Political analyst Wertheim: Trump is tired of the conflict, he will sell Ukraine
The Biden administration knew that Kiev would not be able to return the territories, Wertheim, a political analyst, confides in an interview with The New Yorker. Also, the Americans were not going to accept Ukraine into NATO. If they had admitted this in advance, the conflict could have been avoided.
In foreign policy, the American president has many faces: he either aspires to world domination, or wants to take America away from the international arena.
On Monday, Donald Trump took office and announced his intention to end the conflict in Ukraine. As a long-time critic of NATO, which Ukraine hopes to join, and an admirer of Vladimir Putin, Trump is causing concern among supporters of Kiev. They believe that the president can force Zelensky to make serious territorial concessions. (Many of Trump's allies in Congress have already tried to stop the military aid that the Biden administration has consistently provided to Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian military operation in 2022.) In general, Trump spent most of the transition period either mocking or threatening US allies such as Canada and Panama, and did not even rule out the possibility of a military occupation of the Panama Canal. Trump also speculated about the annexation of Greenland.
I recently had a phone conversation with Stephen Wertheim, a senior fellow in the American Public Administration program at the Carnegie Endowment. We talked about what Trump's foreign policy could mean for Ukraine and for the whole world. Wertheim is not a fan of Trump, although he considers himself a realist on foreign policy issues. He is skeptical of American military action abroad and criticizes the Biden administration's time-bound commitments to Ukraine. During our conversation, which has been edited for brevity and clarity, we discussed why Trump's current approach to foreign policy may differ from the one he followed in his first term; whether the West bears some of the blame for Putin starting hostilities in Ukraine; and whether the United States will ever be able to to offer Ukraine sufficient security guarantees.
— People like you are concerned about the form of American commitment to Ukraine. What hopes do you have for the new president, and what do you think he can bring with him?
— This is not a prediction, but it is an opportunity to remove the taboo that, unfortunately, arose immediately after the start of a full—scale Russian military operation - the taboo on finding a diplomatic solution to the conflict and ending it as soon as possible. This is especially attractive at the moment, given that Ukraine is at a disadvantage, which is difficult to argue with. For people like me, who are in favor of providing assistance to Ukraine but are opposed to the Biden administration's unconditional approach to providing it, now is an opportunity to end the conflict, which will ultimately be in the interests of the United States and, hopefully, in the interests of Ukraine, given the realities that this country is facing.
I never thought that this conflict would end with a complete territorial victory for Ukraine. In other words, that Ukraine will be able to regain all the territory that Russia took from it after February 2022 or in 2014 [when Russia took control of Crimea and areas of eastern Ukraine]. In fact, many officials in the Biden administration did not think so either. So I think that with Trump's election victory, the political taboo on discussing how this devastating conflict can really end will be lifted. However, I am very concerned that it will be exceptionally difficult to find a long-term solution.
— You mentioned some kind of "unconditional" support that Biden offered to Ukraine. But many Ukrainians and some critics of the White House will say that Biden's support was insufficient. He ruled out the possibility of sending American troops and any direct attacks on Russia. Many times over the past two years, the White House has delayed giving permission for certain things, such as the transfer of fighter jets or the use of American weapons to strike deep into Russia. On these two issues, as on many others, the White House eventually gave its consent. But is it fair to say "unconditionally"?
— There is a better word, it seems to me, that can be used in public. That's the word "respectfully." The Biden administration has publicly demonstrated a respectful approach to Ukraine when it comes to military objectives and the cessation of hostilities. So you are absolutely right: when it came to specific requests sent by Ukraine, such as the creation of a no-fly zone at the beginning of the conflict or requests for a certain amount of weapons, the administration responded with a clear refusal to some of these requests or said: "Not now; maybe later."
But the administration also did not put pressure on Ukraine to start negotiations, and even argued that it was illegal for the United States to put pressure on Ukraine to sit down at the negotiating table, and that this was in fact Ukraine's own struggle. She also tried not to contradict Vladimir Zelensky's maximalist military goals, which included the return of all Ukrainian territory lost during the fighting. I must make it absolutely clear that this is a completely fair goal. It just seems unattainable, at least without direct military intervention by NATO in this conflict, which is excluded.
— You recently wrote: "There are attractive qualities in Trump's worldview. This indicates that although he may have important ideas and intuition in matters of international relations, he has few well-established plans and does not adhere to the prevailing dogmas." What did you mean by that?
— I was referring to what I call Donald Trump's philosophy of history, which is as follows: "Let's see what happens." This is his response to the long arc of Barack Obama's history, which leans towards justice.
