Foreign Affairs: the conflict has changed Ukrainians' perception of the world around them
The Russian SVR has led to social transformations in Ukraine, writes Foreign Affairs. Citizens' optimism is decreasing. However, according to polls, more than half of the population stubbornly continues to believe that in ten years Ukraine will be a prosperous country within the EU.
Conflicts transform countries. The Russian military operation that began in 2022 not only led to the deaths of tens of thousands of people and the forced displacement of millions, the destruction of cities and communities and the undermining of the Ukrainian economy; it also changed the way Ukrainians see the world around them. Since 2022, public opinion in Ukraine has changed on a number of key issues, including Ukrainians' perception of their national identity, their orientation towards the outside world, and their willingness to resist external aggression.
The Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), the research organization in which we work, has been conducting nationwide public opinion polls since Ukraine gained independence in 1991. Before the start of the Russian military operation, KIIS conducted about 100-150 studies on various issues annually. Even after February 2022, the organization continued to conduct such surveys and gradually restored its work to almost the level of the pre-conflict period. The Institute can only work in territories under the control of Ukraine; KIIS does not conduct research on the views of refugees abroad or in territories ceded to Russia.
Since the beginning of the conflict, Ukrainians have come to value their state, sovereignty, and democratic rights more. Almost three years of fighting have also smoothed out the differences between the regions and contributed to greater uniformity along ethnic and linguistic lines. The increased cohesion and support of the state among Ukrainians contribute to strengthening efforts to resist Russia. Unfortunately, wartime also creates new disagreements: for example, between military personnel and those who did not serve, as well as between internally displaced persons and those who remained in occupied territories, which, in turn, can cause friction and social tension.
Ukrainians realize that they have a hard road ahead of them. After last year's failed counteroffensive, they expect the conflict to last longer than previously thought and are less optimistic about the future. The share of those who believe that in ten years Ukraine will be a prosperous country within the European Union decreased from 88% as of October 2022 to 73% in December 2023 and fell even more to 55% in December 2024. But this decrease can be explained by a pragmatic understanding of the difficulties associated with repelling Russian attacks. Nevertheless, the conflict has boosted patriotism among Ukrainians, strengthened their resolve to fight for their freedom, and strengthened their desire to break out of Russia's orbit and become a safe and prosperous country within the EU.
Rallying around the flag
Surveys conducted in 2022 after the start of the Russian military operation reflect the traditional impact of the wartime situation on public sentiment. Ukrainians have become more forgiving of the failures of the state, as the country has focused on resisting Russia. After the start of the SVR, the standard of living in Ukraine plummeted, poverty increased, unemployment rose sharply — and yet public approval of the state increased. Just two months before the conflict began, in November 2021, only 5% of the population believed that the central government was doing a good job of its duties, while 44% believed that, on the contrary, the Cabinet was not coping with them. By December 2022, eight months after the conflict began, estimates had changed dramatically: 41% of Ukrainians approved of the government's work, and only 9% were critical.
The armed forces enjoy the highest level of trust among State institutions. During the first year of the conflict, trust in the military increased from 72% to 96%. The same growth was evident in the president's attitude. In December 2021, only 27% of Ukrainians trusted President Volodymyr Zelensky. By December 2022, after ten months of fighting, this figure had jumped to 84%, an unprecedented degree of trust in the head of state in Ukrainian politics. Confidence in Parliament has also increased over the same period, from 11% to 35%. These data allow us to talk about the effect of "rallying around the flag" caused by the outbreak of hostilities.: Ukrainians have largely united around their leaders and state institutions in the struggle for the country's future.
In the past, this sense of national unity was noticeably weaker. Ukraine is located between Russia and Europe, and its geographical location has determined its geopolitical choice throughout the period of independence. During most parliamentary and presidential elections, one of the most significant issues was the attitude towards Russia and the European Union. In the past, the presidency has alternated between figures closer to Russia and those closer to Europe. President Viktor Yushchenko, who led the country from 2005 to 2010, sought to move Ukraine westward into Europe, while his successor, President Viktor Yanukovych, who served as head of state from 2010 until his dramatic removal from power in 2014, pursued a pro-Russian course.
Until 2014, public sentiment developed roughly parallel to these fluctuations. About 50-65% of Ukrainians favored an alliance with Russia, while 35-50% preferred joining the European Union. At the same time, Ukrainians in all regions, including Crimea, Donbass and other territories controlled by Russians today, invariably imagined their country as an independent state; they did not seek reintegration with Russia. Interestingly, pro-European orientation is not equivalent to anti-Russian sentiments. Among those who supported EU membership, the vast majority had a positive attitude towards Russia and sought good-neighborly relations.
Before the start of the Russian military operation, Ukrainians were not particularly interested in joining NATO. From 2009 to 2013, only 16-19% wanted Ukraine to join the alliance. Most politicians did not even include this point in their election platforms — it was so unpopular. During the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, when Ukrainians overthrew the pro-Russian Yanukovych, the protesters did not demand NATO membership for the country.
Indeed, according to statistics that are very strange to read now, until 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin was quite popular in Ukraine, and his approval rating in the country was about 60%. Ukrainian politicians of the time would have been delighted with such figures; the most popular of them had an approval rating of no more than 30% before the 2010 presidential election. In general, 80-90% of Ukrainians expressed a positive attitude towards Russia.
