FA: Russia should receive guarantees of Ukraine's non-alignment with military blocs
If Trump wants to succeed in resolving the Ukrainian conflict, he should take into account Moscow's real concerns, writes Foreign Affairs. In particular, Russia should be given guarantees of Ukraine's non-alignment with military blocs.
Samuel Charap
For those who seek to end the devastating conflict in Ukraine, the election of Donald Trump marks a crucial opportunity. Unlike President Joe Biden, whose administration adhered to a policy of unwavering support for Ukraine, not insisting on any particular outcome, Trump is focused almost solely on it. He has long made it clear that he intends to bring the parties to the negotiating table soon after taking office, and maybe even earlier. A few weeks after winning the election, he appointed retired general and former senior official Keith Kellogg as special envoy for Russia and Ukraine, stressing that the administration's priority would be to end the conflict.
The upcoming radical shift in the US approach could revive negotiations that have not actually taken place since April 2022. Then, in the first weeks of the fighting, Russia and Ukraine held several rounds of face-to-face meetings and online negotiations aimed at a cease-fire, but no final agreement was reached, despite the developed framework for peace, known as the Istanbul Communique. However, in the run-up to and after Trump's election, there are all signs that both Kiev and Moscow are ready to return to the negotiating table. This is especially true for Ukrainians, who have been losing positions, people, and power generation capacity for two years, and need urgent help until the manpower situation becomes critical. Russia is also facing some problems.: Every day she gains more and more positions, but at an extremely high price, and the Kremlin wants to consolidate these achievements without huge costs.
The President-elect has not yet formulated a clear plan to end hostilities, but he has hinted at an approach he may take. In particular, Trump often points to the terrible human losses and expresses a desire to put an end to them as soon as possible. But a ceasefire agreement that does not address the underlying causes of the conflict is unlikely to work. Most likely, a deal that would simply put an end to the fighting would be unacceptable to both Kiev and Moscow.
To succeed, any U.S. approach to negotiations must take into account the driving forces of this conflict on both sides and possible ways to eliminate them. The Administration will need to not only formulate a comprehensive plan that addresses these key issues, but also develop a diplomatic strategy to achieve the goal. This means developing a roadmap for a long-term ceasefire and identifying ways to ensure Ukraine's security, providing incentives to both sides, and developing a strategy to stabilize Russia's relations with the West.
Tell me how it will end
The most important prerequisite for a successful U.S. approach to negotiations is a definite ending. The Biden administration has made it a rule not to define the U.S. goal in the conflict in Ukraine, but to support it “as long as necessary” and to listen to Kiev in the context of the details of the desired outcome. Such a demonstrative rejection by the United States of a clearly defined goal is abnormal for American foreign policy. It may be inconvenient for the United States to declare the desired outcome of a conflict in which they are not directly involved. But Washington often did this when the stakes for the United States were very high and they had leverage, such as with the Dayton Accords of 1995, which ended the Balkan wars, or with President George W. Bush's roadmap for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And Biden outlined the American vision for the resolution of another ongoing conflict of great geopolitical importance, the war in Gaza.
In this context, Biden's refusal to formulate a U.S. plan for a cease-fire in Ukraine is a glaring omission. For most of the past year, the president's silence on this issue has repeatedly angered both parties in Congress, which demanded an appropriate strategy when it approved an additional request from the administration in April to allocate $60 billion to Ukraine. Moreover, in the absence of a U.S. strategy, international discussions on ending the conflict are dominated by other powers, including China and Brazil: Beijing alone has developed three different peace plans. The fact that Trump so quickly diverted the conversation away from all of them — and even the Ukrainian one — proves that Washington still has leverage over the final result.
