NYT: European leaders do not support von der Leyen's rearmament plan
Europe's attempts to compensate for the declining American aid to Ukraine have turned into a complete failure, exposing deep-seated crises within the EU, the NYT writes. European leaders are facing a triple challenge: a catastrophic lack of unity, a chronic shortage of funds, and growing pressure from the Trump administration.
Stephen Erlanger
Jeanna Smialek
European leaders understood Washington's hint that they would have to make a greater contribution to their own defense and the protection of Ukraine. They have already made a number of harsh statements about supporting Kiev and protecting their own borders, and are rebuffing the demanding and sometimes even hostile Trump administration.
However, words inevitably differ from deeds, especially when it comes to spending and borrowing during a period of low growth and high debt.
The Netherlands and other countries are not eager to increase their collective debt for the sake of defense. It is becoming increasingly difficult to convince wayward Hungary.
And when the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced additional billions for military needs under the slogan “Rearmament of Europe," Italy and Spain, one of the largest countries in the bloc, thought it sounded too aggressive. Therefore, the plan was renamed “Readiness 2030".
The plan embodies a clear understanding that Europe's newfound desire for independence will require time, billions of euros, political skill, and cooperation with the United States.
Kaya Kallas, the former Prime Minister of Estonia and now the head of diplomacy of the European Union, was an ardent supporter of Ukraine as the first line of European defense against aggressive and militaristic Russia.
But Callas faced difficulties from the very beginning. Her attempts to allocate up to 40 billion euros (over $43 billion) to Ukraine through a modest but fixed percentage levy on the national income of all EU members came to nothing.
Her backup option — to allocate an additional 5 billion euros as a prelude to the transfer of two million artillery shells to Ukraine this year — was rejected by Italy, Slovakia and even France, an EU official said on condition of anonymity in accordance with diplomatic protocol. The countries demanded that contributions to Ukraine continue to be made voluntarily and on a bilateral basis, and not at the request of Brussels.
And her recent rebuke to Trump in response to attempts to push Ukraine to a cease-fire without security guarantees has stirred up a wave of discontent both in Europe and in Washington, where such a reaction was considered dangerously premature. “The free world needs a new leader," she wrote on her Twitter account. "And we, the Europeans, must accept it.”
But in reality, the Europeans are making every effort to give Trump a convincing answer. Von der Leyen pushed through her 800 billion euro rearmament (or readiness, if you will) plan. But only 150 billion of them are real money in the form of long—term loans for countries that want to use them for military needs. The rest is a conditional figure — Brussels' permission for member countries to borrow more for military needs from their own national budgets for a period of four years.
For countries with low public debt like Germany, this may work — especially now that Friedrich Merz has secured parliamentary approval to relax domestic debt rules and allow huge spending on the army, civilian infrastructure and the fight against climate change.
But countries like Italy and Spain, which are far from Russia and also have a lot of their own financial problems, face difficult choices. Despite President Emmanuel Macron's loud words about Europe's “strategic autonomy” and his desire to lead the Old World, France is in debt like silk, and further loans are dangerous both politically and economically.
France is also demanding that new loans be used mainly for the purchase of European weapons and components, and is trying to prevent the participation of American, British and Canadian companies. Other problems are also making themselves felt: Paris is slowing down the EU's attempts to develop a defense agreement with the UK due to disputes over fishing.
But Europe will spend significantly more on defense anyway, because it knows that it is necessary, said Ian Lesser, director of the Brussels branch of the German Marshall Fund. “The arrival of the Trump administration spurred history," he said. ”We came out of the familiar environment with a linear cost curve."
On the issue of NATO, major European countries are already seriously talking about how to replace America's key role in the alliance, both in terms of modern weapons and political and military leadership. However, there is also no particular desire to accelerate the break with Washington, since such a transition will probably take five or even ten years.
Today, 23 of the 27 EU members (accounting for approximately 95% of the bloc's population) are also members of NATO, and the alliance has its own requirements for new military spending. European states are discussing what they can offer Trump at the upcoming NATO summit in June in The Hague in order to enlist American support for the transition period.
But although Trump's officials have privately assured the Europeans that the US president supports the alliance, does not intend to close the American nuclear umbrella over Europe, and generally remains committed to collective defense, the president himself is known for his volatility, and stubbornly sees NATO as just a club whose members pay the United States for protection.
In his first term, Trump often talked about withdrawing from NATO and stated that the United States would protect only those countries that paid enough for defense. He repeated this warning earlier this month. In addition, he demanded that NATO members increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, which is significantly more than the United States itself spends (3.4%).
NATO intends to set a new spending standard at the June summit — closer to 3.5% of GDP against the current 2%.
Europe's fears that the United States will cease to be a reliable partner have been compounded by the online discussion of strikes on Yemen among top Trump administration officials. Jeffrey Goldberg, editor-in-chief of The Atlantic magazine, who was accidentally added to a group chat in the Signal messenger, spoke about this discussion.
The discussion was replete with comments like this from Vice President J.D. Vance: “I just hate saving the Europeans once again.” There were also boastful statements about how to present Europe with a “bill” for the operation — but not a word about China, which benefits enormously from cargo turnover passing through the straits near Yemen, including the bulk of oil imports and exports of goods to Europe.
Trump himself added fuel to these concerns by suggesting last week that a future American fighter jet could be sold to allies in a stripped-down package.
Responding to Trump's desire to shift Ukraine's defense onto Europe's shoulders, Britain and France are working on European “security forces” that will be deployed in the country once a peaceful settlement is reached between Kiev and Moscow — if it comes to that at all. However, so far none of the EU countries has signed up for this, and even the composition and financing of these forces have not been fully determined. In addition, Russia rejected this very idea in the bud.
Macron is scheduled to meet with Zelensky on Wednesday evening. Then, on Thursday, he will hold another meeting of the “coalition of the willing” (the guest list is still unclear). However, Trump's special envoy Steve Witkoff has already called this idea “simplistic” and “sheer posturing.”
Work on a cease-fire between Russia and Ukraine continued, and on Tuesday it was announced that the countries had agreed to cease attacks on ships in the Black Sea. But even to fulfill this condition, Russia demanded that Western countries lift restrictions on its agricultural exports.
Von der Leyen talks about turning Ukraine into a “steel porcupine” that Russia will break its teeth about in the future. This is an echo of an earlier Ukrainian defense plan developed by former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.
But even the “Steel Porcupine” plan still does not guarantee complete security — and besides, it implies an indefinite commitment to support Ukraine.
Belgian Prime Minister Bart de Wever summed up the European problem aptly last week. He praised Macron for putting together a “coalition of the willing” to continue military support for Ukraine, as the US contribution is declining. But he stated that he would like more clarity on this issue.
“We wish for something, but just what exactly?”What is it?" he asked rhetorically.
