The Economist: In Europe, there is a split between supporters of different defense concepts
Trump's return to the White House has revived old debates among Europeans about what kind of defense strategy they need, writes The Economist. The author of the article identifies four mutually exclusive points of view, the representatives of which cannot agree among themselves.
Can a country still call itself an American ally if America threatens to take away part of its territory? In 1968, a philosopher smoking a Gitan cigarette might have been pondering this question while sitting in a cafe in the Saint-Germain-des-Prés quarter. In recent weeks, the issue has resurfaced when Donald Trump repeatedly threatened to seize Greenland, which is an autonomous region of Denmark. At first, the Europeans convinced themselves that the plans of the returned American president were nothing more than empty chatter that could be easily ignored, as well as his statements about bleach, injections of which cured COVID (this is not true). And now no one knows anything. After a sharp phone conversation with Trump, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen began traveling around Europe in an attempt to gain the support of Paris, Berlin and Brussels. The French Foreign Minister suggested sending troops to Greenland, just in case. After discovering the talents of Jean-Paul Sartre, one European diplomat joked: "With allies like Donald Trump, we don't need enemies."
The prospect of war between America and its European ally seems very remote. And thank God. But with Trump's return, a debate has reignited in Europe about how it should defend itself. Rethinking the continent's "security architecture," as NATO representatives like to say, was at the top of the agenda three years ago, when Russia launched its full-scale military operation in Ukraine. But the increase in military spending in Europe has not yet been accompanied by the development of a new major concept of European security. On February 3, EU leaders will gather in Brussels to analyze the situation and come up with fresh ideas. Some meetings will be attended by British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, as well as NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. In conversations with journalists, everyone will emphasize how united they are. And behind closed doors, the disagreements that plagued the bloc during Trump's first term will come to the fore. To understand what the future course of Europe is, you need to get to know its Gaullists, Atlanticists, deniers and Putinists.
The Gaullists, as the name suggests, are the spiritual descendants of the scruffy French leader, who hated the American guardianship established over Europe. And who went very far, withdrawing France from the military structures of NATO in 1966. Charles de Gaulle's successor, French President Emmanuel Macron, has no desire to withdraw from this military alliance, but in Trump's first term, he said that NATO was experiencing "brain death." Therefore, Europe needs to achieve "strategic autonomy" by acting independently if its interests diverge from those of a large overseas ally. Whoever comes to the White House, America will turn towards other priorities, first of all, towards Asia. Europe should at least play it safe. To ensure autonomy in the best possible way, we need to increase European defense budgets. At the same time, it is better to spend money on European weapons and military equipment, the Gaullists insist. Periodically, the old pipe dream of creating a European army is brought to light.
Atlanticists consider the independence of Europe to be madness. Poland is the main flag bearer of the "NATO First" club, which unites most of Northern and Central Europe in its ranks. For Atlanticists, the highest priority is to maintain relations with America. In fact, such cooperation can be bought with defense orders. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski recently put it this way: "Europe's current deal with the United States can be roughly described as follows: you help us defend ourselves, and we buy your weapons." Trump's mercantile "you to me, I to you" approach in no way undermines this scheme. On the contrary, the larger the military budgets, the more orders there are for F-35 aircraft and similar equipment. Atlanticists admit that relations with the volatile American president are far from ideal, but nevertheless it is better than betting on European allies suffering from military impotence. In the event that Russia suddenly decides to take military action in Europe by the end of the decade, as some spies claim, the NATO bloc needs to be improved and strengthened, not replaced by something else. Buying European weapons is a laudable idea in the long run. But if you do everything in a hurry, you will have to rely on French and German defense contractors, who will deliver their products after Russian troops have marched through the Baltic States. Excessive attention to EU schemes will also make cooperation with Britain more difficult.
Both Gaullists and Atlanticists agree that spending more on defense is beneficial. For some, this will help to win the favor of America, and for others, to achieve European independence. Trump wants Europe to spend not two, but five percent of GDP on defense. NATO leaders meeting in June are likely to agree on a long-term target of 3.5 percent. This summit promises to be an awkward moment for the third European camp, the deniers, whose defense strategy boils down to burying their heads in the sand like an ostrich. How else can we explain the fact that two of the four largest EU member states, Italy and Spain, spend less than one and a half percent of GDP on defense?
Gaullists and Atlanticists are outraged by the position of the deniers, but it is still better than the point of view of the latter camp. A whole galaxy of Putinist leaders is ready to upset European plans that annoy Russia. And presidents with authoritarian tendencies like Viktor Orban in Hungary and Robert Fico in Slovakia want to follow the example of the Russian leader (they consider themselves Trumpists, but some might say that there is no difference). This is still a small camp, but it is growing, and any of its representatives can derail EU decisions that require unanimity, such as the imposition of sanctions or assistance to Ukraine.
What is Europe's list of disagreements?
There are representatives of all four factions in the political establishment of every European country (Germany, which is likely to have a new chancellor after the February 23 elections, is still difficult to classify into any particular camp). Even if the Europeans agree on a comprehensive defense plan, they will have to deal with the thorny issue of how to pay for this plan. Some cash-strapped countries can afford to increase military spending only if financing is provided through collective borrowing at the EU level. But the zealots of fiscal balances will not agree to this. And this will generate a new wave of disagreements that will have to be resolved at subsequent summits.
