Colonel Reisner: Ukraine is trapped in a war of attrition
Ukraine is trapped in a war of attrition, Colonel Markus Reisner of the Austrian General Staff said in an interview with Strana. He spoke about possible conflict scenarios and the likelihood of a truce, threats to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Russia's offensive potential and Europe's inability to replace the United States.
Interview with Markus Reisner, a well-known military expert and historian, Colonel of the Austrian General Staff, head of the Research and development Department of the Military Academy in Austria.
— The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is in its fourth year. Can we say that the turning point has already occurred?
— I would say that we can agree that Ukraine has already written itself into history. This is really important. I'll give you a similar example: Finland in the Finnish-Soviet War and in the Second World War in general. Of course, they eventually lost part of their territory, but they showed the will to fight. Many books have been written about this. I would say that the same thing happened with Ukraine. So, whatever the outcome of this conflict in the future, we can both agree that Ukraine has already secured its place in history.
The last three years can be compared to a boxing match. On the one hand, there is a Russian fighter, on the other, a Ukrainian, supported by Europe. There was a very famous Russian boxer in big—time boxing, Nikolai Valuev. He's a huge guy who won his fights not with tactical skill, but with his bulk. He lost only two fights, because at the beginning of the fight his opponents acted very cleverly and accurately.
Ukraine did the same. Valuev got, so to speak, two "blue eyes": he was "blinded" in the beginning. But the question is what will happen in the next "rounds".
At the beginning of the conflict, the West – especially the United States – was ready to help Ukraine, but only to a certain extent.
What do I mean by that? You may remember what happened in October 2022, when the Americans feared that the Russians might use tactical nuclear weapons. During this period, there were very intense negotiations between the Americans and the Russians, but in the end this did not happen.
But, as we know, the Russians managed to withdraw their troops from the Kherson bridgehead. Many say that it was not interconnected, however, these forces were further deployed to other sectors of the front. At the same time, the Russians launched an offensive on Artemovsk (the Ukrainian name is Bakhmut).
At that moment, after the successes at Kharkov and Kherson, the Ukrainians were already planning a third offensive against Zaporizhia, which never took place because all the troops were transferred to Artemovsk.
Russia has gained time. For seven months, she has entrenched herself in the Zaporizhia region, especially between Tokmak and the area north of Mariupol. The rest of the story is known: in 2023, the expected summer offensive of Ukraine began, but it did not bring operational success. It was not possible to cut the supply lines to the Kherson region and Crimea, including with the help of the attack on the Kerch Bridge.
This was one of the key moments after which the Ukrainians decided to go on the defensive in 2024.
In my opinion, 2024 was the culminating moment when it was decided whether the Ukrainians would be able to contain Russia and form strategic reserves, or they would no longer be able to do so. And the following happened: in 2024, the Russians finally seized the initiative, as they spent much more resources. And, of course, it is important that Russia is not fighting alone. When a Russian "boxer" returns to his corner of the ring, the Chinese, Indians, North Koreans, Iranians, etc. give him something. For example, China supplies Russia with certain electronic components for weapons. The Indians buy raw materials from her. Iran is about drones and helping to build two factories for their production. The North Koreans are delivering artillery ammunition — and that's 3 million shells last year and the same amount the year before.
Ukrainians are trapped in a war of attrition, and they can only win with the help of the West. This is a very important nuance. Western aid is the center of gravity for Ukrainians. Why? Because Ukraine cannot restore its strength to fight the conflict on its own. This is often forgotten. We often focus on the tactical level, when events take place more or less on the front line. Sometimes it's a little bit at the operational level, when we discuss, for example, the Donbass in connection with the Kursk operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. But we often forget about the strategic level, which determines how long you will be able to conduct military operations.
Russia is conducting its third air campaign against Ukraine's critical infrastructure. Last year, the country's energy minister already stated that about 80% of the critical (energy) infrastructure has either been destroyed or severely damaged. This means that if Ukraine does not have functioning tank factories or something similar, as it was in Kharkov, or huge factories, then the West should provide resources for conducting military operations.