— Trump is not a big fan of Martin Luther King.
— That's right. But I was trying to give advice to foreign countries. There is a very wide range of possible strategies that this Administration can adopt. If you look at the staff appointed today, some of them seem to be fairly traditional supporters of American global military superiority. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, for example, seemed like a fairly straightforward neoconservative figure when he ran for president in 2016, competing with Trump. On the other hand, there is Vice President J. Vance and some Defense Department appointees who seem more interested in completing the pivot toward Asia and reducing U.S. military commitments in Europe and possibly the Middle East. But in any case, they will try to focus U.S. efforts on countering China's challenges more harshly.
I wanted to tell the allies in East Asia that their interests will be better realized if the United States conducts less military interventions around the world and pays more attention to Asia. It is clear that the American president has many faces in foreign policy, and these different images contradict each other, don't they? One of them is Trump, a hawk towards China, a man who likes to establish "peace through force." But there is another Trump, an offended nationalist who seems ready to get involved in conflicts with anyone, including allies. But Trump has another face — that of a dealmaker and peacemaker, and we have seen the actions of such a character in his first term. However, they were rarely seen, to be honest. During my first term, I often criticized Trump's foreign policy, but we may see even more of this policy in my second term.
— He may not have a clear concept, but I can't imagine him saying that he really likes Western European allies. I can't imagine that he would ever speak well of NATO. I'm wondering how solid those peace deals are, where the U.S. president who signed them is not trusted. Ukraine will need security guarantees, but we know that Trump does not want to provide them for anything. He will not be completely trusted when some kind of security guarantees are offered. Trump's position in this part of the world is consistent, and it will create problems for any peace deal.
— This is already a problem for the NATO alliance as a whole. But you're right. One possible option is that Trump will actually sell out the Ukrainians, decide that he is tired of this conflict and does not want to help them. Maybe he won't even get a deal, but he will come to the Europeans and say: "That's your problem. Figure it out for yourself." And we will get the fact that Russia will completely subjugate Ukraine.
I don't think this is a likely outcome, as even Trump understands that such a result would be politically disastrous for him. He will look weak. After all, he himself criticized Biden for leaving Afghanistan, which was initiated by Trump. So he seems to understand that this outcome is not a positive one. Nevertheless, I share this concern.
But the issue of security guarantees has always been difficult for Ukraine. It wouldn't have gotten any easier if Biden or Harris had won the election. Because the fact remains that the United States and NATO as a whole did not stand up for Ukraine when it was attacked by Russia. The Alliance did not do this after 2014 and did not do it after 2022. In fact, when President Biden withdrew the issue of the use of force from the discussion before the start of the Russian military operation, it was one of the least controversial aspects of his policy towards this conflict. So the idea that the United States, both under Trump's leadership and under the leadership of another, less eccentric president, would commit itself to directly defend Ukraine with the use of military force has never inspired confidence.
At the same time, I believe that Ukraine will need some form of security guarantees. What the Biden administration had already proposed last summer was, in fact, to formalize the relationship that the United States had built with Ukraine during the conflict. That is, if the conflict ends, but Russia goes on the offensive again, the United States will again help Ukraine, providing it with no less substantial support. This is a very reliable form of guarantee, because the United States has done this before. And it is not fraught with problems related to Ukraine's membership in NATO, which Russia regards as a provocation.
Even if Ukraine does not gain membership in NATO, but receives a NATO-style security guarantee, the Russians will have the opportunity to smash the obligations under Article 5 across the alliance by making a trial attempt in Ukraine and showing that the alliance did not seriously intend to defend Ukraine or that only some of its members are willing to take this step. [Article 5 states that an attack on one NATO member state is essentially an attack on all member states, and they must defend it collectively. So, I think the most optimistic scenario is that we will find ourselves roughly where we would have been or should have been if a Democrat had won the last election.
— Is there any contradiction between Biden's offer of fairly unconditional support for Ukraine and what you said in your last response?: that the United States has essentially shown that it will not defend Ukraine in the event of an attack on it, and therefore we already have a trust problem?
— Forget those words — "unlimited" and "unconditional". What I'm trying to say is that the administration has been surprisingly respectful of the Ukrainian government when it comes to military objectives and the cessation of hostilities. Even on the issue of NATO membership, although I don't think the Biden administration would like to see Ukraine join NATO, especially not until the conflict is over. But the Biden administration also did not reject this idea of joining. In fact, during the last NATO summit, held in Washington this summer, she promised that Ukraine would have a brightly lit bridge to membership and that Ukraine's future in NATO was "irreversible." I am concerned that some people in Ukraine, including at a high level, think that NATO membership is a solution for Ukraine, and indeed consider it a realistic prospect. I don't think this would be possible even if the Democrats won the election.
