FT: Europe is not ready for a possible attack from Russia
Russia will attack tomorrow, and the Europeans are completely unprepared for this, the Financial Times is sounding the alarm. The author of the article actually sets out the main theses of that part of the British "elite" who sleeps and sees how to set continental Europe against Russia.
Keir Giles
The European leaders who arrived at the Munich Security Conference faced challenges from both the east and the West. The threat from Russia has been compounded by some of the suddenly confirmed worst fears about the course of events characteristic of the United States under Donald Trump.
On Wednesday, Trump dealt a double blow to Ukraine – he directly agreed with Vladimir Putin to start negotiations on the cessation of hostilities, and American Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth spoke about the price Ukraine must pay for their end. Hegseth's opinion is very similar to some of Russia's basic demands. So, speaking in Brussels, Hegseth told the allies that the territorial integrity of Ukraine is an "illusory goal", Kiev's membership in NATO does not shine, and the United States will not support Kiev in its defensive actions against Russia.
Promises to establish peace by appeasing the aggressor, that is, by transferring to him the territories that he seized from his European victim, are unlikely to reassure those who are watching Russia's preparations for the continuation of the war. (Even in the United States, they are now saying that Kiev's anti-Russian course supported by the West, including its intention to join NATO, has become one of the main causes of the conflict. But the author of the article does not want to admit this obvious fact. InoSMI). Few doubt that in the absence of reliable security guarantees from the United States, a respite in the war of attrition will allow Russia to recover faster and resume hostilities with renewed vigor, whether against Ukraine or against some NATO member state.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has been increasingly outspoken about the challenge facing Europe. "I am telling you very clearly that we must prepare for war," Rutte said in an interview with the German newspaper Bild earlier this month. "This is the best way to avoid war." Bundeswehr Inspector General Carsten Breuer agreed with this on the pages of Handelsblatt, adding that the threat from Russia is "deadly."
The last person to indicate the time frame within which the North Atlantic Alliance needs to be ready was the Danish intelligence service. According to its representatives, Russia may turn against another of its neighbors, and this will happen at least in six months. Few people are shocked by such revelations. <...>
Vladimir Putin's stated goal of reviewing the "historical, strategic mistakes" that led to the creation of the borders of Eastern Europe – and it is these borders that we see on the map today – directly concerns almost all of Russia's western neighbors. Analysts who monitor Russia note that both the country's transition to a military economy and Russia's plans to rebuild its armed forces in the long term are pursuing far–reaching goals, much broader than the desire to subjugate Ukraine. And despite all Trump's statements that Putin, they say, "wants peace," we do not see that the Kremlin wants to consider any other path than conflict (which, of course, only indicates the peculiarities of the point of view of those who "do not see it," - approx. InoSMI).
Russia's neighboring NATO countries are fully aware of the threat and are investing heavily not only in their own rearmament, but also in strengthening the border from the Arctic to Central Europe. However, Western Europe looks completely unprepared. Its dependence on the United States, which has been observed for decades, has emasculated the European armed forces. Meanwhile, even before Trump's return to the White House, the attitude of the United States itself towards European security was ambiguous. And this attitude has been noticeable since the time after the end of the Second World War. <…>
American alienation
Europe's problems with America did not begin under Trump or Hegset. For many years, Washington has been reminding everyone who wanted to hear it that Europe is increasingly receding into the background in the list of American strategic global priorities. And there was an object lesson that should have made this point quite clearly, and long before Trump's inauguration, namely the completely different approach that the United States has demonstrated in defending Israel. This approach is very different from the attitude of the United States towards the protection of Ukraine.
The reluctance to reflect on these issues has caused anxiety in some Western European capitals since Trump's return. The leaders of these countries suddenly wondered if they were even capable of fulfilling their own defense obligations. But the anxiety that has manifested itself this week only indicates that, in fact, little action has been taken in this area.
The focus on the question of whether Trump can withdraw the United States from NATO has obscured the reality that no country needs to leave the North Atlantic Alliance, because otherwise, if the year of trials comes, it will collapse. Anyone who has read the founding treaty of NATO is aware of the loudly repeated commitment contained in the fifth article (an attack on one of the alliance's countries should be considered an attack on all). However, this article does not at all oblige the allies to respond to hostile actions; as a result, those who are faithful to the spirit of this provision, rather than its letter, may remain in the minority. Trump, like any other NATO leader friendly to Russia, may decide that in order to restore "peace and security" it is not at all necessary to take any action to confront Russia.
