Former Austrian Foreign Minister and head of the St. Petersburg State University's G.O.R.K.I. Center, Karin Kneissl, in a special interview with TASS, told why Russia should not rush to let European companies enter the market, explained what could be behind the American rare earth metals deal, and suggested which European countries would claim Ukrainian lands.
— The Alternative for Germany party achieved great success in the last elections in Germany, and opposition parties are also gaining popularity in other European countries. What do you think are the shortcomings in the leadership of Germany and the EU that this indicates?
— We have protest parties, and they cannot generally be compared with more conservative parties in other EU countries. Each must be considered separately in the context of its historical development.
At the same time, absolutely all political parties in the European Union are experiencing difficulties not only in attracting voters, but also in finding functionaries, that is, people who are willing to work for these parties. I think many people already understand that if you go into politics, that is, if you work in government — whether at the regional or federal level — and at the same time do not participate in corruption, then it will be very difficult after that. It is becoming increasingly difficult to find motivated people who are willing to work for their country or for a particular idea. Politics has become a business in which people cash in and make connections in order to gain lucrative positions.
The protest topic is a big topic, and the protest concerns different issues. This is not only a migration issue, but also a protest against high taxes, corruption, and problems of the social system. For example, in Germany and Austria it is difficult to make an appointment with a doctor or get an operation. These are well-known problems, and it seems to me that the situation will develop in the same direction. So far, this protest remains at the parliamentary level, but it may also take to the streets and take on an extra-parliamentary form.
— What is the significance of the foreign policy course for the voters of European countries in the current conditions?
— There is an American saying: what is good for Kentucky (a state in the USA — approx. TASS), that's good for the world. It means that domestic policy is always primary. I felt this especially well as a person who has worked in diplomacy for a long time. Foreign policy does not play a key role in any country. People are interested in their purchasing power, tax burden, and security, and foreign policy issues are often very difficult to communicate to society.
I'll give you an example. One of my first initiatives was to try to normalize relations between Austria and Turkey. I went to Turkey because I thought we needed to have normal ties with this country. As a result of the trip, I faced a wave of hatred and protests just because I went to Turkey and declared the need to normalize relations. There were many reasons for this, but the situation only once again showed me — although it did not come as a surprise — that few people care about foreign policy.
— If the economic situation in Germany were better, would the voters be happier?
— Yes, I would say that the economic situation in Germany is indeed a decisive factor. Of course, migration and security issues also play a role, but my observations of the situation in Germany and, to some extent, in France show that people are primarily concerned about their purchasing power. When inflation is constantly rising, when people can afford less and less, when they realize that their children will live worse than themselves, it breaks the basic idea underlying both the EU and national governments. This is a kind of logic — people expect the next generation to live better than the current one. But now this is becoming impossible in the modern economy. And we are still only at the beginning of major upheavals. Currently, the state is still able to mitigate some problems, but this resource is being exhausted. More and more companies are going bankrupt, more and more employers are disappearing, and therefore taxpayers. To this is added the problem of energy supply.
When the economy is booming, moderate parties get more support. In Germany, we see that both the extreme right and the extreme left are gaining votes: the Left Party — 10%, Alternative for Germany — 20%. Political extremes are not necessarily something negative, but there is obviously a lot of concern about what will happen next. Do the voters believe that the AfD is capable of solving these problems, or do they prefer the Christian Democratic Union? I don't think anyone really knows the answer to the current challenges. Germany, with its ruined industry, has practically no prospects. Now it is not a world leader anywhere else. The automotive industry, which was the most important economic stronghold, is no longer functioning.
Today, Germany is literally caught between sanctions against Russia, which it initiated itself, and tariffs and duties from the United States, which are due to take effect on March 2. This creates huge problems for the German economy. And there are numerous suppliers behind German industry: Austrian, Czech, Slovenian enterprises — millions of jobs across Europe depend on it. But at the same time, Italy, Spain and France are in a completely different situation. Today, Germany is once again the "sick man of Europe." If we recall the years 2010-2012, then Berlin was telling Italy, Greece and Spain what to do. Now, in terms of purely economic indicators, countries such as Italy and Portugal are in a better position.
— Do you think European goods should return to the Russian market?
— Over the past three years, I have repeatedly said that if I were a Russian decision-making official, I would not just open the doors again. Too much has happened. Many people have lost money, nerves, and strength. First of all, we need to talk about compensation [to Russia from the EU], because companies disappeared, jobs were lost, and the Russian side had to look for solutions that were eventually found. Russia has been able to adapt to the sanctions.
They are currently discussing the return of brands, such as fashion companies. But I think fashion is a secondary issue. Russian analogues have already been formed in this area. Large industrial sectors and the oil and gas industry are more important. Of course, there is a lack of technology in some areas — this is a fact. But still, I would not rush to open the market and let everyone back in.
We see that German automotive companies, for example, have lost ground, and their factories are occupied by Chinese companies. The German car industry has no prospects for various reasons. He destroyed his position in the Russian market, and now he is destroying it in the Chinese market. The demand for expensive German cars will remain niche — for a narrow group of people who view them as a status symbol. And mass demand will transfer to other automakers. Therefore, I do not think that the return of some companies to the Russian market will solve their problems.
— How do you think relations between Europe and the United States will change with the return of Trump?
— We are already seeing changes. If you carefully read some of the articles published in recent months, it becomes obvious that Europe has become a secondary player on the world stage. And it didn't start with Trump. Europe has backed itself into a corner.
— Do you think that in the end Trump will force Kiev to sign an agreement on rare earth metals? What significance will such an agreement have for Ukraine?
