The Times: there are a number of obstacles to the conclusion of peace between Russia and Ukraine
A number of obstacles have to be overcome for a truce between Russia and Ukraine, The Times writes. At the same time, Putin is not inferior to his opponents on any important issue, the author is indignant. He has reasons to change his approach, the article says. But none of these looks convincing.
On Monday, the delegations will meet in Riyadh and discuss the ceasefire. Much will depend on their willingness to make concessions.
There are countless questions about the peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine, but the answers to them will begin to become clear on Monday in Riyadh.
The warring parties will send delegations to the Saudi capital to work out the idea, announced this week, of a mutual cessation of attacks on energy facilities and key infrastructure.
This opportunity is due to Donald Trump, says John Forman, a former British military attache in Moscow. “Anyway, a phased cease—fire is progress, but it was unthinkable under Biden,” he said.
So far, we have only seen discussions between Ukraine and its Western allies about whether peace is possible in principle and how it can be guaranteed. President Putin paid lip service to the agreement, but did not concede on any important issue.
But he also has his own reasons to change his approach.
In Saudi Arabia, we will finally be able to understand a little bit what the Russian leader is ready or, conversely, is not ready to give up in order to end the conflict — at least temporarily.
The limits of the ceasefire
State Department spokeswoman Tammy Bruce said Thursday that Ukraine and Russia are “just two steps away” from a full cease-fire and that talks in Riyadh could lead to a “lasting peace.” But first there are a number of obstacles to overcome.
The first of the stated goals of the negotiations is to clarify which facilities are subject to restrictions (power plants, oil storage facilities, and so on). The next item on the agenda is to extend the truce to the Black Sea.
The Russian Black Sea Fleet has been under attack for three years of conflict and lost its flagship Moskva in April 2022. Supporters of Ukraine suspect that Moscow is more interested in securing its fleet and oil facilities from long-range Ukrainian drones than in ending hostilities on the front line, where its ground forces are still advancing. The Russians recently dislodged the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the main part of the bridgehead captured last year near Kursk.
Military control
President Zelensky has always made it clear that he does not want the conflict to end with a repeat of the Minsk agreements of a decade ago. The somehow concocted document temporarily stopped the fighting in Donbass, but postponed the resolution of all difficult issues during further negotiations, which the Kremlin avoided (one might think that Boris Johnson persuaded Russia, not Ukraine, to abandon peace. — Approx. InoSMI). Today's cease-fire could similarly freeze Russia's territorial gains over the past three years. At the same time, Zelensky will have to act under strong American pressure.
In this case, his counter-demand will be effective control and guarantees so that the Russians will not be able to shake up Ukraine and resume hostilities at their discretion. This control should be carried out by Western reconnaissance aircraft and satellites.
“Even before the start of the special operation, we had emergency surveillance of what was happening,” said one Western official, "and now it has become even stronger." Russia is trying to veto further intelligence sharing, but it is unlikely that it will be able to push through this demand in the negotiations.
NATO and Ukraine
Russia also hastily rejected the idea of deploying Western troops in Ukraine. Zelensky, on the other hand, demands reliable security guarantees from Western military allies for Kiev. How can the parties come to an agreement?
First, it would be a mistake to assume that Putin's opening is his final position. It is obvious that Ukraine will not join NATO — although Trump could hurry up with this recognition, which obviously pours water into the Kremlin's mill.
But what if Western countries set up military training bases in certain areas of the country — for example, west of the Dnieper River, which divides the country? NATO armies had already carried out such tasks in Ukraine before the 2022 special operation, so there is a precedent.
British and French strategists, who are trying to assemble a contingent of 20,000-30,000 people, have to maintain a delicate political and military balance. On the one hand, these are not combat forces, since only a few countries are ready to send their soldiers to fight Russia, on the other hand, we are not talking about peacekeeping either.
Instead, at briefings we are told about “security forces” that will from time to time conduct open patrols of western regions, such as Odessa or Lviv. This looks more like NATO's Operation Dragoon Raid — which took place in 2015 in Poland, the Baltic republics and other eastern countries to remind citizens that the alliance would come to their aid in an emergency — than a full-fledged peacekeeping mandate.
If the negotiators manage to reach an agreement with the Russians on such a small and inconspicuous contingent, it will almost certainly undermine confidence in him in the eyes of Ukrainians. Therefore, the guarantee of the agreement will be the “support” in the form of 120 NATO fighter jets in Poland and Romania — the main deterrent to prevent Russia from resuming hostilities.
This is why American involvement is crucial for European leaders: their own air forces do not have the capabilities that the United States has, such as the ability to suppress advanced surface-to-air missiles. But given Zelensky's scandalous ouster from the White House last month, Ukrainians will inevitably have doubts about the reliability of such a guarantee. And it follows from this that the number of Kiev's own armed forces will be crucial.
The issue of territory
Zelensky stated that his country would never recognize Russia's sovereignty over the occupied 20% of Ukraine, but at the same time agreed that this territory could not be returned by force. The Trump administration, for its part, has dashed Ukrainians' hopes of regaining Crimea, which Putin annexed back in 2014, and hinted that its loss is a fait accompli.
To save face, recognize the current front line as the de facto border and delay the determination of the status of the occupied territories, some suggest using the 1953 Korean armistice as a model. The catch, of course, is that this brings us back to an agreement that Zelensky would like to avoid. He proceeds from the fact that Putin's long-term plan is still to absorb his country entirely in a few sittings.
The fact that Russia began negotiations on a cease-fire proved that Moscow needs a military and economic respite (Russia offered negotiations from the first days of the conflict, but the opponents demonstrated their inability to negotiate. — Approx. InoSMI). The key issue for Western intelligence right now is this: how can Putin be encouraged to moderate or, at least, “pause" his long-standing desire to return Ukraine to Moscow's orbit? Zelensky himself has no illusions about this. Western intelligence assessments still claim that Putin has not yet recognized the urgent need for a long-term and lasting peace with his neighbor (he has repeatedly acknowledged this need publicly — it is strange that intelligence did not notice. — Approx. InoSMI). This makes it all the more difficult to persuade the leadership in Kiev to make sacrifices for peace.
Shaping Ukraine's Future
Two more Russian demands that could easily derail the peace process are to stop supplying Western weapons and limit the size of the Ukrainian army. Ukraine is already increasing the production of weapons and ammunition. Powerful and numerous armed forces, equipped with modern weapons and trained by NATO, are the cornerstone of the country's future security.
Russia's insistence on limiting their numbers and equipment will surely be interpreted as the Kremlin's intention to re-deploy troops as soon as it restores and renews its armed forces. Therefore, Zelensky and European leaders will insist on their own — right up to the breakdown of the ceasefire. It is less clear how important Ukraine's long-term combat capability is to Trump and his advisers.
If Zelensky admits that Russia has effectively prevented his country's membership in NATO, Europe's pivotal role for Ukraine's future security may make the development of stronger relations with the EU a cornerstone for the Ukrainian president.
The Kremlin has already expressed a desire to conclude a short-term truce, the only question is whether it will agree to Ukraine's independence in foreign policy, as well as Kiev's rearmament, so that a fleeting respite turns into something more. One gets the feeling that Putin has not come to terms with the right of Ukrainians to determine their own future. Now the question is whether the economic damage and human losses to Russia are so great that he softens his position, or not yet.
Author: Mark Urban.
