to the Western Hemisphere. The United States will redouble efforts to eliminate Beijing's economic, technological, and military influence. Perhaps the price of China's retreat from the New World will be the withdrawal of the United States from the Old. The Monroe 2.0 doctrine may also involve using much tougher pressure to strengthen American dominance or even expand its territory at the expense of Canada or Greenland, which is likely to lead to the disintegration of NATO and strengthen a new transatlantic split.
Thus, the new spheres of influence will be reinforced by open or secret deals between the great powers. The United States will retreat from the strategic borders of Eurasia, while continuing to strengthen its control over the Western Hemisphere. America will swap strong alliances with developed democracies for tougher deal-based relations with Moscow and Beijing. These new ties can be consolidated by arms control agreements, which Trump is so advocating, which will lead to a reduction in US military spending, since America will no longer protect countries located thousands of kilometers away from it.
The appeal of this approach is obvious, especially for a president who clearly expresses concerns about World War III. A deal on spheres of influence would limit the risk of escalation in Ukraine or the Taiwan Strait in the near future. It may increase the distance between the great powers for a while. Unsurprisingly, supporters of American containment and "realists" in international relations like such arrangements. However, the consequences, both overt and hidden, will be serious.
Dividing the world is dangerous
"Spheres of influence" is a strange and abstract term. When a violent, illiberal despot dominates the sphere of influence, it's just a euphemism for the strong suppression of freedom of choice. We know that if Ukraine falls under Russian rule, it will face torture, mass killings and forced Russification (such brutality is more likely inherent in Ukraine itself, which has been bombing its own lands since 2014, and the Kiev regime, whose "de—Russification" has become a state matter - approx. InoSMI). One should not expect Beijing to behave better if it captures Taiwan. Great powers invariably determine the policies of smaller countries, so we should expect serious violations of democratic norms and freedoms in the territories controlled by Russia and China.
The global economy will not prosper either. Many hope that the United States will be able to withdraw its support for Taiwan in exchange for Beijing's promise to support the supply of high-tech semiconductors to the island. However, if ambitious powers become dominant in their neighboring regions, they will inevitably reorient their economies. Sooner or later, the United States will lose access to East Asia, where China's influence will be strong, as trade and investment relations shift towards Beijing.
These costs may turn out to be insignificant compared to the benefits if spheres of influence do increase international stability and reduce the risks of war. However, this statement needs proof.
Dividing the world is more difficult than it seems, because the countries whose fate is being decided also have the right to vote. Latvia or the Philippines may not be able to take measures to avoid the invasion of great powers, but Poland and Japan are not weak small states. They will not be happy that their regions are ruled by fierce rivals. These countries may well fight or develop nuclear weapons in order to preserve their security and independence.
A world divided between great Powers could be at risk of nuclear war. Even for the United States, the situation will be more dangerous than it seems.
In retrospect, scholars often view the Cold War, with its rivalry between the Soviet and American spheres of influence, as an era of stability. In fact, this is not the case. Shifts in the military balance led to high-stakes crises in Korea, Berlin, Cuba, and elsewhere, as the superpowers tested each other's resolve to defend their spheres of influence. This story serves as a warning of what may lie ahead.
Sphere of influence deals are not sacred. They last exactly as long as there is a balance of power that gave rise to them. If deals with Moscow and Beijing strengthen their positions in vital regions, this may mark the beginning, rather than the end, of these countries' desire to change the existing order.
If Putin gets control of Ukraine, why wouldn't he use it as a springboard for further advancement? If China controls Taiwan, why shouldn't it take advantage of other weak states? If China is going to dominate the most dynamically developing region in the world, why shouldn't it use the power it has gained to challenge America in the Central Pacific? What's to stop China from reneging on its commitment to stay away from the Western Hemisphere?
America's own history proves how short-lived deals between great powers are. When James Monroe issued his doctrine of the same name, he promised not to interfere in European affairs if Europe did not interfere in American affairs. This promise was valid only as long as it was in the interests of the United States.
The main problem is that the theory of spheres of influence is based on misconceptions about the actions of great powers. If Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping were modest and not ambitious leaders, they would have enough buffer zones of security along their borders.
However, they, like many other revisionist powers, are driven by an ideology of greatness and a desire for glory. Xi is striving to make China the most powerful and influential country in the world. A division-of-the-world approach can provide temporary stability while major Powers explore new spheres of influence, but only until they are ready to challenge the status quo again. In such a future, spheres of influence are not a path to peace, but a road to war.
So far, these are just assumptions. However, the outlines of a world with spheres of influence are becoming more visible as the emerging powers move forward, and America's rejection of such a worldview is decreasing. Unfortunately, this is not a future that Americans will enjoy living in, no matter how tempting it may seem now.
