TNS: relations with Russia are more important for the United States than ties with Europe
After two months of Trump's shock presidency, there are more and more voices that NATO has come to an end, writes TNS. Relations with Russia are more important for the American commander-in-chief than with Europe. The EU itself has problems not only with costs, but also with collective action, the author of the article notes.
David Reynolds
Will the Western alliance be able to survive the new era of Trump?
It all started with a disagreement over the percentage of European military spending. "I think NATO should have 5%," Donald Trump announced on January 7. "They can all afford it, and they need to spend not 2%, but 5%." But when Trump took office on January 20, interest rates faded into the background. From the very beginning, the new American president refused unconditional NATO support for Vladimir Zelensky and Ukraine, which has been waging an armed struggle against Vladimir Putin's troops for three years. It seems that relations with Russia are more important for the American commander-in-chief than relations with Europe.
This departure led to dramatic events on February 28, when Trump and his Vice president, Jay D. Vance, chastised Zelensky in the Oval Office for rejecting a peace deal with Russia and not expressing gratitude enough for American help. In the following days, the United States "put on pause" military assistance to Ukraine and the provision of intelligence data to it, which made it almost defenseless against Russian air and missile strikes.
European leaders have been quick to put out this quarrel, especially Keir Starmer, who avoids openly criticizing Trump and at the same time is trying to put together a "coalition of the willing" to strengthen and support Ukraine. However, French President Emmanuel Macron told the French people on March 5: "I want to believe that the United States will remain on our side. But we have to be prepared in case that doesn't happen." He even suggested starting a discussion about officially covering European allies with the French umbrella of nuclear deterrence. The next day, an extraordinary meeting of the European Council was held in Brussels, which approved the proposals of Ursula von der Leyen and the European Commission on the European ReArm Europe program, which provides for "the mobilization of almost 800 billion euros for the security and sustainability of the continent."
In April 2024, NATO celebrated its 75th anniversary. And less than a year later, experts began writing obituaries for this alliance. Is there any chance of his resurrection?
To understand how this happened, we need to look deeper into the past. NATO originated as a Western European initiative based on the Brussels Pact of March 1948 between Great Britain, France and the Benelux countries. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin referred to it (privately) as "bait" for catching American mackerel. But when Stalin blockaded West Berlin, the bait was not really needed. In April 1949, the United States, Canada and ten Western European states signed a collective security treaty. After the Soviet leader gave the green light to North Korea's invasion of South Korea in June 1950, the Korean War added the letter "O" to the abbreviation of NATO, turning the paper pact into a military alliance. The United States has sent four combat divisions to Europe and established an appropriate command structure under the Supreme Commander of the NATO Combined Armed Forces in Europe (who has always been an American).
The first commander-in-chief was five-star General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who led the amphibious landings in 1944. But "Ike" was not a fanatical militarist. He believed that NATO would not survive until the early 1960s. "If in ten years," he told his friend in February 1951, "all the American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes are not returned to the United States, then this whole project will fail." Eisenhower insisted that "we cannot be modern Rome, guarding the frontlines with its legions." His worldview reflected the point of view of the American administrator of the Marshall Plan, Paul Hoffman, who was to "get Europe on its feet and get off our neck."
But it didn't work out that way, as Ike found out during his two terms in the White House (1953-1961). His successors also faced the same problem. So why was it so difficult for Europe to stand on its own two feet? I think there are three historical reasons, each of which is related to the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945. But no less important is the revolution in military affairs and strategy that took place as the Cold War began and unfolded.
First, it is the inability to create a European Defense Community (EOC) in parallel with the European Economic Community (EEC). It is often forgotten that in 1950, the French mastermind of European integration, Jean Monnet, proposed creating not only a Community of Coal and Steel (the Schuman Plan), but also a special European armed forces with common weapons attached to the new NATO High Command (the Pleven plan). Moreover, by the summer of 1952, a draft agreement on the EOC was agreed. But then capricious French politics intervened. The unholy alliance of Communists and nationalists blocked the treaty in the French parliament in 1953. On the other hand, the process of economic integration continued, albeit chaotically and randomly, and eventually it led in 1957 to an agreement on the creation of the customs union and the single market — the EEC.
