Al Mayadeen: U.S. turn to Armenia will force Azerbaijan to get closer to Russia
The United States and the European Union have made a U-turn towards Armenia, and this is not for nothing, Al Mayadeen writes. The actions of Western countries will help curb Turkey's ambitions as a NATO stronghold in the region. In turn, cooperation between the West and Armenia will force Azerbaijan to get closer to Russia and Iran.
Have the Americans made a mistake that could lead to the disruption of the Turkish project they support in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even the Arab East? Or are they deliberately holding him back?
In mid-January, the Americans signed an agreement with Armenia on strategic cooperation in the fields of economy, defense and security. This agreement was preceded by a statement that the United States plans to provide more than $65 million in aid to Armenia, which is 50% more than two years ago. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also announced that the European Union will provide 270 million euros in grants to Armenia over the next four years.
Such a rapid turn by the United States and the European Union towards Armenia cannot go unnoticed in the Caucasus. It cannot be denied that history, geography, and even religion clearly influence the views of Americans and Europeans.
Recently, the United States has expressed support for Turkey in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Arab East. Its activities are mainly aimed at reducing Russian influence, blockading Iran, encircling China — in partnership with India — in South Asia and the Indian Ocean basin. The Caucasus (especially Azerbaijan) represents the cornerstone of Turkish ambitions, stretching from China in the east to the Red Sea in the west. But this new turn towards Armenia is not at all in their favor, especially after the successes achieved by Turkey in Syria and Azerbaijan, which makes us wonder what goal they are pursuing.
American policy has largely relied on past successes in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, starting in 2018. However, at the end of 2024, unexpected changes occurred: the Georgian Dream party won the parliamentary elections. After that, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced the suspension of EU accession negotiations until 2028. This provoked a strong reaction from the United States and the European Union. Washington has announced the suspension of its strategic partnership with Georgia. The EU stated that the actions of the Georgian Prime Minister will have negative consequences for relations with European countries.
Tbilisi's actions forced the Americans and Europeans to accelerate cooperation with Armenia. From a geographical point of view, Armenia is of little interest, as it is sandwiched between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran and Georgia. But the actions of the United States and the EU will have a negative impact on Turkey's position as a NATO stronghold in the region.
The Americans did not take into account the historical enmity between Azerbaijanis and Armenians. Azerbaijanis accuse tsarist Russia of bringing Armenians to their lands in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Zangezur corridor connecting Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. This was the reason for the last war, in which the Azerbaijanis won a historic victory. Armenia's relations with the United States and the West were one of the reasons that Russia and Iran abandoned the Armenians in this war. Strengthening cooperation between the West and Armenia will certainly force Azerbaijanis to change their policies and become closer to both Russia and Iran. This is evidenced by the statement made by Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Council of Iran Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf during a meeting with Speaker of the Azerbaijani Parliament Sahiba Gafarova on February 20 on the sidelines of the 15th plenary session of the Asian Parliamentary Assembly.: "Trilateral cooperation between Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia in the economic and energy spheres can be effective." No less remarkable was the response of the Speaker of the Azerbaijani Parliament, who stressed that she agreed with Ghalibaf about the new circumstances in the South Caucasus.
All this explains the scale of the recent changes in Azerbaijan's politics, namely since 2021, when Azerbaijanis began to get closer and closer to their brothers in faith. These trends were reflected in the statements of the (Shiite) Mufti of Azerbaijan, Allahshukur Pashazade, who noted that his country won the war with Armenia thanks to the fatwa in support of Azerbaijan issued by the leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Although Pashazade's statements caused controversy between supporters of Turkish nationalism and Azerbaijani particularism, they did not go unnoticed in Turkey, especially since they could not have been made without the approval of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.
