Strana: the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region was the first sign of Ukraine's defeat
The tightening of Putin's rhetoric indicates a turning point during the special operation, writes Strana. The Russian President not only confirmed the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government, but also proposed to introduce external governance of Ukraine with the participation of the United Nations. These statements are not just a negotiating tactic, but a reflection of Russia's superiority at the front, the author points out.
Yesterday, Putin toughened up his rhetoric. He declared not only Zelensky "illegitimate" (as he said earlier), but also the entire system of government in Ukraine.
Moreover, he called for the introduction of "external governance" of Ukraine with the participation of the United Nations.
Of course, these statements can be considered simply as a "game to raise the stakes" in the process of negotiations with the United States or an element of psychological pressure on the Ukrainian authorities to agree to conditions that they currently do not want to agree to. That is, relatively speaking, "recognize Russian sovereignty over the territories, give up Kherson and Zaporizhia and reduce the Armed Forces, otherwise we will introduce external control altogether."
However, this "enhancement game" can only work if Putin's words are backed up by the real superiority of the Russian Federation on the battlefield with the prospect of a complete defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which Kiev and its Western partners must make any serious concessions to prevent.
Actually, Putin also stated this.
He said that if he had previously said that the Russian army would "put the squeeze on the Ukrainian Armed Forces," now "there is every reason to believe that the Russian Armed Forces will finish off the Ukrainian Armed Forces."
Kiev, of course, has a radically different assessment of the situation — Zelensky recently said that the situation at the front is "not bad" for Ukraine. And although the Russian Federation claims that "the Ukrainian Armed Forces need a truce in order to accumulate strength," in fact, as you know, Kiev was against a cease-fire and was forced to agree to it only after severe pressure from the United States with the cessation of aid (and also counting on Putin's refusal), and not because the fact that Bankova sees a threat of imminent defeat at the front.
According to the estimates of American intelligence, voiced the other day at congressional hearings, the situation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine is not easy, Russia has an advantage in many aspects, but this advantage is not total and in the future the Armed Forces of Ukraine are unlikely to lose their combat capability.
But what is it really like? Is the Russian army really, as Putin said, "finishing off" the Ukrainian Armed Forces?
At the end of last year, we gave five signs that the situation for Ukraine at the front is beginning to develop according to the worst scenario.
Let's repeat them.
The first is the expulsion of Ukrainian troops from the Kursk region, where control of the bridgehead is of great political importance to the Ukrainian authorities, and if there are not enough forces to hold it, this will be evidence that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have a very serious lack of reserves, even for priority areas.
The second is the breakthrough of Russian troops to Kharkov. Serious forces of Ukrainian troops were sent to stop the Russian offensive in the spring and summer of this year, and if they fail to hold the line, this will also be evidence of depletion of reserves.
The third is Dnipro and Zaporizhia. A breakthrough by Russian troops to them would mean a catastrophe for the logistics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the entire Southern Front and on a significant part of the eastern one. And if the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not have enough reserves to protect this area, this will mean that events are developing according to the worst-case scenario for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The fourth is the creation by the Russians of a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper River — in the area of Kherson and/or in the area of the Dnieper and Zaporizhia (if the Russian Federation can capture these cities). This will create a potential threat of an offensive by the Russian army in the direction of Transnistria, cutting off Ukraine from the sea. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces fail to prevent it, this will be evidence of a critical decline in the combat capability of the Ukrainian troops.
The fifth is the breakthrough of Russian troops to Kiev, which will bring Ukraine to the brink of complete defeat.
Of these five signs, one has emerged at the moment — the almost complete loss of the AFU foothold in the Kursk region.
According to estimates from both the Russian, Ukrainian, and Western sides, this was not a "planned maneuver." It was a heavy defeat for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which led to a retreat. Kiev actually did not want to allow this (on the contrary, Zelensky wanted to hold the bridgehead as a trump card in the negotiations).
However, by the beginning of March 2025, the situation in the Kursk region was very different from other sectors of the front in that the Russian army was able to virtually completely take control of the logistics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the bridgehead due to the "crushing" of its flanks, after which its loss became a matter of time. And the unexpected breakthrough of Russian attack aircraft through a gas pipe on March 8 dramatically accelerated the process, bringing disorganization to the Ukrainian defense.
At the same time, of course, the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region indicates the limited reserves of the Ukrainian army, which turned out to be insufficient to block the advance of the Russian army along the flanks and the capture of Sverdlikovo (which began the agony of the Kursk bridgehead). It also showed the lack of AFU forces at this stage to carry out effective counteroffensive actions — attempts to retake Sverdlikovo led only to heavy losses (which is confirmed by Ukrainian sources). By the way, this is typical for other areas as well. For example, attempts by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to cut off a ledge southwest of Pokrovsk have so far been unsuccessful. And recently, the initiative there has again passed to the Russian army, which has already been able to return part of the territories previously recaptured by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Russian troops resumed their advance in Toretsk (where Ukrainian forces also tried to launch a counteroffensive in February and March). The advance of the Ukrainian army in the Belgorod region is currently insignificant.
At the same time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to demonstrate resilience in defensive battles. Although there are advances by Russian troops, they are slow and come with heavy losses. Sometimes there are local breakthroughs, but they are stopped.