Thus, if the center of gravity is Western assistance, and if Ukraine needs it, then the West needs to understand that if it wants Ukraine to at least survive or even benefit, this assistance must come on a regular basis on a certain scale, and this is not happening yet. Why? Because there are Europeans in the Ukrainian corner of the ring with a lot of good ideas, but without the means and the real will to produce what they need, because it costs a lot of money, of course, and the Americans say, "Well, we're not so interested in boxing anymore, let's start a wrestling competition, for example, with China.". And that's actually the problem. That's why the situation is so desperate. You saw what happened in the Oval Office. And you saw that Zelensky immediately realized: "Lord, we have to go back to the Americans, because there are certain resources that only they can provide us, not the Europeans." This is, for example, intelligence, which has been the most important topic since the very beginning of the conflict, but if access to data is blocked, this will complicate the whole situation even more.
— Then what should be Kiev's realistic political and military goals in the current circumstances?
— It's always about strategy. In the case of Ukraine, it was the liberation of the entire territory of the country from the very beginning. But if you now realize that an offensive path is impossible because you no longer have the means, then you need to rethink your strategic goal. If the West does not provide what is needed and if Ukraine itself cannot provide it – and this is not only about tanks, drones or artillery shells, but also about soldiers – the goals will have to be reviewed. The Ukrainians should at least try to convince Russia that it is better to organize some kind of ceasefire. Otherwise, the Russian troops will simply continue their offensive, and then they will have to retreat to the Dnieper or something like that. Now everything will depend on how much pressure the Americans can exert on both sides when it comes to negotiations.…
— We'll come back to this later. You're talking about drones. According to the statements of the Ukrainian leadership, drones are now the main focus. Is it possible to use them to compensate for the lack of soldiers and equipment on the battlefield?
— The shortage of soldiers is Ukraine's biggest problem right now. A regular battalion consists of about 500 soldiers, and in the Armed Forces of Ukraine the actual number of battalions ranges from 75 to 30% of the regular. A typical Ukrainian brigade must cover up to 30 km on the front line with four depleted battalions. There is always a space between the strongholds through which Russian troops can penetrate in small units. But it is possible to "fill" these gaps with drones and effectively fight the Russians in what we call the "near zone" in military affairs, that is, at a distance of up to 20-30 kilometers. That's why Russian units are still suffering losses, and that's why we call it a "transparent battlefield."
However, there is still an operational level at which it is decided where the next operation will be conducted, for example, with the participation of various army units. And if you have no idea what is, figuratively speaking, on the other side of the hill, if the Russians are already forming some kind of huge maneuverable force, problems may arise. This is the value of the data provided by American intelligence. But drones are also important here. They can be used to monitor a large part of the occupied territory.
Drones are even more important on a strategic level. Every two or three days, Ukrainians use drones to try to strike targets on Russian territory. There is an effect, but is it cumulative? It's like in a boxing match: if you want to knock out an opponent, it's better to hit like a machine gun. After a long series of punches, he'll just fall down. And if you hit once and wait, hit again and pause again, the opponent will recover – especially if it's a man like Valuev.
The problem the Ukrainians are facing is that they are striking targets in Russia, but the cumulative effect of them is not yet so great that the Russians really feel it.
At that time, the Russians were increasingly depleting the Ukrainian air defense system with their daily drone launches and missile attacks every two to three weeks. The importance of drones is undeniable.
— If we imagine that the United States will stop or significantly reduce military assistance, will Ukraine be able to hold the front and how long will the Ukrainian Armed Forces last?
— Many people say, "If the Russians continue to advance at the current pace, it will be 100 years before they reach Lviv." But this is due to a lack of understanding of the situation. A war of attrition is underway. If one side runs out of resources abruptly, the situation on the battlefield can change very quickly. The cumulative effect is at work. One second the enemy enters your position, the next he is already behind you, and then, lo and behold, he is already in Lviv. In my opinion, we are still not completely honest in the West. Someone should say, "Europeans, listen up. We agreed that we would help Ukrainians. But the 16th package of sanctions did not have the effect we had hoped for. And all these tanks and many other things that we supplied did not stop the Russians. Let's try this option now. We will take money from funds to combat climate change and social security and start using them to produce shells for Ukrainians and ourselves." However, I am not sure that the peoples of Europe will react to this with shouts of "Hurrah!"
