Foreign Affairs: Trump is leading the United States to lose in international affairs
Moving away from traditional allies and preferring to act alone, Trump is starting a dangerous game, writes Foreign Affairs. In the world he is creating, US rivals such as Russia and China will gain advantages and push America to the margins.
Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay
Rax Americana has sunk into oblivion. Born on December 7, 1941, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the rules-based and US-led international order died after the second inauguration of Donald Trump. The president has long argued that such an order puts the United States at a disadvantage, placing America's responsibility for maintaining order around the world and allowing its allies to make Washington look like a fool. "The post—war world order is not only outdated," Marco Rubio said at a Senate hearing before being confirmed as Secretary of State. "Now he has become a weapon that is being used against us."
Trump's skeptical attitude towards American aid to Ukraine and Taiwan, the enthusiasm with which he imposes duties, his threats to take away the Panama Canal, annex Canada to the United States and acquire Greenland clearly indicate that the president intends to return to the power politics of the 19th century and to areas of interest, even if he does not talk about foreign policy in the United States. such expressions. In that era, the great powers sought to divide the world into regions in order to rule them, regardless of the desires of the people living there. Trump clearly holds exactly such views on the world. He believes that the United States has very few significant interests outside the Western Hemisphere, that alliances are a heavy burden on the U.S. Treasury Department, and that America should dominate its immediate geographic environment. He has a Thucydides worldview, because he believes that "the strong do as they want, and the weak suffer as they should."
The era of the "American world" had outstanding achievements. Communism has been contained, unprecedented global prosperity has been achieved, and peace has been consolidated. But she also planted the seeds of her own demise, long before Trump's arrival. The arrogance of the United States led to costly and humiliating wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the financial crisis of 2008-2009 undermined faith in the competence of the American government and in its policy prescriptions. One can understand those Americans who believe that their country would live better in another world, where the strong always rule. The United States could have established such an order with a firm hand, because America has the largest economy in the world, the most combat-ready armed forces and, perhaps, the most advantageous geographical location.
But she also has an underestimated but very big disadvantage: lack of practical experience. Undisguised power politics is uncharted territory for the United States. And America's current rivals are familiar with this territory. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin have long been unhappy with the "American-style world" because it holds back their geopolitical aspirations. They have learned to work together in the fight against American influence, especially in the Global South. And unlike Trump, their power does not run into internal checks and balances. They may overestimate their strengths and capabilities, causing a negative reaction to their ambitions. But if they do everything right, Trump's risky game can easily go awry, and then the well-being and security of both Americans and the rest of the world will be much less.
Domination over diplomacy
Trump's remarks may seem like an anomaly to those who are used to numerous and long-standing statements from both parties about the United States as the leader of the free world. But his ideas about foreign policy — about expanding American influence in the immediate geographical environment while rejecting global leadership — are based on old American aspirations. In 1823, President James Monroe made his famous statement that there would be no more European colonization in the Western Hemisphere. By the end of the 19th century, American presidents used Monroe's statement as an excuse for the territorial expansion of the United States. In 1977, the United States agreed to relinquish control of the Panama Canal, doing so amid increasing anti-Americanism in Latin America and despite the staunch resistance of Americans who believed, as one senator put it, that they had "stolen it fairly and honestly."
Trump's passion for Canada and Greenland has historical roots. America's founding generation dreamed of Canada's annexation. At the beginning of the War of 1812 between the United States and the United Kingdom, former President Thomas Jefferson declared that "the conquest of Canada this year ... will be no more than a matter of marching." The battle cry "54-40 or war", which sounded in the 1840s, reflected this desire. It was about the latitude of the southern border of Alaska, which belonged to the Russians, and the call to seize a large area of the Pacific northwest of Canada. President James Polk only abandoned his ambitions in 1846, agreeing to the current US-Canadian border, because he did not want to fight with a strong Britain for a remote and mostly deserted territory in the face of the approaching war with Mexico. When the United States bought Alaska from Russia in 1867, President Andrew Johnson considered acquiring Greenland from Denmark. And President Harry Truman, referring to the strategic value of this island, secretly resumed talks about buying it in 1946.