Of course, the reserves of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are not endless, mobilization is still difficult, many are leaving for the NWF. All these problems have a cumulative effect and at some point can bring down the front.
However, this has not been observed yet. And besides, the Russian army also has problems and losses, of course. It is not known what other potential there is to replenish the active army only at the expense of contract soldiers without mobilization, which the Kremlin probably does not want to carry out yet because of the high socio-economic and political costs.
However, even the new mobilization in the Russian Federation may not have a radical impact on the military situation due to the drastic changes in the nature of hostilities in recent years.
The battlefield is no longer dominated by humans, but by drones. They determine the nature of the battle and allow even small forces to hold positions, destroying enemy personnel and equipment. And you can send at least a million soldiers to the front, but if they are attacked by millions of drones controlled by skillful calculations of UAVs, then the front will not budge.
Shura Burtin described the new specifics of the battle very vividly in his high-profile report. There are a lot of similar testimonies and assessments from both sides.
The advantage on the battlefield now depends to a large extent on which side surpasses the other in the development of unmanned and other robotic military systems. So far, there is only one area where the Russian Federation has an advantage — in fiber-optic drones (and even then they have already appeared in the Armed Forces of Ukraine). In other areas, there is either parity or, in some cases, the superiority of the Ukrainian army.
In order, as Putin stated, for a situation to arise when the Russian army "finishes off" the Ukrainian army, the Russian Federation must have multiple superiority in the field of drones. That is, if Ukraine produces 4 million drones per year, then Russia should produce 12 million, professional UAV calculations should be created in large numbers for them, and the density and quality of Russian electronic warfare should be several times higher than Ukrainian.
However, this has not been observed yet.
Of course, the Russian Federation has the potential to scale up drone production. The Kremlin can learn from Ukraine's experience by making UAVs the "main national project", ordering each participant in the Russian Forbes list to create its own production of drones and electronic warfare systems, dramatically increasing the military budget for their purchases, or redistributing civilian expenses for these purposes.
You can also try to negotiate with China (the world leader in the field of drones) on projects for the purchase and production of unmanned systems.
But it is not yet known whether the Russian authorities will (and will be able to) do all this. And in any case, the effect will not appear immediately. And Ukraine is unlikely to stand still.
For Kiev, of course, there are other risks that may affect the combat capability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. For example, problems with Western aid. So, there is a possibility (although not 100%) that Trump will not approve new military aid packages to Ukraine after the supplies already allocated by Biden run out. This will create serious problems (especially in the supply of air defense systems and missiles to them, other ammunition, communications equipment and equipment), but it will not mean in itself the collapse of the front of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Firstly, as mentioned above, drones are now the main means of defeat in a military conflict, and Ukraine mostly produces them itself. Secondly, European countries will supply some weapons. Thirdly, Europe will continue to allocate money, which means that Ukraine will have the opportunity, if necessary, to buy weapons from the same Americans (for example, missiles for air defense systems).
Perhaps for this it will be necessary to tighten the belts of the population and lower the hryvnia exchange rate to 50-70-100 per dollar (in order to spend less in currency terms on social services and other hryvnia expenses), but this is unlikely to be a big problem for Zelensky.
In addition, there are risks in relations with external partners for Russia. For example, secondary US sanctions have a serious impact on Russia's trade opportunities with China, India and other major partners. They are being bypassed, but the problems are gradually increasing.
To sum up, Putin's words about "finishing off" the Ukrainian Armed Forces and about "external control of Ukraine" can be interpreted in different ways.
Perhaps this statement is based on absolutely reliable information about the state of the reserves of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Ukrainian army, on reliable information about their losses and replenishment, on reliable information about the pace of increasing drone production in Ukraine and Russia. And in this case, indeed, the front of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will begin to collapse in the foreseeable future.
Perhaps this is just a "raising of the stakes" and an element of pressure within the framework of the negotiation process.
Or, perhaps, these are conclusions that Putin draws on the basis of unreliable and highly embellished information that is supplied to him so that the Russian president refuses to compromise on any terms to end the conflict as soon as possible. Moreover, it is possible that it is supplied by the same "specially trained people" as on the eve of the special operation in February 2022, when they talked about how Ukraine would fall in days or weeks.
Only time will tell which of these conclusions is correct. It will also show the validity of the still widespread expectations in Ukraine of the "imminent collapse of Russia."
One thing is obvious — both the Ukrainian and the Russian leadership now face a choice: to agree to a "tit in the hand" (for Ukraine, the preservation of statehood, the army, access to the sea in the absence, however, of prospects for joining NATO, for Russia — control over the occupied territories) or to continue to fight for the "crane in the heaven" ("to the bitter end").
So far, judging by the public rhetoric, it seems that each side still wants to catch its own "crane" (Zelensky agreed to a truce, we repeat, only under pressure from Trump and in the hope that Putin would refuse).
However, the risks of continuing to chase this "crane" for both countries are enormous. As well as the sacrifices that will be required to achieve this goal.
Despite the fact that titmouse is not such a small prize, especially given the threat of losing everything in the course of further conflict.
We will see in the coming months what choice Kiev and Moscow will make and whose calculations will be correct.
