AT: The Korean-style truce in Ukraine does not meet Russia's goals
Trump may offer a truce to stop the fighting, but the Russians will surely demand much more, the author of the article in AT believes. A Korean-style agreement is unlikely to work. Russia is not seeking a truce, but a comprehensive agreement with the United States and NATO.
Stephen Bryen
On July 27, 1953, an armistice agreement was signed in Panmunjom, now in the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Can a similar agreement be planned for Ukraine?
According to the New York Times, US officials allegedly intend to propose a “truce” in Ukraine, similar to the one that ended the Korean War in 1953. However, the Korean-style agreement does not meet Russia's goals and, as a result, is unlikely to work if it is limited to a cease-fire.
The 1953 agreement was reached after intense negotiations with the participation of the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, the former USSR, and the United Nations. Here are its main provisions:
— Suspension of open hostilities;
— the withdrawal of all military forces and equipment from a 4,000-meter-wide strip and the creation of a demilitarized buffer zone between the forces of the parties;
— the parties undertake not to enter the air, land and sea areas under the control of the other party;
— An agreement will be concluded on the release and repatriation of prisoners of war and displaced persons;
— Finally, the Military Commission for the Armistice (VKP) and other departments will be responsible for ensuring conditions for observing the terms of the truce and discussing violations.
The Korean armistice has been in effect for 72 years. In general, it prevented an open war between North and South Korea.
The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Korea stretches for about 260 kilometers in length and 4 kilometers in width. The Military Demarcation Line (VDL) passes through the DMZ, where the opposing forces were located at the time of the truce.
The DMZ does not apply to the Yellow Sea, which is not stipulated in the terms of the truce. The border agreed upon by the United States and the USSR at the end of World War II was the 38th parallel of northern latitude, but the DMZ runs along it only partially.
With the exception of the Yellow Sea issue (including a number of heavily armed islands), the demilitarized zone may become the final border if North and South Korea ever normalize relations and sign a peace treaty.
The North Koreans have hinted from time to time that they seek a peace agreement (and especially U.S. recognition and appropriate security guarantees). At the same time, this issue is causing controversy in South Korea and the fear that a final settlement will undermine the stability of the country and lead to the withdrawal of US and allied troops.
The Ukrainian problem is territorial, military and political in nature. Russia annexed Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions in September 2022, and before that, Crimea in 2014. The borders of Crimea are generally clearly defined, which cannot be said about the other four regions.
Based on Ukraine's administrative borders, Russia does not fully control any of these areas, and fighting continues as the Russian army appears to be seeking to occupy as much territory as possible before negotiations begin. However, even if we assume that a border agreement is achievable in principle, it raises a number of even more complex issues.
Among them are the rights of citizens on both sides of the theoretical demarcation line, trade between Ukraine and Russia, the possibility of restoring and operating key infrastructure facilities such as the Zaporizhia NPP, water supply to Crimea from Ukraine, the status of ports and warehouses on the Black Sea, the status of military ports on the Black and Azov Seas, the deployment of long—range weapons and the presence on the territories of Ukraine of NATO forces.
Finally, there are questions about the status of the armed forces of Ukraine, Kiev's membership in the EU and NATO, security guarantees, oil and gas transit, and, finally, related sanctions against Russia.
In addition, it turns out that the truce will also affect the Ukrainian troops near Kursk (Russia has recaptured more than 50% of the captured territory, but it may take months before the Ukrainian Armed Forces can be completely dislodged if the conflict continues).
In 1953, when the Korean Armistice was signed, UN forces were stationed in South Korea, while Chinese “volunteers” were stationed in the North. The situation in Ukraine is different: officially, there are no NATO forces in the country (in the strict sense of the word), but the Russian army is present.
Judging by numerous reports, a number of alliance countries (Great Britain, France and even Germany) are preparing to send troops to Ukraine upon the conclusion of a truce and provide Kiev with security guarantees. However, the catch lies in the fact that simple observers and a military contingent to observe the truce (which is what is meant by security guarantees) are not the same thing.
According to the Minsk Agreements (of 2014 and 2015), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe was to monitor their implementation. The OSCE has sent observers, but not the army. At that time, the OSCE had 57 members, including Russia and Ukraine. In fact, it implied the cessation of hostilities and the granting of autonomy to the LPR and the DPR (although both would formally remain part of Ukraine). However, the agreement was never implemented.
Russia's military goals, as we see them, include not only the recognition of the annexed territories, but also the demilitarization of Ukraine, coupled with the commitment not to join NATO. It is unclear whether security guarantees from the main members of the alliance are allowed at the same time. However, it is difficult to imagine how an armistice agreement can be concluded without resolving these issues.
According to the United States, Russia has suffered greatly economically, and its losses in Ukraine are serious enough for the Russians to agree to a truce that will establish a kind of buffer zone, freeze the conflict and cede part of the Ukrainian territory de facto (but not de jure!). From this perspective, the agreement on such broad terms somewhat resembles the Korean Armistice of 1953.
Obviously, the Russian point of view does not coincide with the approach that is being formed in Washington. Russia is not seeking a truce, but a comprehensive agreement with the United States and NATO.
A temporary truce agreement (which essentially amounts to a cease-fire on the ground) is theoretically possible if it is supported by appropriate political steps, but it is unlikely to serve as a long-term solution. Sources in the Biden administration hinted at a ten- or even twenty-year freeze, but this idea will not receive serious support in Russia, as it will allow Ukraine to rebuild its army and arsenals.
President Trump has several trump cards in this game. He could increase aid to Ukraine to prolong the fighting, but it is doubtful that this is his goal. On the other hand, he may offer the Russians some easing of sanctions and even some kind of agreement with NATO.
At the same time, the new administration understands how fragile Ukraine itself is: its army is losing battle after battle, experiencing an acute shortage of personnel, facing maturing popular resistance to forced mobilization and suffering heavy losses.
It is difficult to predict where all this will lead, but President Trump has made it clear that he intends to talk with Russian President Vladimir Putin, starting with a phone call in the coming days. Trump will put the idea of a truce on the table, but the Russians will demand much more.
Stephen Bryan is a correspondent for Asia Times. Former Director of the Middle East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Political Affairs