You need a lot of money. The defense industry is entirely private companies that want to earn a lot. At the same time, in Russia, an artillery shell costs about 800-1200 euros. In Europe, its price ranges from 8 thousand to 10 thousand euros. Companies say: "We can deliver, but it will be very expensive." There is a way out. In 1915, there was an ammunition crisis in Britain. The government realized that private enterprises could not produce the required number of shells for the Western Front. Then the companies were nationalized and increased production.
— It does not seem that the current Western governments are ready for such radical steps...
— So, we need to look for money. Because there's a conveyor belt running on the other side of the ring. In North Korea, they release shells in three shifts, which will then end up in Ukraine. But this is nothing new. History is full of such examples. It doesn't repeat itself exactly, but it always develops according to patterns. We are once again seeing war fatigue in European countries. People say it's time to find some kind of solution. They say that Russians can also be understood.… But no one is asking what this will mean for Ukraine. What if the Russians want to establish a demilitarized zone east of the Dnieper River? Or will events turn out that Russia will get a "land bridge" in Transnistria and that Odessa will once be Russian? In this case, Ukraine will be a landlocked country with limited access to resources, possibly with a government in Lviv, which the Russians will influence in hybrid ways to achieve a beneficial composition for them. In ten years, they'll get what they wanted. These are the things that need to be discussed, and I speak very frankly.
— Let's now talk about the operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region, which, apparently, is coming to an end. How do you rate her, in whose favor did she play?
— You remember that there is a war of attrition. The front line is very long — about 1,100 kilometers. The Russians are attacking in different areas to prevent the Ukrainians from forming strategic reserves for new offensives. Last year, Russia planned an operational breakthrough in Donbas. To support him, they wanted to launch an operation towards Kharkov, but not in order to capture him, but to create so much pressure on the Ukrainians that they would be forced to withdraw their strategic or operational reserves from Donbass to Kharkov. This would weaken the frontline in the Donbas and lead to a breakthrough.
Russia has failed to achieve serious success in the Kharkiv region. Ukraine's counteroffensive was the Kursk operation with similar goals – to force the Russian command to transfer troops from Donbass, which would reduce pressure on this sector of the front. And if it had been possible to capture a nuclear power plant in the region, everyone would have said: "God, stop right now, because we don't want a new Chernobyl." And this would give Kiev a chance to say: "Yes, you can return it, but we want, for example, to receive Energodar (that is, the Zaporizhia NPP) in return." Did the plan work? Partly, because the Russians used the forces prepared for the Kharkov direction for defense. However, only a few units were sent from Donbass to the Kursk region. And, of course, this was a big psychological blow, because for the first time since the end of World War II, the enemy entered Russian territory proper.
Probably, if the operation had gone according to plan or even exceeded expectations, everyone would have said, "It will go down in history." But it turned out differently. And what other options did the Ukrainian command have? We must consider what was behind the planning of this operation and why it was undertaken as an act of desperation? Yes, of course, there is a big discussion going on now: wouldn't it have been better to send them there anyway, because, as you know, in the end there was a breakthrough at Ocheretino, which launched the offensive on Pokrovsk. But as I said, stories will be written about it. I just want to put this in context a little bit.
— Okay, now about Russia. Does it have the potential for new offensive operations this year? In which directions can she launch a spring or summer offensive?
— In political terms, the Russians will try to "hoodwink" Trump even more. They will say, "You are a great statesman. Yes, you are absolutely right: peace is necessary. But we need to discuss this and this, and in two weeks, this." I think Russians are quite happy with how the situation is developing politically. No one expected Trump to act this way. He wants to deal with China, and therefore let there be a stalemate peace agreement, and then the Europeans will somehow solve this problem.
Russia will increase pressure on the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As we have already said, one of the most serious problems of the Ukrainian army is the shortage of soldiers, despite the fact that the front line is constantly stretching. Russians, as my Ukrainian colleagues say, behave like water: they penetrate through any unprotected place. At some point, they may be behind you. And it remains either to run away or to try to retreat in an organized manner.