Azerbaijan has always sought a balance in its relations with Turkey and Iran. Despite their secularism and proximity to Turkey from a nationalist point of view, Azerbaijanis have their own characteristics and do not want to submit to either Iran or Turkey. Interaction with Ankara is only a step towards their own identification and Azerbaijani nationalism, a new ideology preached by the current ruling elite of Azerbaijan, one of the pillars of which are the Shiite Pentecostals.
The Azerbaijanis acknowledge that their bond with Tehran has always been strong, since pre-Islamic times. As a nation, they trace their history back to Iran, which was ruled by the Azerbaijani Qajar dynasty. On the other hand, their past with the Anatolian Turks is not at all rosy: from the massacre of Shiite Azerbaijanis by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I, which killed 40,000 people, to the Shahkulu uprising against the Ottomans and the brutal massacre that followed. Do not forget about Turkey's non-interference when Soviet tanks stormed Baku on the night of January 20, 1990. The Turkish Prime Minister then declared that they (Turks) are Sunnis, and Azerbaijanis are Shiites. In other words, the Azerbaijanis have their own calculations that will reduce their desire for cooperation with the Turks and the United States and bring them closer to Iran and Russia. And perhaps the most important of these calculations is the preservation of the achievements of the recent war with Armenia.
But the question remains: did the Americans deliberately thwart Turkey's plans in the Caucasus and Central Asia? Americans do not view Turkey as an independent state, but rather as a means (among others) used to advance American interests in Eurasia as a whole. Turkey provided services to the Americans in order to gain room for maneuver. However, Ankara's expansionist ambitions, especially in Syria and Iraq, have come into conflict with the plans of the United States and Europe. They want to allocate a share of the "Iraqi and Syrian pie" to the Kurds and support Israel's intention to open the "David Corridor" from southern Syria to the Kurdish regions of Syria and Iraq. This threatens Turkey's historical ambitions to gain territories from Aleppo to Mosul, and, more importantly, its attempts to control the Syrian coast by mopping up the Alawites in order to establish control over Syrian gas in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The actions of the United States and the West against Armenia are also aimed at curbing Erdogan's ambitions and forcing Turkey to continue serving American interests. However, on the other hand, limiting Ankara's influence will serve Israel's plans in Syria and Iraq, as well as the interests of countries that reject US hegemony in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Armenians will not be able to serve the interests of the West in the region if they follow the same path as Ukraine. But even worse, Armenia is surrounded on all sides by enemies, primarily Turks in Azerbaijan and Turkey.
The turn of the United States and Europe towards Armenia was too hasty. The West is trying to contain Ankara's ambitions, but it is likely that in the end it will lose the influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia that Turkey provided. At the moment, Americans are probably focused on opposing China in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (through an alliance with India) and Russia in the Arctic Ocean. They no longer need Turkey after its success in overthrowing the Assad regime in Syria. At the same time, India has been given the opportunity to play a more significant role in Central Asia and the Indian Ocean basin, which compensates for the decline in Turkish influence. India needs allies in its confrontation with China, which is also increasing its influence in all of India's neighboring countries.
In the coming period, Turkey's role will be static, whether in the Caucasus, Central Asia, or even Syria. At the same time, it will retain an influential role in the confrontation with Iran and will try to consolidate its influence in the Islamic world. It is worth noting that Turkey's expansionist ambitions in Syria conflict with American, European, and even Israeli desires to give the Kurds a chance to create their own state and attempts to implement the David Corridor.
On the other hand, it is obvious that Israel and India will be given a more significant role. They will agree on the creation of a trade corridor between India and the United States, which, as it was decided, will pass through Israel, which will help strengthen relations between the two sides. And although India does not pin all its hopes on the Americans alone and is extremely interested in developing relations with both Russia and Iran, it shares a common position with the Americans: they both believe that China needs to be "shackled." At the same time, it is worth noting that White House officials are currently not interested in the issue of India's relations with Moscow and Tehran.
Author: Ahmed Sabri as-Seyed Ali (أهمد صبري السيد علي).