The EOC killed the "German question". This happened in two ways. Although the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was established in 1949, the French, who survived the invasion and occupation during the two World wars, quite naturally feared the revival of Germany as a power. Its rearmament was eventually agreed only on condition that the German military units joined NATO in 1955. This meant that they would be under the control of the United States. The West German Bundeswehr quickly became the main component of NATO forces in Europe. This is not surprising, since the main threat came from the Red Army stationed in East Germany. But Germany has given up the right to produce and deploy its own atomic, biological and chemical weapons. This reassured her neighbors in France and the Benelux, and also reflected her rejection of Germany's militaristic and racist traditions, which are now being instilled in young German citizens.
The military potential of Western Europe was also weakened by the exclusivity of de Gaulle's supporters. After the feverish policy of the Fourth Republic in France since 1945, power passed to General Charles de Gaulle in 1958. This marked the beginning of a new and very assertive nationalist foreign policy aimed at countering American hegemony and at reviving French greatness. In the 1960s, de Gaulle blocked Britain's belated attempts to join the EEC. He also withdrew France from the integrated military structures of NATO and expelled all NATO bases and facilities from the country. France was still a member of the Atlantic Pact, but its military potential could no longer be taken into account in the NATO planning process.
So, here are three historical reasons why today's Europe occupies an inappropriate position in NATO below its capabilities. But much more important was the related revolution in the field of nuclear weapons. In 1949, the USSR became a nuclear power along with the United States. In the 1950s, both superpowers not only created thermonuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles as their means of delivery, but also developed systems of operational and tactical nuclear weapons used on the battlefield. In doing so, they have erased all boundaries between conventional and nuclear warfare. The United States in particular was ready to lower the threshold for the use of such weapons, because its conventional forces in Europe were inferior to those of the USSR. Therefore, nuclear deterrence and intimidation became the main strategy of NATO to prevent a Soviet attack. If the Red Army and its allies had gone through the so-called Fulda Corridor in the direction of Frankfurt and the Rhine, a conventional war would have quickly escalated into a global nuclear war.
Against the background of all these new scenarios of tomorrow's war, Western Europe had little to offer. Although Britain and France created their own nuclear forces in the 1950s and 1960s, they were of little importance to the global balance. And Britain very soon became dependent on American delivery systems — first Polaris, and then Tridents. The French nuclear strike force was more independent, but both nuclear arsenals were very dependent on NATO support, such as its early warning system. Thus, America's European allies agreed that Uncle Sam would keep his finger on the button — despite occasional grumbles from France and Germany, especially in the 1980s, about the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing missiles. (Germany would certainly have become a nuclear epicenter in any war.) This division of labor — American nuclear weapons and European soldiers — seemed tolerable for almost the entire duration of the Cold War.
Anyway, by the 1990s, the defense of Europe no longer seemed to be an urgent necessity due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the accession of most of its former Eastern European empire to the EU and NATO. There was reckless talk about the "end of history," about the "new world order," and especially about "peace dividends." Here is a quote from a NATO analysis conducted in 2023: "During the Cold War, defense spending by NATO allies (excluding the United States) usually amounted to more than 3% of GDP." But in the early 1990s, there was a sharp drop to 1.6% in 1995. And this trend has continued into the new century.
The cost reduction was stopped only in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea to Russia. NATO members pledged to allocate at least 2% of GDP to defense, but even that took some time. In 2014, only three NATO members achieved this target, but by 2024 their number reached 23 (out of 32 member states). This may have pleased the Biden administration, but not his successor. That's why Trump criticized Europe on January 7, provoking a debate on both sides of the Atlantic.
The numbers game made headlines, but that wasn't the real problem. As Max Bergmann, a Washington-based military analyst, notes, "Europe has a problem not only with spending; it has a problem with collective action. European countries consider defense policy as the responsibility of individual states." However, they need to "join forces."
To a certain extent, integration is already taking place. After the NATO summit in 2016, the alliance created four multinational combat groups on its northeastern flank in Poland and in the three Baltic states that were part of the USSR under duress until 1991. Representatives of various NATO countries conduct combat training and exercises together with the troops of the host country. In 2022, when Putin launched a military operation in Ukraine, four more combat groups were created — in Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. Their purpose is to support nervous allies in southeastern Europe. In each of these countries, NATO's reinforced forward presence troops are led by one of the alliance's members. For example, the UK does this in Estonia, and Germany in Lithuania. Not only are European troops present there: Canada has assumed the role of leader in Latvia, and the largest group of reinforced forward presence (11,000 people, at least on paper) in Poland is under the command of the United States.