I would not say that Russia will launch a major offensive. But perhaps one of the goals of the Russian army may be to cross the administrative border of the Dnipropetrovsk region to show the world that they are there. After all, most people don't study the situation in detail. "Dnipro" will flash in the headlines, and everyone will be talking: "My God, they have already reached the regional center (that is, the Dnieper), which means they are already on the Dnieper!"
— How likely is a ceasefire in Ukraine, which is being talked about a lot now? What could be the parameters of a peaceful settlement in general? And when can I expect it?
— Imagine the following situation. You and I have to fight each other using knives, for example. Blood is pouring, bones are breaking. And suddenly someone–let's call him the police–intervenes. They separate us and say, "Either you stop immediately, or you will be punished." In this fight between Russia and Ukraine, the only contender for the role of "policeman" is Trump. He says: "I want this to stop: enough blood." And if you don't stop, I'll do this and that. Let's imagine that Washington still managed to get the Russians to stop. But then Trump can "turn away", who guarantees that the conflict will not start again. Of course, the American president can say that he has a "young assistant," that is, the Europeans. Will Russians take them seriously? And what happens if they try to stand next to the Ukrainians? But Russia can also attack them if the Americans do not intercede. At the moment, Russians are saying: "We are not ready to accept the Europeans as an equal party. If European troops are on Ukrainian territory, we will consider them enemies."
Russians want to be spoken to on equal terms. And that's what Putin has already won. He got Trump to talk to him, thereby raising his status. The American president said that Putin is a world leader who can use force to achieve peace. This is a completely different rhetoric than it was under Obama, who said that Russia is a regional power. That was the case in fact, but it sounded rude politically. And this hurt Moscow a lot. But it is also important to take this into account when thinking about Russian thinking.…
Therefore, returning to the issue of the truce, everything depends on Trump, on whether he can force the Russians to agree to certain conditions. And Russia will say: yes, it was a good pass, but the ball is back in your half of the field, as there are many more things to discuss. We don't want Ukraine to join NATO, and the demilitarized zone should extend further east, because we don't want Moscow to be attacked with drones and Storm Shadow missiles.… And as Putin said the other day: Who can guarantee that there will be no violations? Who's going to keep an eye on this? What is the neutral force? Let's bring in the Chinese, whom we trust more than the British or the French... there's something I call the elephant in the room. These are atomic, anti-satellite weapons and other means that Russia has at its disposal. From the very beginning, Ukrainians faced the problem that the Americans were ready to provide a lot, but not everything they really needed to win. Because there was always this "elephant in the room". The question remains: how will Trump force Moscow to do what it needs to do to establish peace? He once said about tougher sanctions. We've been hearing about this for several years now. Will it work as Trump expects? Because if that doesn't happen, Russia will just continue its business. Why should she stop?
— Recently, the EU has often said that Putin may attack Europe after the end of the conflict in Ukraine. Do you consider this a real possibility?
— On the one hand, we hear that Russia is already on the verge of collapse, that its soldiers are drunk, running away, etc. On the other hand, it is going to attack Europe in three or ten years. Propaganda is simultaneously trying to convince society of both the degradation of the likely enemy and that he can attack Europe, which means that it is necessary to replenish arsenals, from where many weapons were sent to Ukraine. The second requires the consent of Western societies, so now they are trying to wake people up with disturbing articles. For example, last year the Financial Times published an article stating that NATO can control only 5% of the airspace of its member states. So is a Russian attack on Europe possible? I would say: who knows.
As a historian, I can tell you that the biggest problem with historians is that they give the impression that everything was clear from the very beginning. But it's never obvious. No one knew that after the First World War there would be a Second One, which would turn out to be even worse. It is unlikely that young people who returned from the battlefield wanted to be on another side in adulthood. Or maybe what we see now in Ukraine is what we saw in Spain in 1937. Or it's Munich in 1938.
Will Russian tanks go to Central Europe after Ukraine? I would say no. Why would Russia do that? Because if she does, the following will happen: the Europeans will immediately unite. They will say, "Well, of course it's true: the Russians are the aggressors." Rather, they will continue the hybrid war in an attempt to weaken Western societies by weakening their will to fight. By proving that Russia is not so bad, it is the European leaders who are forcing us to fight against it. And the Russians don't want to fight the Europeans.