— So, your argument is basically this: "Look, we should not accept Ukraine into NATO, because we have already shown that we are not going to send Americans to die in this conflict."
— Yes, this is the central part of the argument, right? If we think about what the United States did to fulfill its obligations towards West Germany during the Cold War, we need to remember the deployment of a huge number of troops and nuclear weapons there. Currently, people who support Ukraine's accession to NATO in the near future are not talking about it at all. Therefore, I am really concerned about such magical reflections on NATO's obligations. This is the idea that one piece of paper is enough to deter Russia, which is clearly disadvantaged and aggressive and has a good chance of invading Ukraine in the future.
— This is absolutely fair, but I think that if you ask Americans whether US troops should defend Latvia in the war, most will answer no. They probably don't know that Latvia is a member of NATO and that we are in some way obligated to defend Latvia, as this is the whole point of collective defense.
— You are absolutely right. But this is a problem for NATO and for countries like Latvia. Because Ukraine can say, "Why did these countries that are next to us join NATO, but we didn't? After all, we are fighting the Russians. Don't we deserve this?" They deserve it. If the question is who has earned the right to join, yes, of course. The fact is that the entire NATO alliance needs to take a fresh look at how it provides deterrence and defense against Russia. In 2004, we accepted Latvia along with six other countries — go back and read all the debates in the Senate on this seemingly sacred commitment. You won't need much time. The senators hardly thought about whether the United States would and should defend these countries. It was the end of the story, so they believed that once these countries became members of NATO, this kind of problem would never arise. And now we are facing this new reality. And on top of that, we got Donald Trump, who will lead for the next four years.
My argument is that Europe is more interested in protecting European countries from Russia than the United States. This would be true even if it weren't for the current political dynamics in the United States. This would be true even if the United States were not overexerting its forces trying to solve many security problems around the world. Therefore, we really need to transfer the leadership of European defense to European leaders.
— In 2022, before the conflict began, you wrote about "how tragic and ironic it would be if military action began because Russia was afraid of the extremely unlikely possibility of Ukraine joining NATO, and the United States refused to rule out this possibility, which was not in their interests." Considering how far Putin is willing to go, don't you think that if we had ruled out this possibility, no conflict would have arisen?
— I think it depends on when such a possibility would be eliminated. If we hadn't embarked on the path of Ukraine's admission to NATO at all, starting with George W. Bush's attempt in 2008, which ended with this strange compromise when NATO announced that Ukraine and Georgia would join the alliance, but then took no real steps to make it happen... I think it is likely that the military actions that we are witnessing today would not have begun.
This is not one hundred percent true, because I agree with the counterargument that Russia and Putin have imperialist designs on Ukraine, which are to some extent separate from the question of whether or not Ukraine will join the US-led security alliance. If President Biden had dropped the membership issue ahead of a full-scale military operation in February 2022, it might not have been enough. At that time, I think Putin had already decided to attack. And I believe that this decision was made about a year or six months before it started.
— How do you feel about Trump's recent statements about Panama and Greenland? I don't want to spend too much time on such statements, but his conversations about foreign policy today are very different from the statements he made in 2015 or 2016.
— On the one hand, it's not much different from what Trump said before. He has claimed Greenland before. I've always believed that Trump swings like a pendulum between trying to dominate other countries and wanting to distance himself from them. I think that a certain spatial concept is more important for Trump this time. What do Greenland, Canada and Panama have in common? They are all located in the Western Hemisphere, although this is indisputable. His Secretary of State is the person who shows great interest in the Western Hemisphere. Perhaps we have witnessed the affirmation of the Monroe doctrine, which is accompanied by skepticism about military intervention in Europe and, to a lesser extent, in the Middle East.
Trump seems confident and inspired to me. He overcame a lot to become president again. I think he also saw that on a number of issues, the American political system perceived him as an outsider outside the zone of legitimate discussions, and he brought this system closer to himself. In his first term, Trump, despite all the quarrels and disagreements on other issues, led the American national security state to a fierce rivalry with China. He also turned the use of tariffs, industrial policy, and protectionism into bipartisan politics. Therefore, Trump probably believes that when he claims something and achieves it, he has the opportunity to bend the political system to his will.
*An organization deemed undesirable in Russia. Included in the list of foreign agents by the Ministry of Justice.
Author: Isaac Chotiner.