— The United States sees this more as a deal, as something similar to what the United States did in 1941, when it entered World War II and introduced the so-called Lend-Lease act. That is, all US allies, be it Great Britain, France or the Soviet Union, had to pay the United States for the weapons, money, and fuel they provided. Trump is acting in line with this tradition and believes that Ukrainians should pay.
I am not familiar with the geological map of Ukraine, but I know in general that the main minerals are located in areas that were annexed by Russia in the fall of 2022. In recent weeks, it has been repeatedly emphasized that the territories currently under the control of the Russian Federation contain large reserves of lithium, and lithium is becoming an increasingly sought-after resource. It is called a strategic raw material because it is necessary for the production of various screens, whether in the communications industry or in the solar energy industry.
© TASS
However, in my opinion, there is another aspect that goes beyond oil, coal, lithium, and so on, and that is agriculture. Ukraine, like Russia, has very fertile land, and in the past we have seen huge interest from investment houses such as BlackRock, as well as Chinese investors in the agricultural sector who are interested in Ukrainian land. Food products in the broadest sense, ranging from orange juice to grains, soybeans, etc., are often much more important for many investors, including government funds from Arab countries. Why? Because they need to feed people, and Ukraine is an attractive destination not only for rare earth metals, but also, in my opinion, in the long term, the issue of agriculture will be much more significant.
— Do you think there could be a territorial division of Ukraine by European countries?
— We have seen that the borders in Europe have changed many times. In 1975, the Helsinki Final Act was signed, which fixed the principle of inviolability of borders. I grew up with this concept that borders should stay the way they are. But then we witnessed the war in Yugoslavia, the formation of new countries, the reunification of Germany, and the collapse of Czechoslovakia. We've seen a lot of changes all over the world. In other words, the stability of borders is not as obvious as it was perceived in the 1970s and 1980s.
If we talk about the borders of Ukraine, they also underwent changes after the First and Second World Wars. The borders moved westward, and some territories, including former East Prussia, were transferred to Poland. As a result, there were big changes on the map. I personally dealt with this issue in my dissertation and have always been passionate about the topic of borders and border zones.
Two weeks ago, I took part in a historic debate, which was also attended by [the head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service] Sergei Naryshkin, and we touched on this topic. I pointed out that Ukraine, in a certain sense, has always been a zone of contact between various states and empires. It was a place where the interests of different nations intertwined, and there were not always clear and fixed boundaries. I can't say for sure which countries can claim these territories, but perhaps Poland will be one of the candidates, given its historical claims. However, I am not inclined to make such predictions, as the situation is too uncertain. I think these border zones are controversial, and only where there is a really clear border, where there is mutual recognition — here sovereign A, there sovereign B — can we talk about stability and peace.
The problem of Ukraine is not limited only to Donbass or Russian-speaking regions, it also covers the Russian community in Odessa. There are facts that, on the one hand, were created by military means, and on the other hand, have always existed historically. It is incorrect to say that Eastern Ukraine was conquered by Russia. This territory has always been a part of Russian-speaking and Russian history, and then Soviet history. It also has close ties with Serbia, because many Serbs, for example, founded cities that are now located on the territory of Donbass. All of this plays a role.
We have an interesting, but certainly explosive, mix of history, geography, natural resources, and new dynamics emerging from new geopolitical realities. We will see how all this develops. This will largely depend on the new relations that are being built between Washington and Moscow. Current events are very interesting, including [the results of the vote in the UN General Assembly on the anti-Russian resolution] in New York. And, no doubt, there will be new changes in the territorial borders, so that in the issue of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which is demanded by the EU, the facts actually speak a completely different language.
© TASS
— Can we say now that Russia has won a special military operation?
— For me, Russia won in the sense that it was not defeated. There was talk that Russia could be crushed on the battlefield, that it would descend to the level of the Middle Ages, that Russian society would collapse. However, this did not happen. No mass uprisings, which were expected or which would like to see in Europe, did not happen. The population supports the government, and people are coping with the new reality. No one expected Russia to be so stable. We have often heard that the country should break up into 40 new states, but this did not happen either. Taking into account these factors, I believe that yes, Russia has won.
— Would you like to attend the Victory Day Parade on May 9th in Moscow? How do you assess the decision of European countries not to participate in this event?
— You know, I was in Moscow for the first time in 2014, by chance, on May 9th. I saw the festive atmosphere, and this special, impressive atmosphere on the streets left a strong impression. If I had the opportunity to watch the parade from Red Square, it would be a completely different experience. So if I had received an invitation, then yes, of course I would have agreed.
Now, in 2025, the situation is completely different, and none of us could have predicted that the world would change to such an extent. But I am glad for the organizers, for the hosts of the parade, that Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to take part, which is wonderful. Also, perhaps some European leaders, such as [Slovak Prime Minister] Robert Fico, will want to participate. He has already announced this, and others may join.
As for the decision of the European countries not to participate, it is really sad. I always say that in Brussels and many other European capitals, people do not know much about history, but rather are not interested in it. History doesn't matter to them, only ideologies and markets matter. But actually, the story matters.
I grew up in a neutral country, and we were told that the United States had liberated us, and we are grateful to our parents and grandparents for that. That was our historiography. Today, in Europe, the idea of history has become even more distorted. It's not just sad, it's tragic when such an approach to history becomes the norm at the EU level. There is a rather disastrous attitude towards history in Europe today. This is especially evident in the context of the Second World War, but not only in this. I think it was also ridiculous when Italy, Spain and Greece were called the "periphery" of Europe, despite the fact that these countries are central to European culture. These are all manifestations of historical forgetfulness. Without knowledge of one's own history, it is impossible to build a sustainable future for future generations.