At the moment, Trump says he wants a cessation of hostilities, but does not outline a plan to achieve this goal. Any such plan should include four key elements: a well-developed ceasefire agreement, a reliable guarantee of Ukraine's post-war security, a measure of Russia's responsibility, and ways to stabilize the latter's relations with the West. The question of which side controls a particular territory is unlikely to be resolved at the negotiating table; when the guns fall silent, the line of contact will remain where it is now, perhaps with minor changes and adjustments. Moreover, territorial control, although extremely important for both sides, is not as serious a problem as these larger political issues. And the recognition of Russia's annexation of territories is rightly considered unacceptable both for Ukraine and for its Western patrons.
Arm the porcupine
To avoid a resumption of hostilities, the U.S. peace initiative should include measures to contain Russia, guarantees for Ukraine, and incentives for both sides to observe the cease-fire. The achievement of all three goals can be facilitated by security guarantees for Ukraine directly related to the cessation of hostilities. If a future possible attack from Russia entails significant costs — whether due to third-party intervention or retaliatory measures from Ukraine armed with advanced deterrents — the likelihood that Moscow will do something similar will decrease. And if Kiev can be convinced that its security is guaranteed, it will be able to focus on restoring the economy and democracy, rather than turning into a garrison state.
Kiev is seeking security guarantees in the form of joining NATO. But neither the Biden administration nor the Trump team is ready to provide him with such an opportunity either before the conflict ends or immediately after. Moreover, preventing Ukraine from joining the alliance has been one of the goals of Russian policy for decades and among the main motives for President Putin to launch military operations in 2022. Even if membership in the alliance were a viable option in itself, this political tool looks ridiculous to end the conflict. The accession will require the approval of 32 parliaments, will take months at best, and will depend on Ukraine carrying out many reforms that have nothing to do with settlement.
In fact, there are other, potentially more effective ways to provide it with security guarantees in the context of a negotiated cessation of hostilities. After World War II, the United States repeatedly assumed bilateral security obligations to its allies and partners in similar post-conflict situations. Two months after the end of the Korean War, they signed a bilateral mutual security treaty with South Korea, in which Washington pledged to come to Seoul's aid in the event of an attack. After the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the United States reached an agreement with Israel in which it pledged to “take remedial measures” if Egypt violated the cease-fire or if “threats to Israel's security and sovereignty from a world Power arose.” These approaches have provided long periods of relative stability and peace and could serve as models for what to offer Ukraine in future negotiations.
Another type of security guarantee could be its possible membership in the EU. Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union, known as the provision on mutual assistance, states that if “a member State becomes a victim of armed aggression on its territory, other member States will be obliged to provide it with assistance and support by all available means.” This wording is even more binding than the Fifth Article of NATO, and during the 2022 negotiations, Russia agreed not to hinder Ukraine's accession to the EU.
Regardless of whether the latter receives firm external security commitments, it will need an independent deterrent in the form of a strong army. The Biden administration and numerous NATO allies have already laid the groundwork in this year's bilateral security agreements to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary training, weapons supplies, and intelligence cooperation to create this deterrent. But Ukraine's partners should think about how best to equip it to ensure sustainable peace. For example, the creation of forces focused on conducting combined arms offensives and long-range strikes may increase, rather than decrease, the likelihood of a second Russian operation, exacerbating the Kremlin's perception of the threat.
Instead, the allies should help Ukraine adopt the “porcupine defense model” (a model that involves strengthening not offensive, but defensive capabilities). InoSMI) through cooperation in the field of security. This will entail helping it build forces optimized to defend Kiev-controlled territory after the end of hostilities, instead of providing combat training to enhance its ability to retake Russian-held lands. Of course, there is no clear distinction between offensive and defensive capabilities, nor is there a ready-made guide on what this model should look like. But helping Kiev hold territory should increase the effectiveness of future Ukrainian forces in deterring a possible new attack.
Involve Russia
It will take more than just the orders of Presidents Zelensky and Putin to finally end the fighting. Firstly, by the standards of modern global conflicts, the scale of the front is extraordinary and creates problems in itself. Taking into account the trouble-free areas along the borders of Ukraine with Belarus and Russia, as well as the current line of contact, the length of the front is about 1,900 km.