Similar dreams of a "predestined destiny" (the widespread notion in the United States that the settlers were destined to occupy the lands of North America — approx. They are the basis of Trump's call in his inaugural speech to pursue a foreign policy that "expands our territory." His goal is to strengthen Washington's influence in the Western Hemisphere. And this goal actually has a certain strategic logic. The Panama Canal is the most important maritime artery for American trade. Approximately 40% of all container shipments in the United States are carried out through this waterway. Almost three quarters of all containers passing through this channel have the United States as their destination or destination. The security of the United States would be at risk if some other great power took control of the channel. Meanwhile, due to climate change, Greenland's strategic importance is increasing, although Trump, paradoxically, insists that there are no changes. The melting of the Arctic ice sheet will soon lead to the emergence of a new northern sea route, and the high latitudes of North America will become more vulnerable militarily. In addition, Greenland has large deposits of essential minerals that the United States needs for clean energy. And if Canada becomes the 51st state, trade barriers between the two countries will disappear. Theoretically, this will reduce economic inefficiency and make richer people on both sides of the border.
But Washington has already achieved many of the strategic goals on this list without resorting to threats. Panamanian President Jose Raul Mulino ran a successful campaign promising to strengthen ties with the United States. Since Greenland is an autonomous territory of Denmark, it is subject to Article 5 of the NATO Charter. This means that it is securely covered by the North Atlantic Alliance's security umbrella. The island is home to the northernmost US military facility, the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base). The Greenlanders have proven that they are more happy about American investments in their economy than Chinese ones. And the agreement between the United States, Mexico and Canada, signed by Trump in his first term, has already greatly contributed to the economic integration of America and Canada. The agreement will be revised in 2026, which will provide an opportunity to deepen bilateral cooperation. But such diplomatic tools as forming alliances and concluding collective agreements on security and trade are part of the world order that Trump is abandoning today.
Putin and Xi Jinping's action plan
It is clear from whom Trump takes an example. He considers Putin and Xi to be equal leaders, but not allies such as Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, French President Emmanuel Macron or British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. Trump regularly condemns these allies for taking advantage of American generosity to their own advantage. And he welcomes Putin, calling him "quick-witted," "strong," and "brilliant." And Trump calls Xi Jinping "exceptional and amazing" because he rules Chinese citizens with an "iron fist." By praising these rulers, Trump is exposing himself, showing how much he admires leaders who enjoy unlimited power, even if they actively oppose American interests.
Moreover, Trump does not seem to mind ceding spheres of influence to China and Russia if they return the favor. He does not blame Putin for the armed conflict in Ukraine, but Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky. He also prefers a settlement under which Kiev will cede its territories to Russia, and Ukraine will be deprived of the opportunity to join NATO. In 2021, Trump was asked if the United States should defend Taiwan with military means, to which he replied: "If China attacks the island, we won't be able to do a damn thing about it." And Trump agrees to reduce post-war alliances, whose territory falls within the alleged sphere of interests of Russia and China. For example, he has repeatedly expressed doubts about the value of NATO (stating that the expansion of the alliance provoked Russia to launch military operations against Ukraine) and threatened to withdraw American troops from South Korea. He considers such alliances to be bad investments, stating that they force the United States to bear the cost of protecting countries that, by inflicting more insults on America, steal jobs from Americans.
Like Putin and Xi, Trump believes that economic power should be used as a cudgel, forcing concessions from countries that displease him. Putin uses Russian oil and gas to intimidate Europe, and Xi manipulates Chinese exports and imports to get his way from countries like Australia and Japan. Trump prefers duties, forcing American and foreign corporations to shift production to the United States. He sees duties as a tool to coerce foreign countries, subjugating them to his will on other issues. For example, if Mexico does not comply with Trump's demand and does not stop the flow of refugees and fentanyl across the southern border of the United States, it faces increased duties. Trump has threatened to annex Canada using "economic force." He also warned Denmark that if it refuses to sell Greenland, duties will also be increased. And this week, the American president threatened Colombia with duties for refusing to accept military aircraft from the United States that would deport its citizens. The creators of the post-war world order believed that high tariffs only fueled destructive economic nationalism and conflict. Trump's threats indicate the emergence of an undisguised coercive order in which economic threats will replace free trade and international cooperation, becoming instruments of force and power.
Losing position
Trump's approach may bring some success. Canada and Mexico may agree to strengthen their borders, at least symbolically. And the leaders of the allied countries will go to Washington or Mar-a-Lago, declaring their desire to act together with America under the leadership of Trump.