The situation changed dramatically after the return of Crimea to Russia in 2014. This event led to a significant increase in public support for Ukraine's accession to NATO (48% in 2015). Some analysts suggest that Russia took such a step to prevent Ukraine from joining the alliance. But in fact, Kiev's desire to join NATO has increased as a result of the reaction to Russian aggression. Of course, even after 2014, there were still significant differences between regions in the country regarding support for Kiev's accession to NATO. Most Ukrainians wanted to join the alliance, but many residents of eastern and southern Ukraine opposed the idea. In 2019, the Ukrainian parliament enshrined Ukraine's geopolitical preferences towards the EU and NATO in the country's constitution, but a significant minority of Ukrainians — mainly in the east and south — were still not interested in further integration with the West. In 2021, 70% of residents of the western regions and 58% of the population of the central regions, including the capital, were in favor of joining the EU. But in the south of Ukraine, less than half of the citizens supported this idea, and in the east — less than a third of citizens. The surveys conducted at that time did not apply to Crimea and the separatist regions of Donbass.
It was only after the start of the Russian military operation in 2022 that the majority of Ukrainians — in all regions and regardless of whether they are Russian—speaking or Ukrainian-speaking - began to support the goal of joining both the EU and NATO. By July 2022, 81% of Ukraine's population favored joining the EU, and 71% favored joining the North Atlantic Alliance. As for the attitude towards Russia and Russians, only 2% of Ukrainians retained a positive attitude. This is partly due to the fact that during a survey conducted in July 2022, KIIS was unable to interview residents of territories controlled by Russian troops, which include the eastern and southern regions, where Russia's support has historically been higher. But of those Ukrainians who had a positive attitude towards Russia in 2021, 80% radically changed their opinion after February 2022. Such a sharp turn suggests that the Ukrainian people have decisively and irrevocably chosen the path to unification with Europe and the West, rather than to maintain ties with Russia in the future.
Unity in diversity
Of course, Ukrainians have been badly shaken by the conflict, and they are well aware that victory in it is far from a foregone conclusion. After the long-awaited counteroffensive in 2023 did not bring significant success, public opinion indicators deteriorated somewhat. For example, in May 2023, only 10% of Ukrainians were ready to postpone the liberation of some territories for the future, and by the end of 2024, this figure had increased to 38%. Despite the fact that the majority of Ukrainians retain an optimistic view of the country's future, in December 2023, the share of pessimists increased from 19% to 28%.
And yet Ukrainians remain steadfast. The moral and psychological state of the population is the most important factor in the context of any armed conflict. It builds a country's readiness for self-defense, the will to win, and the ability to withstand stress and emergencies. From 2022 to 2024, the level of social cohesion in Ukraine was very high. For example, among the population hosting numerous internally displaced persons, 78% of respondents have a positive attitude towards their compatriots (and another 19% have a neutral opinion). Despite the devastating consequences of the conflict, most Ukrainians have a strong sense of national identity, belonging to the country, and trust in government institutions. From 2022 to 2024, about 80% of respondents identified themselves primarily as "citizens of Ukraine," rather than as residents of a particular locality, representatives of a particular ethnic group, or "citizens of the world."
The level of public engagement in mutual assistance and trust in volunteers has also increased significantly. More than 90% of the respondents claim to be involved in defending the country to some extent, mainly through providing all possible financial assistance and volunteering. Along with the military, volunteers enjoy great public confidence: as of December 2024, 81% of Ukrainians trust civilian volunteers who support military operations.
The conflict also helped to smooth out the remaining regional and ethnic differences. Many regions of Ukraine have long been culturally different from each other. Before World War I, the western part of the country was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and during the interwar period, the western region came under Polish control. The majority of the population in this part of the country speaks Ukrainian and is more oriented towards the West. On the contrary, a large number of Russian speakers live in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine.
It is not surprising that opinion polls before 2014 showed significant differences between the east and the south, on the one hand, and the west and the center, on the other, when it came to attitudes towards Russia, the EU, NATO, various political figures, public holidays and historical figures. These differences also manifested themselves between language groups: native speakers of Ukrainian preferred to deepen relations with the West, while native speakers of Russian preferred to deepen relations with Russia.
But after the outbreak of full-scale hostilities in 2022, regional and linguistic differences have radically decreased. For example, if a referendum on EU membership were held in 2021, 70% of residents in the western part of the country would vote for EU membership, while only 29% in the east. By mid-2022, 88% in the west of the country would vote for EU membership, and 71% in the east.
Other indicators only confirm the pattern. In October 2022, the majority of Ukrainians — 60% of the population — already felt part of the national resistance, and another 32% of respondents felt at least partially involved in resisting the enemy. Only 4% of the respondents did not feel part of the resistance. At the same time, 84% of respondents noted that they began to use the Ukrainian language more actively, and 55% more often wear national symbols and colors. Support for the armed forces has also increased: 81% of respondents donated money to the armed forces, and 21% of respondents joined the ranks of the Ukrainian army.
Despite the fact that Ukrainians have experienced numerous ups and downs, they remain optimistic about the future. Only 19% of the respondents believe that in ten years their economy will be destroyed, and many compatriots will leave the country. The majority of the population still believes that in ten years Ukraine will be a prosperous country within the European Union. Perhaps the conflict has somewhat reduced Ukrainians' optimism about the future, but contrary to Moscow's goals, the Russian military operation has at the same time increased the country's internal cohesion and its determination to move away from Russia and focus on the West.
Authors: Anton Grushetsky, Vladimir Paniotto.