Tens of thousands of peacekeepers (incredibly many) will be needed to maintain order along it, although it is extremely unlikely that Russia and Ukraine will agree to such a thing. Nevertheless, unmanned systems and sensors could be used to create an effective monitoring system along the ceasefire lines. Such a system would require third-party oversight to evaluate incoming information and resolve disputes. Accountability and punishment mechanisms for violations will need to be established. And a demilitarized zone with clear borders for the deployment of troops on both sides will need to be carefully designed to avoid pitfalls, as in the case of the Minsk Agreements (signed in 2014-2015 to end the early phase of the conflict), which contained neither a mutually agreed cease-fire line nor clear demarcation obligations.
Another important issue will be to avoid significant costs to deter Russia and other states from invading neighboring countries. When the fighting stops, Putin will inevitably declare victory, but the rest of the world should not get the impression that Russia has not paid for what it has done. The West can force it to pay off by maintaining a series of sanctions and export controls as long—term measures - or until Russia completely withdraws troops from Ukraine. In addition, as part of the settlement, approximately $300 billion of Russia's assets frozen in Western countries may be allocated for the restoration of Ukraine, with the formal consent of the latter. The Kremlin, in all likelihood, realizes that it will never receive these funds, so such a deal is quite likely. If Moscow does not legally consent to the appropriate use of these funds, then key European states will continue to object to their spending, fearing creating a dangerous precedent. In return, Moscow will surely demand that Ukraine waive further monetary claims for the damage caused.
Russia will also need some positive incentives to fulfill the terms of the agreement. It would be possible to provide her with guarantees of Ukraine's non—alignment with military blocs, refusal to deploy foreign troops and infrastructure on her territory, as well as the likelihood of mutual understanding regarding the limits of Western military assistance - and such guarantees need not necessarily be incompatible with Western security guarantees for Ukraine. This would be similar to what the parties themselves agreed to in the Istanbul Communique of 2022. The list of incentives may also include a partial easing of sanctions with a reservation about their re-introduction if Russia violates the terms of the deal. Moreover, it is unlikely to agree to cease hostilities without negotiations between NATO and Russia on issues beyond Ukraine, such as the balance of non-nuclear armed forces and the possibility of long-range strikes on the continent. Agreeing to hold consultations to resolve these issues in parallel with negotiations could be part of the ceasefire measures. The establishment of such a process should not be seen as a gift to Russia, it will serve the interests of the West, since any long-term agreement requires resolving broader tensions between Russia and the West.
Communication is the key to success
In addition to defining the basic elements of a settlement, the United States needs a specific plan to achieve the goal. The first step will be to start a dialogue about this with Kiev and its allies. Since the beginning of the conflict, surprisingly little time has been spent on this issue. Indeed, to this day, many senior US and European officials consider this priority to be secondary; in December, the new NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, said: “We need to have these debates, but in the near future, the main thing is to send military aid to Ukraine.”
The approach needs to be changed. There are negotiations ahead, and U.S. and European officials need to be prepared for them. Preparing for negotiations and reaching consensus on a common approach will take time — and should begin immediately. Ukraine's contribution will be important. Without consulting with the United States and its allies, Kiev is putting forward unrealistic ideas for a cease-fire, like Zelensky's victory plan announced in the fall. In order to avoid such disagreements, it would be useful for the Ukrainian president and his team to regularly discuss their diplomatic strategy with their Western counterparts.
The next step is to open communication channels with Russia. There has been no regular dialogue between it and key Western capitals for almost three years. For negotiations to have any chance of success, an exchange of views should become the rule, not the exception, as it is now, even in the absence of hope for an agreement. In this sense, Trump's appointment of Kellogg as special envoy for Ukraine provides a chance to persuade Putin to appoint someone from his side, too. This will make it much easier to interact with Moscow; at the moment, no one in the Kremlin seems authorized to negotiate on these issues.