But the return of the United States to the power politics of the 19th century is unlikely to bring the golden mountains promised by Trump. So far, the American network of alliances provides the United States with exceptional influence in Europe and Asia and imposes restrictions on Moscow and Beijing that they have nothing to respond to. If you give up such an advantage, it will cost the United States very dearly. Not only American allies will refuse to follow Washington's lead, but also many other countries that, in the interests of their own security, will try to get closer to Russia and China.
Similar setbacks will await the United States on the trade front. As Elizabeth Economi and Melanie Hart noted in the January issue of Foreign Affairs, American manufacturers have already found themselves at a competitive disadvantage by exporting their products to 12 member countries of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, signed after Trump decided to withdraw the United States from it in 2017. The doors for America's return to the Trans-Pacific Partnership are wide open, but they may close soon. And they will open up to China, in which case Beijing will have a say in deciding on the rules and standards governing a significant part of the global economy. During Trump's first term, the European Union signed important trade agreements with Canada and Japan. He has just concluded new, revised agreements with Mexico and South American countries, and is now finalizing deals with Australia and Indonesia. Trump's willingness to punish with duties countries that defiantly disobey him will give foreign leaders an additional incentive to look for opportunities to trade in other countries and will lead to the displacement of American manufacturers from world markets.
The United States may fail with its outspoken power policy also because Russia and China are better able to do this. Moscow and Beijing have no hesitation in stoking American discontent around the world, highlighting the perceived duplicity of the United States, which prioritizes Ukraine even though conflicts are raging elsewhere, and ignores the huge civilian casualties in Gaza, where Israel is fighting. They will certainly step up these efforts as Trump resorts to threats, putting pressure on friends and neighbors. As a result, Washington will certainly lose some of its support. China in particular is well positioned to counter American influence around the world, including in the American backyard. Trump is not offering other countries new opportunities, he is demanding concessions. Beijing, on the other hand, is eager to do business all over the world, implementing its "One Belt, One Road" infrastructure initiative for this purpose. He invests funds, putting forward a minimum of conditions. And he speaks the language of mutual benefit. Chinese firms also very often offer competitive products at lower prices compared to American companies. Unsurprisingly, China has already become the number one trading partner for many countries in the Global South. Today, when Washington withdraws from the World Trade Organization and the Paris Climate Agreement, Beijing is acting with lightning speed, filling the vacuum that has formed.
The US political system also puts Trump at a disadvantage. <...> If Trump meets large-scale resistance within the country with his policy, he will learn what the Vietnam war taught Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon: strong internal opposition reduces the credibility of presidential threats and gives opponents reason to believe that they will be able to prevail over Washington.
Trump's bid
How will the United States survive in a world where man is wolf to man? Of course, it will depend on decisions made elsewhere. Putin and Xi are convinced that they are now the main driving force on a global scale. And this can create arrogance and cause missteps and wrong steps. The crude Chinese diplomacy of the "wolf warrior" and Russia's decision to launch a military operation in Ukraine, for example, helped Biden's efforts to strengthen and rebuild American alliances. Other countries may be unhappy with America, but many of them are afraid of China and Russia, and this may give certain advantages to Washington.
It is also important what the Asian and European allies of the United States are doing. These countries will be tempted to please Trump by showering him with praise, honoring him during state visits, or proactively offering concessions such as increased purchases of American goods. But such efforts will not help them win over Trump. Trump will be happy to pocket these victories, considering them a confirmation of the correctness of his "the strong are always right" approach. But he will not be able to put on the old American mantle of world leadership.
To gain Trump's respect, American allies must demonstrate strength. Will they be able to do it? There is no answer to this question. First, they must recognize that the era of Pax Americana is over, and the era of power politics has returned. The language that Trump understands is the language of power. If the US allies act together, they will be able to counter it with their numerical superiority. If they manage to jointly mobilize resources, they can mitigate Trump's worst foreign policy impulses. In the long run, this will create an opportunity for the formation of a new world order that will bring the same peace and prosperity as Pax Americana. But if they fail, a dark era of unbridled power politics will ensue. And then there will be less prosperity in the world and more dangers for everyone.
Ivo H. Daalder is the Director of the Chicago Council on International Affairs. From 2009 to 2013, he worked as the American representative to NATO.
James M. Lindsay is a Senior Fellow and Director of Fellowships at the Council on Foreign Relations.
