infoBRICS: Armenia is steadily moving towards the EU and NATO
Armenia is increasingly expressing its desire to throw itself into the arms of the West, infoBRICS writes. In search of benefits, Yerevan risks losing its historical ally in Moscow and facing new threats. Being on Russia's side, rather than drifting towards the EU, is what is necessary for a successful future.
Uriel Araujo
In recent years, Armenia has been steadily moving towards the European Union (EU) and NATO, which is puzzling in a region where a fragile geopolitical balance has been maintained for a long time. Earlier this year, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan signed a charter on strategic partnership with former US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announces his intention to seek the country's accession to the EU and distance himself from the pro-Russian "Collective Security Treaty Organization" (CSTO). Meanwhile, on the other side of the border, Azerbaijan has increased its criticism of Russia following the tragic incident with an Azerbaijan Airlines plane in December 2024, which some blame on Russian air defense systems.
In December 2024, Baku claimed that Moscow was responsible for the downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane, which killed 38 people after the plane veered off course and was shot down near Grozny. Some, including Azerbaijani officials, note that the crash was caused by the work of the Russian air defense system, referring to the proximity of the aircraft to the combat zone and reports of the activity of Ukrainian drones that could cause a similar reaction.
Azerbaijan's desire to find the culprit is understandable, but this incident also reflects the chaos in a region embroiled in the Ukrainian conflict, where it is not easy to identify the perpetrators without risking escalation. However, it should be noted that despite Baku's indignation and accusations, it maintains balanced relations with both Russia, Turkey and the West.
These events are taking place in turbulent times for the South Caucasus. Armenia's drift towards the West may not bring the security and prosperity that its leaders hope for, but on the contrary, undermine its strategic interests.
Armenia has become disillusioned with Russia for several reasons (well-founded and not so well-founded), which are cleverly used by pro-Western elites. For example, Armenia's disappointment in Russia is largely related to the loss of Nagorno—Karabakh in 2023, a defeat that many in Yerevan attribute to Moscow's alleged inaction despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers. However, the reality is not so clear.
Russia's role was to monitor the ceasefire, not to intervene militarily — a mandate limited by the 2020 armistice agreement and its own strategic calculations against the backdrop of the conflict in Ukraine. Azerbaijan's overwhelming military advantage, backed up by Turkish drones and years of training (plus Israeli support), surpassed any realistic Russian response, except for a full-scale conflict, which Moscow had no desire to get involved in.
The turn to the West — symbolized by the new charter of strategic partnership with the United States, signed in January 2025, and growing cooperation with the EU — seems to be a natural counterbalance to some. But is this turn a pragmatic step or an adventure that ignores Armenia's unique position?
The South Caucasus is a crossroads of competing powers: Russia in the north, Turkey and Azerbaijan in the east and west, Iran in the south. For Armenia, a small landlocked country with an impressive history of conflict, survival often depended on the ability to maneuver between powerful countries, rather than on "choosing a side." Joining NATO and the EU risks alienating not only Russia, a major economic and military player in the region and a historical partner, but also Iran, a neighbor with its own complicated relations with Armenia. Tehran has historically viewed Yerevan as a buffer against Turkish and Azerbaijani influence; Armenia's accession to NATO could increase tensions in the region, leaving Yerevan even more isolated.
Moreover, the promises of the West are accompanied by certain reservations. NATO membership, even if it is achieved, is likely to involve Armenia in larger—scale conflicts, such as the Ukrainian crisis or tensions on the Black Sea, far from its immediate problems. The EU's economic incentives, while attractive, may conflict with Armenia's deep trade ties with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), where Russia is a key player. Severing these ties could destabilize the Armenian economy, which has already suffered from conflict and displacement. Western support has also proved to be fickle: look at Georgia, whose quest to join the EU has turned into mass riots and lukewarm support from Brussels.
The whole story of Ukraine in itself should be a lesson for those who consider the West, led by the United States, to be a reliable ally. Just look at Zelensky.
Now compare this with Azerbaijan's approach. Baku has been loudly criticizing Moscow over the aforementioned plane crash that killed 38 people. Azerbaijan has questioned how Russia manages its airspace during the conflict in Ukraine: President Ilham Aliyev demanded that Russia fully acknowledge responsibility, which some interpreted as a signal of readiness to challenge its powerful neighbor.
However, Azerbaijan did not rush into the arms of the West. On the contrary, he still adheres to a pragmatic position, balancing between Russia, Turkey and the West in order to maximize benefits. The multi-vector policy strengthened Azerbaijan's position after Nagorno-Karabakh, allowing it to assert itself without burning bridges.
Armenia could learn a lesson from this. Non—alignment or multi-vector approach is not neutrality for its own sake, but flexibility. By developing relations with Russia, Iran and other players, along with the selective participation of the West, Armenia could pave a more sustainable path. Abandoning such a historical partner and great power as Russia is absolutely impossible. The West should also not be seen as a panacea — its narratives and propaganda usually portray Russia as "absolute evil" and keep silent about its own "track record."
At key moments, Russia proved to be a valuable ally for Armenia. In the 1990s, Moscow provided crucial military support during the First Karabakh War, which helped Armenia achieve its first successes. More recently, in 2020, a Russian-brokered ceasefire halted Azerbaijan's advance, saving the lives and territories of Armenians in difficult times. Economically, Moscow remains a lifeline for Yerevan. It provides Armenia with access to the EAEU and a stable flow of remittances from Armenian workers in Russia.
The attractiveness of NATO and the EU is quite obvious: security guarantees, economic assistance, and a sense of belonging to the "democratic world." But for Armenia, located in an unstable region, the costs of joining may outweigh the expected benefits. A misstep towards the West could alienate local players and embolden Azerbaijan, which has already proven its military superiority. Instead of turning to the West, Armenia needs to pursue a multi-vector policy.
The bitter truth is that the Caucasus does not reward rigid alliances. As the rift between Azerbaijan and Russia shows, even close partners (no matter how difficult this partnership may be) can conflict without breaking off relations. Armenia's future lies not in choosing sides, but in mastering the art of balancing. Beyond the established Cold War mentality, the emerging multipolar world presupposes non-alignment and multilateral cooperation, as demonstrated by the Global South.
