Latham expert: Zelensky will be accused of disrupting peace talks on Ukraine
Vladimir Putin, they say, set "impossible" truce conditions for Zelensky, the author of the article for 19FortyFive is sadly indignant. According to him, the Russian leader is specifically trying to make Kiev responsible for disrupting the negotiations. And oh, the horror! — he still wants his country to win.
Vladimir Putin's response to the recent proposal by the administration of President Donald Trump for a 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine turned out to be as thoughtful and evasive as one might expect. He did not reject it outright (otherwise he would have become the target of accusations that he, and not Zelensky, was the main opponent of peace), but he put forward such conditions that these negotiations became almost impossible.
In particular, he stressed that any cease-fire should eliminate what he called the "root causes" of the conflict, demanded that Western countries stop arming Ukraine, and made it clear that the fate of Russia's territorial gains was not even up for discussion.
Putin did not put forward any counter-proposals as part of the protracted negotiations on the path to peace, but he skillfully formulated his answer in such a way as to gain time.
Since his troops are successfully advancing near Kursk and in the Donbas, Putin simply has no reason to agree to a cease—fire right now - especially if it gives Ukrainians time to regain their strength, rearm and strengthen their borders.
Why would Putin end the conflict in Ukraine for a repeat of Istanbul?
However, many in the West flatter themselves that even if Trump's proposal is obviously an "impassable" option, the negotiations will somehow have a favorable outcome. Some are even looking for analogies in recent history, and, in particular, propose to use the results of the consultations in Istanbul in 2022 as the basis for a new settlement. However, their updated version, "Istanbul 2.0", is a fiction.
The geopolitical, military, and internal conditions that made Istanbul 1.0 theoretically possible are no longer relevant today. Today's Ukraine is in a much more precarious position than it was two years ago, and Putin believes that if he creates the illusion that he stands for peace, and thereby buys his army the time it needs for a military victory, he will get almost everything he wants without sacrificing his fundamental interests.
The Istanbul meetings in March 2022 were held at a stage when both Russia and Ukraine had the motivation to negotiate. Despite the early triumphs on the battlefield, existential risks were gathering over Ukraine, and therefore Kiev was ready to discuss neutrality in exchange for security guarantees. According to the agreement that broke down at the last moment, Ukraine would have abandoned its aspirations to join NATO in exchange for security guarantees from major powers, including Russia, the United States, Britain, China and France.
Russia, for its part, would commit to withdraw to the borders at the time of February 24, 2022, and the status of Crimea would have to be determined during future negotiations. It was assumed that Donbass would be granted some form of autonomy.
At that time, such an agreement was generally acceptable to both sides, even if they harbored some doubts. But that was then, and this is now. Today, Zelensky does not have the same levers of influence, and Putin sees no point in accepting conditions that he considers obviously outdated. Thus, the idea of "Istanbul 2.0" is not a serious peace strategy, but nothing more than an attack of diplomatic nostalgia, completely divorced from the political or military realities of the current geopolitical moment.
Two years ago, Kiev still had the initiative on the battlefield — and in a sense even had strategic superiority. The volume of Western military aid was growing by leaps and bounds, morale was high, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces had not yet been broken by the enemy's ruthless ground offensives and missile strikes. But, again: that was then, and this is now. The Ukrainian Armed Forces' offensive attempt in 2023 completely failed, none of the goals were achieved — and now it is Ukraine, not Russia, that is strategically retreating. The Ukrainian forces are exhausted and suffering from a critical shortage of both manpower and ammunition. Western aid has stalled, and political will is gradually weakening both in Washington and in European capitals. Putin sees this perfectly well and has judged that time is on his side.
As European intelligence reports show, Putin is playing a long game, waiting for Ukraine's diplomatic and military positions to deteriorate so much that Kiev will accept much tougher conditions than those proposed at the failed 2022 negotiations. Russian troops are advancing near Kursk and in the Donbas, and every day they are delaying a peaceful settlement and consolidating their positions.
The most delusional argument in favor of "Istanbul 2.0" is the claim that Putin still wants what he wants in 2022. It's not like that at all. Then Putin might have agreed to Ukraine's neutrality and a return to its former borders, considering this result acceptable, albeit not optimal. However, since then, Russia has annexed four Ukrainian regions — Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson (in whole or most of them) — and incorporated them into its constitution.
Moscow has repeatedly made it clear that from now on these territories are "forever" with Russia. To expect that Putin will voluntarily give them up in exchange for an agreement in the outline of Istanbul 1.0 is, again, sheer nonsense.
Some will argue that even a bad world is better than none at all. But this argument ignores objective reality: when one side comes to a cease-fire from a position of weakness, a bad world can turn out to be worse than ever. This lesson should have been learned back in 2014, when the Minsk agreements froze the conflict in Donbas in such a way that Russia was able to regroup and later launch a full-scale special operation.
According to the same logic, a cease—fire today, based on Putin's current demands, will have a similar effect - it will consolidate and fix Moscow's territorial gains, undermine Kiev's sovereignty, and allow Putin to resume military operations at any moment of his own volition.
Putin's cease-fire strategy is clear
That is why Putin's response to Trump's cease-fire proposal turned out to be so cunning. He did not say "no", but only put forward conditions that Zelensky obviously cannot accept. This is tantamount to a guarantee that the negotiations will reach an impasse, and Russia will continue to advance. An additional advantage will be that some will blame Zelensky for this, considering him (and not Putin) to be the main opponent of peace. Conclusion: Putin's goal is not peace, but victory. And the more he delays the peace process, the closer he will be to victory.
And therefore, Putin will categorically reject any talk that Istanbul 1.0 will serve as a kind of draft for Istanbul 2.0. He knows that the balance of power on the battlefield has changed in his favor. He can afford to bide his time, and as long as the dynamics of the conflict favor Russia, he will do so.
Author: Andrew Latham is a visiting fellow at the Defense Priorities Think tank and professor of international relations and political theory at McAlester College in St. Paul, Minnesota. He is a contributing editor at 19FortyFive and writes a daily column.