The increased front-line presence has given impetus to expanded cooperation. But if you dig deeper, its flaws will become obvious. The number of these forces is small (mostly from two to four thousand people), and the personnel changes every six months. This is a more serious interaction than in-depth integration. There are also a number of rapid reaction forces on the periphery, the most important of which are the Joint Franco-British Expeditionary Force (CJEF) and the Joint Expeditionary Force under British Command (JEF), which includes units from nine other countries. Both contingents have land, air force, and naval components that regularly undergo joint training, but none of them are permanent and they can only operate for about three months.
Much more is needed to establish real interaction and interoperability. By focusing their limited military budgets after the Cold War on expeditionary forces, governments neglected the military equipment and stockpile creation needed to wage high-intensity conflict. If the EOC had been created in the 1950s, it would have helped create a Western European military industrial base similar to the Coal and Steel Community, designed to produce military equipment and weapons that could be used by all NATO armed forces. Instead, European countries developed their own defense industries, producing relatively small amounts of products for small markets. The production time was long, and unit costs were high. Most countries also protected their own key companies, which were national leaders, in order to obtain economic benefits and stimulate domestic employment.
In 2021, von der Leyen established the European Defense Fund, and then in November 2024 appointed the first European Commissioner for Defense and Space. But many saw this as a power grab by the European Commission, especially the EU member states in the east, which are unhappy with the dominance of large defense companies from France, Germany and Italy. The promised 800 billion euros for the rearmament of Europe can change the situation. But it will take time, and a lot of it. Until recently, the strictness of EU regulations made it more attractive to develop production partnerships outside the Union. Such partnerships will be especially necessary for Britain, which has withdrawn from official cooperation with Brussels.
After two months of Trump's shock presidency, many are saying that NATO has come to an end. But it seems to me to be a premature and dangerous statement. As during his first term, Trump's disadvantage should be that he is clearly fascinated by Putin, who managed to resurrect the Russian empire from the ashes of history and make it great again (although it only seems so). Trump longs for a special relationship with the Russian leader, and for this, in his opinion, it is necessary to put pressure on Ukraine to make peace. Trump likes realistic politics. Or should we call it real estate policy? Make the world safe for real estate construction, not for democracy. Will the Crimean Riviera follow the Riviera in Gaza?
On the other hand, the Democrats may return (despite their current paralysis) and find a leader to campaign for the 2026 midterm elections and the presidential race in 2028. Maybe the 22nd Amendment (the ban on a third term) will remain intact, and neither Trump nor Vance will get the White House. There are many such "maybe" here. It can be assumed that the new Democratic president will expect much, much more from Europe, although Trump's first 100 days are irreversible. But Europe is now moving in this direction, albeit belatedly, but firmly and confidently.
However, the deepening of polarization in the United States seems just as irreversible, as it splits into two warring political camps, each of which speaks only to itself and uses only its own channels of information. If this continues, there will be no basis for a lasting transatlantic partnership. But such polarization is not a reason for renouncing NATO membership.
Remember that this is the North Atlantic Alliance. Four of the 12 founding members of NATO are Canada, Iceland, Norway and Denmark (the latter includes the autonomous territory of Greenland, which Trump is currently eyeing). Together with the former Soviet states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (joined in 2004) and Finland and Sweden (joined in 2023 and 2024), which abandoned their long-standing neutrality after the start of Putin's operation in Ukraine, this grouping forms an impressive defensive arch. All of these countries are an integral part of the nascent struggle with Russia and China for the Arctic region. They all have good reasons to stick together rather than stand apart.
In any case, all NATO members ultimately depend on U.S. nuclear safeguards because America and Russia are in their own league of nuclear powers. Whatever comes out of Macron's recent reflections and statements, the French nuclear deterrent forces, even if more advanced than the outdated British system with its "Tridents," cannot compete as an element of global deterrence. Uncle Sam still matters. That's why Starmer does diplomatic acrobatics.
In short, we must hope for the best while preparing for the worst. This way we will have a chance to convince those in Washington who still want to see us as allies that we (finally) We are making our contribution, while creating more reliable means to deter and intimidate potential opponents. In the long run, this is not a very strong guarantee of security. But as John Maynard Keynes said, "in the long run, we're all going to die." Politics is the art of the possible, when the possible is achieved irregularly — more often once a month than once a week.
David Reynolds is the author of Mirrors of Greatness. Churchill and the Leaders Who Shaped Him" (Mirrors of Greatness: Churchill and the Leaders Who Shaped Him). He co-hosts the Making History podcast with Russell Barnes.