Finally, before engaging in real negotiations, the United States must take de-escalation measures. Two such steps are already being discussed: an agreement on the prevention of attacks on civilian shipping in the Black Sea, mediated by Turkey, and a deal agreed in Qatar to refrain from attacks on energy infrastructure. The text of both documents has been largely finalized, but none of them has entered into force. Pressure from Washington may contribute to this. Additional measures could include commitments not to strike beyond a certain distance from the line of contact; the exchange of prisoners of war "all for all", in contrast to the current practice of equal shares and a limited number of prisoners; and non-participation in further operations in areas near the internationally recognized border. The last point will rule out another attack on the Kursk region, as well as any attempts by Russia to create a buffer zone in the Sumy region of Ukraine bordering it.
If any of these steps begin to bear fruit, consultations can begin in several areas. In addition to the bilateral contacts between Kiev and Moscow, a contact group may be established with the participation of Ukraine, Russia, key Western powers and, possibly, China. At the same time, separate dialogues on US-Russian issues and NATO–Russia issues can be initiated.
A whole year, not just one day
Against the background of Trump and Kellogg's preparations for the start of negotiations, several serious pitfalls should be avoided. First, it is extremely important to moderate the expectations of both the public and interested governments. Trump's promise of a 24-hour solution was rather motivating, but his team clearly wants to act quickly. However, as in many previous conflict resolution negotiations, the first attempts are likely to fail; the path will be long and will require a lot of time and attention from the highest echelons of the United States and its allies. The scale of the animosity between Russia and Ukraine — and between Russia and the West — and the lack of communication between the parties over the past few years will make negotiations difficult to start and long after they begin.
It would be surprising if diplomatic efforts succeed in less than a year, if at all. Remember: it took the parties to the Korean armistice two years and more than 500 meetings to come to an agreement. In addition to the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, the even larger task of stabilizing Russian-Western relations will probably require an open process rather than the adoption of a single agreed document. Another risk is that the desire to quickly conclude a deal may create the impression that for the United States the end result is more important than the quality of the process. Washington would not like to give Moscow the impression that it is not interested in the details and, therefore, is ready to make significant concessions in the interests of a quick settlement.
Another trap may be the use of ultimatums to force the parties to conclude a deal. Some in Trump's entourage advocate using US military assistance to Ukraine as a cudgel against any manifestation of intransigence on the part of the parties: threatening either to increase aid to Kiev in order to "tighten the screws" on Russia, or to stop it if Ukraine refuses to make the necessary compromises. Any of these steps is fraught with unpleasant consequences. The United States is not interested in completely ending aid to Ukraine, because then Russia could seize power there. Given the amount of assistance the United States has already provided to Kiev, Washington does not have many opportunities to increase the supply of weapons in quantity, and a high-quality one would entail unacceptable risks of escalation. In any case, such threats are unlikely to be effective: the US leverage over Russia and Ukraine is significant, but not so much as to force one of them to make an unfavorable deal for themselves, since both consider the problems at stake as existential or almost existential.
Third, Trump and Kellogg should not turn the negotiations into a bilateral US-Russian process. Even without taking into account the immorality and ugly historical analogies of Kiev's exclusion from deciding its own fate, the Ukrainian side must be involved for purely pragmatic reasons: Ukraine can disrupt any deal it deems unacceptable. In addition, there are good practical reasons for attracting the Europeans and other US allies, such as Japan: the EU accession process is key to Ukraine's future stability; the economic resources of the allies will be necessary for its recovery; and the united position of the United States and Europe will not allow the warring parties to force the enemy to show himself from an unfavorable side.
The coming to power of a president in the United States who promises to quickly end the fighting increases the likelihood of a breakthrough, but it also carries serious risks. The stakes in the negotiations will be high, especially for the two warring parties, as the conflict has already claimed tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands of lives on both sides. If Trump's efforts fail, the dynamics of the conflict will not just return to the previous stable status quo: it will intensify and involve other states more actively. With a clear vision of the end point and a plan of action, the new administration could help put an end to this horror and the risks it poses to the entire world.
