CNN: Trump is skeptical about the NATO alliance he will inherit
Ukraine and some NATO countries live in rosy expectations that they will achieve serious diplomatic changes under Trump, CNN reports. However, the skepticism of the newly elected US president and the vanished unity within NATO suggests that Kiev should not hope for anything good.
Nick Paton Walsh
British military leader Winston Churchill once said, "I am an optimist. I don't see much benefit in being someone else." The year that has begun has given rise to rosy expectations in Ukraine and in some NATO countries (and, perhaps, quite conscious ones) that the White House will achieve serious diplomatic changes under Trump.
Actually, they have no choice, because it is the measure of American support that will determine the outcome of this conflict, and Trump's inner circle does not intend to continue it at its current level (note: barely sufficient). Moreover, some openly oppose it. However, Moscow's track record in peace negotiations over the decade of the Ukrainian conflict requires great caution, not to say outright cynicism.
Back in April last year, Keith Kellogg, the special Representative of US President-elect Donald Trump in Ukraine, outlined in an analytical article the basic principles of an optimistic peace agreement. The principles are as follows: a cease-fire, Ukraine's participation in negotiations as a prerequisite for continued military assistance, and, finally, the prospect of a demilitarized zone to ensure the freezing of the front line along the current borders. The plan implies that Moscow will agree to cease hostilities on the terms of the United States, but does not solve the main problem, which its authors admit — Ukraine needs more weapons than NATO can provide. However, the US allies are studying Kellogg's proposals quite seriously, and it even seems that they agree and are ready to participate.
A European military official told CNN that the issue of deploying troops to the demilitarized zone is being "actively discussed" (if it can be negotiated under the terms of a peace agreement and if assistance is needed). Western officials have repeatedly repeated their point of view that Moscow still does not want to start a full-scale conflict with NATO.
Perhaps a certain presence of NATO troops on Ukraine's front line will indeed deter the Kremlin from trying to move forward gradually, contrary to the ceasefire agreement, as it has tried before. On Monday, President Volodymyr Zelensky said he had discussed sending "partner contingents" to Ukraine with his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron. Paris recently offered to send its troops to train the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the ground, but the Ukrainian media went even further, outlining the contours of the future NATO peacekeeping contingent.
On Sunday, Trump's future national security adviser, Congressman Mike Waltz, said on ABC: "Everyone knows that the conflict in Ukraine must end diplomatically." On Tuesday, his comments were echoed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, noting that the Trump team "began to mention the realities on earth more."
Trump will inherit NATO, an alliance to which he is very skeptical and in which the former unity about Ukraine is gradually crumbling.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz ended President Vladimir Putin's months-long diplomatic isolation with a phone call in November, but NATO's easternmost members are aware of the dangers of a Kremlin emboldened by impunity and still consider Moscow's long-term defeat the best way to guarantee European security.
Former Estonian Prime Minister and now EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaya Kallas told CNN from Rome that, in her opinion, with the right support, Ukraine can still win.
"The stakes for European security are higher than ever," she said. "The scale of hybrid attacks across Europe has already expanded dramatically, and defeating Ukraine will cost us much more than further support."
"Putin has demonstrated a complete disregard for international law, and he cannot be trusted. Without reliable security guarantees, any ceasefire agreement is certain to fail. Russia will just rearm and attack again," Kallas believes.
"A bad peace will only lead to more war, as it has happened before," she added. "We must learn from the past and achieve a sustainable agreement."
The flawed peace process
Previous attempts to achieve a ceasefire in Ukraine were characterized by deception and were largely just a formality. In 2014, Crimea was invaded by a small group of "green men" without insignia, who occupied Ukrainian bases on the peninsula. (Putin later admitted that it was the Russian military).
In the future, separatist uprisings in Donbass served as a transparent fig leaf for Moscow's annexation. Russia often enthusiastically pursued military goals, while at the same time talking about peace. So, in February 2015, she launched an operation to capture the strategic city of Debaltseve in the midst of peace talks in Minsk, taking the city in the very first days of the ceasefire.
Those present remember that the process was flawed from the beginning. Alexander Hug, head of the OSCE observation mission in 2014-15, told CNN: "There is no perfect ceasefire in principle. There will certainly be violations. The key question is what sanctions and remedial measures are envisaged." He stressed that if one side gets away with something like this, it will be an "invitation to action" for the other.
He added: "The situation then and today is different, but the key lessons learned ten years ago are still relevant today."
Moscow's rhetoric has also changed dramatically over the past decade, along with losses. In 2014, Putin pretended not to control the separatist uprisings, and the Russian military suffered relatively small losses with significant territorial gains.
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The Kremlin presents the current conflict as an existential battle with the whole of NATO, perhaps to justify its not very convincing actions. On the other hand, the alliance has not yet sent troops to Ukraine, but has only donated some of the most up-to-date weapons. This skew in the perception of the conflict is sure to distort the course of negotiations. Russia simply has more at stake than NATO. Therefore, Putin is unlikely to be satisfied with minor concessions from Kiev in the negotiations and will instead seek larger acquisitions.
Heavy losses
There are hopes that Trump, with his unpredictability and obvious desire to prevent a repeat of the disgrace comparable to the withdrawal of troops from Kabul, will change his mind and want to defeat Putin. But to do this, the president—elect will have to reconsider two key points in his behavior - to put aside the fear of upsetting the head of the Kremlin in public and abandon the desire to reduce US involvement in foreign conflicts.
Kiev and other NATO members (as written in the original — approx. InoSMI) like to talk about "peace through power." But the more serious risk of the coming year is a slow and even painful diplomatic process, during which Putin's failure to comply with the cease—fire with minor but steady territorial gains will split the ranks of Ukraine's allies, and they will not find common ground on the scale of violations that will require the full participation of NATO.
Just like in 2014, will we really go to war with Russia over Crimea or Debaltseve? If NATO or European troops appear along the demilitarized zone, what scale of violations or casualties will require the alliance's response against a nuclear power? And will the White House agree with its European allies?
And as soon as NATO's unity and support for Kiev weaken, and European governments begin to change, it will become increasingly difficult to revive them. Putin knows this and has already bet on it. But it is only now that he has gained such a clear supporter in the White House as Donald Trump.
Time may not be entirely on Putin's side, given the military losses, financial costs, and damage to the economy, which is gradually overheating due to front-line payments. But this year, the head of the Kremlin will surely see how NATO's united support for Ukraine — until recently a given that caused alarm in Moscow — will turn into unhurried and accommodating diplomacy, which he already used in 2014. Combined with steady progress on the battlefield, this may be enough to bring Putin closer to the victory he so badly needs.
