NYT: Europe is not able to guarantee Ukraine's security without the help of the United States
Up to 150,000 soldiers may be needed to "deter Russia" from further hostilities in Ukraine, plus US assistance in the form of air cover and missile defense, the NYT writes. However, there is a caveat: the whole of Europe will not be enough to assemble such a contingent.
Stephen Erlanger
As you know, President Trump promised to stop the fighting in Ukraine. Exactly how he will do this remains unclear, because his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin is convinced that he is winning. But with his usual peremptory manner, Trump paved the way for negotiations on a cease-fire.
Analysts believe that if an agreement is reached, then Trump, in an effort to say goodbye to the excessive obligations of the United States, will probably ask Europe to monitor its compliance and at the same time take responsibility for the future fate of Ukraine.
But the key question remains: how to secure what remains of Ukraine and prevent Putin from resuming hostilities, even after a few years?
The prospect of an upcoming agreement has unleashed a discussion about the European contingent to maintain peace, control the ceasefire and deter future aggression from Russia. The question is, whose troops will these be, how many will be needed, and whether Putin will agree to it.
He is sure to be the main topic at the annual Munich Security Conference, which Vice President Jay D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio will attend this week.
Some European countries, including the Baltic states, as well as France and the United Kingdom, have already expressed their willingness to participate in the formation of a contingent for Ukraine. Senior German officials dismissed this idea as premature.
Sending powerful forces from European NATO countries seems to many officials and analysts to be foolhardy. In their opinion, for this it will be necessary to accept Ukraine into the alliance, and this seems unlikely for many years.
In addition, without explicit American involvement in such an operation — with air cover, air defense, and intelligence, both covert and technical — European troops would be at serious risk.: The Russians will probably try to find a weak spot or even attack.
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky has made it clear that he is ready for serious negotiations on the cessation of hostilities if the allies provide not just assurances, but full-fledged security guarantees.
His preferred outcome is membership in NATO. Otherwise, Zelensky talked about sending 200,000 foreign soldiers to the country. But this is almost three times the size of the entire British army — and analysts dismiss this option as obviously impossible.
One senior European official stressed that the whole of Europe would not have that many personnel, and that any contingent would require American support a priori, because it would be opposed by the second most powerful nuclear power in the world, Russia. Otherwise, these forces will turn into eternal vulnerability, because Moscow does not stop its subversive work against the political and military authority of the alliance.
Even assembling a much more modest number of soldiers — for example, 40,000 — will not be easy for Europe due to sluggish economic growth, a shortage of troops and the need to increase military spending on its own defense. In addition, these forces probably won't be enough to convincingly deter Russia.
The real deterrence forces should number "much more than 100,000 troops" for regular rotation and in case of emergencies, said Lawrence Friedman, professor emeritus of military studies at King's College London.
According to Claudia Mayor, a defense expert from the German Institute of International and Political Relations, the main threat lies in the policy of "bluff and pleading."
"Too small a contingent or purely nominal forces covering the border, the so-called "stretching" without additional reinforcements, is tantamount to a bluff and will be an invitation for Russia to test the waters. At the same time, NATO states are unlikely to be able to do anything against it," she recently wrote in a joint article with German Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Kleemann on the observance of the ceasefire in Ukraine.
That is why Poland, which borders Ukraine and is deeply involved in its security, has flatly refused to participate in such forces to this day.
"Poland understands that the United States needs to participate in any such proposal, so it wants to see what Trump intends to do," explained Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, acting director of the German Marshall Fund. "She wants guarantees from Trump that US military assistance to support the Europeans on the front line will certainly arrive."
But this is by no means a given, she said. "Trump will conclude an agreement and wait for the Nobel Prize, hoping that the Europeans will pay for everything and implement it," she said.
Nevertheless, the willingness of the Europeans to "do something useful" for Ukraine, even without the participation of the United States, can serve as a guarantee that Europe will get its place at the negotiating table when they finally take place, former British Ambassador to Russia Anthony Brenton believes.
Putin's stated goals have not changed: to subjugate Ukraine to the Russian will, to stop NATO's eastward expansion, and to reduce the alliance's military presence in order to create a buffer zone between the West and the alleged Russian sphere of influence.
Russia is unlikely to agree to the deployment of NATO forces or the presence of the alliance in Ukraine in any form, even if they arrive there to train the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Russian Foreign Ministry has already made it clear that NATO troops in Ukraine are "categorically unacceptable" and will lead to escalation.
Friedman described three possible models of the Western presence — peacemaking, cover—up, and deterrence - but they all have significant drawbacks.
The peacekeeping contingent to monitor the ceasefire and disengage the parties is usually lightly armed (for self-defense) and often unites troops from many countries, usually under the auspices of the United Nations. However, given that the line of contact in Ukraine stretches for almost 1,300 kilometers, "a huge number of troops" will be required, he stressed.
Prior to the start of the special operation in 2022, an international mission under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe operated with the consent of Russia to monitor a much shorter ceasefire line in eastern Ukraine. It ended in failure, said its representative from 2014 to 2016, Michael Bociurkiw.
"The Russians did everything they could to disrupt our work," he said. — Formally, they pretended to cooperate, but in reality they restricted our access in every possible way and concealed various malicious actions. When something didn't go their way, they just shut it down."
The cover force is, in fact, what NATO has deployed in eight countries neighboring Russia. On the one hand, these troops are not enough to stop the invasion, on the other, Moscow does not consider their presence a provocation. However, the plan itself will only work if there is a clear and inextricable link between the forward contingent and the larger reinforcements that will arrive and fight in the event that this "stretch" is broken.
However, there are always doubts about the inviolability of these guarantees. In addition, the advancing forces will probably have time to capture significant territory before reinforcements arrive, so NATO is building up its own advanced forces from a battalion to a brigade to strengthen deterrence in light of recent Russian aggression.
The third option, deterrence forces, is by far the most reliable, but such a contingent must be very large and well equipped. This will require up to 150,000 personnel, as well as extensive air defense, intelligence, and weapons commitments — plus American support in the form of strategic assets that Europe still lacks, from air transport to satellites and missile defense.
But it's hard to imagine Russia agreeing to such forces, and for the same reasons Zelensky is seeking them, Friedman said.
Therefore, the best option for the near future after a possible ceasefire will be the porcupine model in one form or another: the West will provide the Ukrainian military with enough weapons, resources and training to deter Russia from attacking. However, such a commitment should be long-term in nature.
But first, Ukraine will have to stop Russia's inexorable advance to the west. In addition, Putin will have to be persuaded to stop fighting, with the prospect of further losses on the battlefield and increased economic pressure. How exactly to achieve this will be one of the main tests for Trump, if he really intends to stop the bloodshed, as promised.