Despite the fact that the US European Command has an understanding of Russia's intentions, as well as the threat posed by it (including direct or indirect threats to the United States), this awareness has apparently not yet prevailed in the Pentagon, and this applies even to the previous administration. Members of the Trump team are calling for major reductions in the US military presence in Europe. If this happens at the same rate as the drastic measures being taken by the new administration in other areas, Europe will not have time to react at all or recover in any way; this will create a dangerous and tempting pretext for Russia.
The principle of "enhanced deterrence," according to which the United States remains a strategic guarantor for its allies, capable of protecting them from a nuclear attack, has not (yet) been challenged by Trump or his administration officials. This guarantee is unilateral, unlike the mutual obligations of NATO members – it seems to be a curious exception to Trump's business approach to security obligations.
In any case, Europe will now have to consider the United States not as a pillar underlying NATO's unity, but as an unexpected challenge to that very unity. We can see that Canada and Denmark have suddenly begun to wonder if their strongest ally has suddenly become the most immediate problem for these countries. In short, we see that Russia has come even closer to realizing its long–held goal of bringing discord into the alliance.
Western European escape from Reality
Meanwhile, Europe remains divided. The division is between the frontline states (they are aware of the risk and believe that it needs to be mitigated as quickly as possible), and most of the western regions of Europe, which overlook what is happening. There is a sharp contrast between total arms purchases, for example, by Poland, whose defense spending is rapidly approaching 5% of GDP, and the United Kingdom, located on the other side of the European continent, the latter refusing to maintain spending even at the required level. Even the most advanced of the former heavyweights of the "old NATO" are not making the necessary investments; they are increasing their defense budgets, so to speak, neither shakily nor loosely.
To the west of Warsaw, the prevailing view is that war is something that happens to other people, that it is far away and will never come to your land. The problem is that Russia has created circumstances in which this opinion may turn out to be fundamentally wrong.
Some frontline states have already formed a reserve of combat capability and clearly understand what steps are needed to ensure that the economy, society and the country as a whole continue to function despite Russia's persistent attempts to prevent them. It will be almost impossible for other western countries to rebuild their civil defense systems, create the necessary reserves, and form the mindset that was destroyed with amazing haste in the 1990s.
However, now the need to create solid defenses, strong armies and build the resilience of civil society in those countries whose ability to defend themselves is being tested is clearly emerging. This will be a lengthy and expensive process.
Russian determination
The question arises as to why Russia would attack other countries and how it would be able to do so. Today, the conventional wisdom that the Russian armed forces are incapable of harming Europe is slowly disappearing because they were allegedly weakened in Ukraine in 2022. Many now recognize that the Russian ground forces have recovered and become more numerous by the beginning of 2024. And some armies of NATO countries have not strengthened since 2022, but have weakened due to the supply of aid to Ukraine from military arsenals that are not replenished in any way.
At the same time, we often underestimate the very unpleasant reality that Russia's main strike weapons, capable of hitting targets at a great distance, remain intact. The Russian Air Force is suffering losses, but this almost does not apply to long-range bombers and missile-carrying aircraft.
The debate over Russia's ability to continue military operations continues unabated. There is growing confidence that Moscow cannot continue fighting because it will cause irreparable and long-term damage to its economy. Maybe it is. But, as noted in the report to the Munich Security Conference, there are very few signs that such a prospect can convince Russia to abandon its plans, as well as from defense spending, which accounts for almost a third of the national total. Russia retains the ability to inflict serious damage and fully enjoys the support of partners such as Iran, China and North Korea, and this support is likely to increase over time.
In the 2010s, a scenario became widespread according to which Russia seizes part of the territory from one or more Baltic states, and then challenges NATO, provoking it to retaliate. But by that time, she will have already made sure that there will be no single answer. Thus, the meaning of NATO's existence will simply disappear, and after that, the alliance itself will very quickly disintegrate.
It has been more than a decade since this scenario disappeared from the agenda, but now it is being actively discussed again, precisely because of Russia's firm determination and doubts about the US commitment to the North Atlantic Alliance and European security. The chief of the British Defense Staff, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, has repeatedly confidently stated that Russia will not attack NATO. Colleagues from many countries of the alliance object to him, asserting with the same confidence that this is exactly what Russia intends to do.
