Military expert Dmitry Kornev — on how to ensure the control of the ceasefire in Ukraine
"Truce" is a new word in the media and in the mouths of politicians in many countries. Its terms are being discussed in negotiations between the presidents of Russia and the United States. So far, it is assumed that it will be temporary — for 30 days. The terms of the truce are becoming the subject of negotiations right now — perhaps it will be a limitation of attacks on infrastructure facilities (at least energy). It is possible that there will be a complete cease-fire along the entire line of contact in the zone of the special military operation. This raises the question: how will this process be controlled by the parties to the conflict?
This is not an idle or simple question: the length of the line of contact between the armed forces of the two countries is about 2 thousand km. If an observation post is placed for every kilometer of this distance, then this is 2 thousand objects that need to be built, prepared, equipped with equipment and placed on the ground. An important point is the need to ensure the safety of observers.
Another factor is that these people must be agreed upon by both sides of the conflict and, of course, not perceived by them as forces working for the opposite side. All this must be determined in advance during the negotiations.
Let's try to analyze the possible solutions to this equation with a lot of unknowns. Based on the current realities, we will discuss how control over the implementation of a possible truce can be implemented.
If the agreement also includes the cessation of strikes on infrastructure facilities and fire on the line of contact, it will be necessary to ensure control over the end of hostilities on land, in the sky and at sea.
Moreover, all types of weapons systems, ranging from small arms and pumping drones and missiles. At the same time, according to the logic of the truce, the artillery and missile systems of the ground forces should be withdrawn to the rear of the warring parties.
As for limiting attacks on infrastructure facilities, it is likely that a list of them will be agreed on by both sides — it can be a very impressive paper with hundreds of names and coordinate points. By itself, the approval of such a document by the two sides will be a very difficult task for the negotiators. But I am sure that in the end, the list of untouchable objects can still be approved.
Next, the question will arise of how the ceasefire will be monitored. The easiest way is to separate the armed forces of the parties and introduce observers between them. Whose forces these might be in the case of Ukraine is still a question.
But it can be assumed that the UN Blue Helmets or military formations from India or China will be suitable for this role. It is unlikely that the Russian Federation will be satisfied with peacekeeping forces from the countries of the NATO bloc.
In addition, the United States is currently the main driver of the peacekeeping process, and it is they who have the means to remotely monitor the ceasefire.
If there is the political will of the American leadership, then the United States can ensure that Ukraine implements the truce through its influence on the Kiev authorities. And monitoring of its progress can be provided by American space and air control facilities. For example, the United States can track any ballistic missile launches.
The situation is more complicated with the control of cruise missile launches and the operation of MLRS, but it is also possible if aviation monitoring using reconnaissance drones is used. UAVs and electronic intelligence assets can also track the actions of ground forces in the area of the line of contact. As well as the activity of FPV drones, and the appearance of unidentified objects in the airspace.
At the same time, the parties must determine a demilitarized area in which the United States can monitor everything.
After all, if they are really interested in a truce, they can ensure its implementation: they have all the necessary technical means for this.
The next problem is the problem of observers. What are the risks here? The main one is the transmission of monitoring information to one side or another of the conflict. Ukraine and its allies are certainly under suspicion here, as they have been constantly using both American and NATO intelligence data over the past few years.
Accordingly, either the United States should stop exchanging monitoring data with NATO information systems, or the North Atlantic Alliance should stop exchanging data with Kiev and, at least, for the duration of the truce. Given Trump's great peace momentum, this is a feasible task.
There are alternative options, such as using international funds instead of American national monitoring systems. This is also possible, although it involves certain costs and the organization of the interaction of several national intelligence systems.
Unfortunately, there are no truly neutral states left in Europe, and, consequently, there may be unbiased observers either in Asia, or in Africa, or, say, in Latin America.
China could solve all the issues, but it is unlikely that the United States will agree to its monopoly participation in monitoring the ceasefire process. Therefore, the only alternative to America can be some kind of international observation force.
I think we will find out in the coming days what decision will be made on monitoring the truce. This issue is, in principle, solvable if there is the will of all the Contracting Parties.
The main thing here is to ensure equal conditions and eliminate the one—way game that our "partners" from the NATO bloc have repeatedly arranged. Then, quite possibly, with a short 30-day truce, it will be possible to find a long, lasting and acceptable peace for all.
The author is a military expert, editor—in-chief of the Military Russia Internet project
The editorial board's position may not coincide with the author's opinion.