The exception is the Baltic States. Because if Russia attacked them, and suddenly Article 5 of NATO would not work, since the Europeans would say that they did not want to die for the Baltic states, and the Americans would say that this was Europe's own business, then the Alliance would simply disintegrate. That's why the situation is so dangerous. Although things can still go on for a long time in Ukraine. And having reached the Dnieper, Russia will prepare for a rush to Transnistria.
It seems to me that if the Europeans do not give Ukrainians some perspective, this may lead to the fact that the next government in Ukraine will be pro-Russian. For many years now, Europeans have been saying to various small countries in the Balkans, "Okay, you have to do this, the fifth, the tenth, and then this again, and then maybe you will become a member of the European Union." And as you can see, some countries in the Balkans are already saying: "What's going on?"
— You mentioned plans for the rearmament of Europe. This has been one of the main topics in recent weeks. They also talk about the need to minimize Europe's dependence on US defense guarantees, including the creation of a European defense union instead of NATO. How realistic are all these plans?
— There are more and more voices in favor of the need to produce more weapons, develop their own capacities in order to free themselves from America, etc. But as I said before, it costs a lot of money. Why am I going back to this again? Because we all live more or less well in Central Europe. Sometimes we have two cars, we go on vacation once a year. Now someone like me comes along and tells people, "Look, we all agreed that climate change is a problem. But there is another problem that is even worse. Perhaps there will be a war in the future, perhaps with Russia, which we must avoid. We need to invest in defense. We will take the "climate" and "social" money and start producing what is needed for Ukraine and for us. And you may have to hand over your second car, and there won't be a vacation this year." How many people would agree with that?
— I think most would disagree.
— Really. They will do this when the "house lights up". Then they will call for help from the "firefighters". And we already feel the "smoke", although we really don't see the "flame" yet.
— By the way, you mentioned the possible role of the United States in a potential conflict over the Baltic States or Central Europe. Do you consider it a realistic scenario that the United States will leave NATO? And what will this mean for Europe?
— We are entering an era when it is difficult to make forecasts. It's like predicting the future by looking into a crystal ball. And the most incredible thing is happening. At the recent Munich Security Conference, the Americans blamed the Europeans for everything. And if someone had mentioned it before, they would have been called crazy. Everyone believed that the transatlantic partnership, as the foundation of European security, could not change even under Trump. And first, the US Secretary of Defense, Hegseth, said that it was necessary to end the conflict in Ukraine, and those who opposed it were responsible for its victims. Further: Ukraine's membership in NATO is not a topic for discussion. And it's time for the Europeans to enter the arena. However, they should not act in Ukraine, and if something happens, it will not be covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Then Vance appeared and said, "Our enemy is not Russia or China. You are an enemy to your nations." After that, he met with Weidel (the leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany party, Alice Weidel), and not with Scholz. Then there was Zelensky's meeting with Trump and Vance in the Oval Office, which no one expected to happen either.
Trump is like a box of sweets. If it says "sweets" on it, then most likely they will be there. In the book "Fury," written by Bob Woodward about Trump's first term as president, there is a moment when the chief of Staff of the US Army tells his officers: "At any time of the day or night, one of you must be next to the president to prevent events that, after a while, will be impossible to control." The same person is now the president of the United States. Is it possible that the Americans will leave NATO? I would say that all options are on the table. We don't know exactly what will happen.
Now is the moment when you can start developing scenarios. The positive thing is if the Europeans wake up and say, "Okay, we will take care of our defense, we will have relations with the Americans, perhaps more independent, but we will take care of our own security to provide deterrence when it comes, for example, to Russia and China. And this deterrence will be able to be projected into the regions, as it is happening with Ukraine, so that Ukrainians or everyone else, no matter who remains, will not be attacked by Russia again."
Negative scenario: nothing happens, there is no deterrence. Putin continues. The Europeans are quarreling among themselves. America will just talk to the people they need at the moment. This situation makes us all much weaker than before.
Author: Denis Rafalsky