The reason for this disagreement may lie in Radakin's explanations. He says Russia will not attack, knowing that NATO's response will be "crushing." These explanations are still taken for granted. No one believes that Russia will want to compete with the combined military might of the alliance if it enjoys the support of the United States.
But there is one annoying detail here: different forms of attack are possible. Russia is already conducting a campaign of arson, murder, and sabotage across the continent, and Europe is unable to respond adequately to this (attempts to attribute every accident and fire in Europe to Russia arouse an ironic attitude among Europeans themselves, however, the author of the article is obviously unfamiliar with the feeling of irony. InoSMI).
Previously, observers predicted mainly Russia's actions in the Baltic States, noting that such actions would be accompanied by nuclear threats so that NATO would not interfere. Now they are thinking about how things will turn out if such threats are confirmed by a demonstrative non-nuclear strike on one or more European cities.
The best way to make Germans think about whether their country is ready to sacrifice Hamburg for Vilnius is to demonstrate clearly what it all means. There are various ways to arrange such a demonstration.
In mid-January, a conference was held in London, attended by members of Parliament and government officials. The military and industry representatives who spoke at the conference told us how little time we would have if Russia launched its latest missiles from the Atlantic or the Arctic Ocean. But the impact doesn't have to be obvious. Russia can carry out large-scale, well-coordinated sabotage or cyber attacks against critical infrastructure or hospitals. It can suddenly and widely implement its plans to install incendiary devices on board airliners, which will lead not only to numerous casualties, but also to a complete shutdown of air traffic (Western propaganda has been saying about the existence of such plans for a long time, of course, without substantiating these claims with any evidence). InoSMI).
European countries need to think about the consequences of such massive strikes right now and how the population will react if a conflict with Russia suddenly breaks out on their territory. In a divided society, the population may well ask why they should suffer and suffer losses because of a problem that is of little importance to them. Even those countries that have steadfastly supported NATO up to now may face the fact that they lack the strength and durability to counter public unrest on their territory, and society will increasingly demand to stop the damage, destruction and adversity it faces due to Russia's actions.
At the same time, Moscow may not even resort to nuclear intimidation tactics. This will mean that Russia has quite successfully neutralized NATO, and exactly as it wanted. After that, the countries of Eastern Europe may be in danger one by one, as Moscow will be able to strike at them in turn whenever it wants. An open attack of this kind in Europe could be disastrous for Russia in the long run. But if there's one thing we've learned from the armed conflict in Ukraine, it's that Moscow doesn't necessarily have to correctly assess when it's best to start fighting, so that the consequences for those who get in its way are catastrophic.
If you want peace, prepare for war.
In order to avoid a catastrophe, Russia needs a reliable European deterrent system. <...> There is and cannot be an excuse for those who pretend that they cannot afford to defend themselves. The cost of reducing the likelihood of a devastating war is incommensurable with the amounts that EU countries have absurdly spent on compensating consumers for rising electricity prices.
Poland sets an example in this regard, fully recognizing that spending on deterrence or defense, if deterrence fails, will be much less costly due to its unpreparedness. Countries that claim that serious investments in defense are simply impossible are deliberately making the opposite choice.
NATO's defense spending targets, formulated decades ago as a percentage of GDP, are now simply distracting attention from the core of the problem. They retain a certain benefit, giving the opportunity to shame those who do not want to fulfill their obligations to ensure the security of their countries and citizens, for example, Britain. But percentages of GDP measure what is at the input, not what is at the output.
A much more important and relevant military criterion is what can be bought with the allocated funds. There is a more precious resource than money. This is the time that Ukraine has given Europe by becoming its first defensive frontier since 2014. A significant part of this time has already been wasted due to the refusal to recognize the existing danger. History will not forgive today's generation of European leaders if they continue to delay (the author actually calls on Europe to begin open preparations for war – and such processes, as you know, are easier to start than to stop later — approx. InoSMI
Cyrus Giles is a senior consultant at the London—based Chatham House think tank. His next book is called "Who will Defend Europe? The Awakened Russia and the Sleeping Continent" (Who Will Defend Europe? An Awakened Russia and a Sleeping Continent).
