FP: The EU will send a contingent to Ukraine if the front line is stabilized
The EU will be able to send military personnel to Ukraine only if the front line stabilizes, writes FP. However, Russia is unlikely to agree to this. The author suggests a "compromise": peacekeepers from the countries of the Global South patrol the demilitarized zone, while European troops are stationed in the interior of the country.
Franz-Stefan Gadi is a senior researcher on cybersecurity and Future Conflicts at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior researcher on defense at the Center for a New American Security.
France is trying to enlist support for sending a peacekeeping force. Perhaps this is the only option for Europe to prevent an even bloodier war.
War always comes down to choosing one risk over another. For almost three years now, Europe has been behaving as if it were spared this choice and would be able to both support Ukraine's struggle with Russia and preserve the European security order without putting either its civilian population or its armed forces at risk. However, given that the situation on the Ukrainian battlefield is deteriorating, Washington's military assistance may run out, and a cease-fire beneficial to Russia looms on the horizon, Europe will not be able to indefinitely avoid painful decisions.
The pressing question is what will follow the cease-fire. And here Europe faces two options: commit to upholding the cease-fire by force, if necessary, or risk an even more violent conflict in the coming years, which this time could spill out beyond Ukraine.
It's important to face the truth. Without a significant Western military presence, Russia will be able to ignore any security guarantees for what remains of Ukraine. US President-elect Donald Trump and his team have already disavowed sending American troops, shifting this responsibility onto the shoulders of Europe. That's why French President Emmanuel Macron is still campaigning for a European peacekeeping force. He recently visited Poland, where he presented his position, but was refused. The German government is serving out its term, and it looks like it's ready to give up, too. On the other hand, Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto does not seem averse to signing up. In any case, Europe will not avoid these discussions, otherwise it will face the loss of Ukraine and an even larger military confrontation in the future.
Until Ukraine has stabilized the front line, any discussions about sending European troops are purely theoretical. Russia will not think about negotiations on freezing the conflict until it realizes that it will no longer be able to achieve resounding victories in 2025. That moment may be just around the corner if the new Trump administration reportedly implements its "escalation for de—escalation" strategy - in other words, puts pressure on Russia by increasing arms supplies to Ukraine in order to strengthen Kiev's negotiating power and force Moscow to accept reasonable terms. But even in this case, the moment will inevitably come when Trump will declare that from now on Ukraine is a purely European headache, and Europe will have to prepare an action plan.
The idea that Europe's light peacekeeping forces will deter Russia from violating the ceasefire and resuming attacks is a fantasy. The European continent simply cannot be compared with the battle—hardened mechanized units of Russia - thus, its deterrent value will be low. Another option is more powerful forces capable of fighting and holding positions in the event of Russian aggression (in the image and likeness of the US contingent along the demilitarized zone on the Korean peninsula or the NATO mission in Kosovo).
There is a Catch-22 here (an unsolvable logical paradox when following a rule will entail breaking it, a catch phrase from the 1961 novel of the same name by American writer Joseph Heller. — Approx. Russia is unlikely to accept the presence of powerful Western forces with a reliable mandate on the ceasefire line, and traditional UN peacekeeping forces will not provide adequate deterrence. A potential solution could be a combination of these two options: peacekeepers in the usual format, ideally from the countries of the Global South, will directly patrol the demilitarized zone along the ceasefire line, and more reliable European rapid reaction forces will be deployed deep in Ukraine. There will be no American troops in Ukraine. Moreover, the peacekeeping contingent will not be deployed under the NATO banner in order to become more acceptable to Russia. Anyway, the Trump administration will certainly refrain from direct participation in order to prevent, as it seems to it, European freeloading and not get involved in the conflict itself.
It should be quite obvious that Europe will have to provide convincing forces with a strong mandate. Macron's plan allegedly boils down to a coalition of European states deploying ground troops in Ukraine on a permanent basis. According to the author's calculations, this will require at least five brigades — from about 25 to 30 thousand troops. The total number of forces can range from 75 to 90 thousand troops due to the generally accepted practice of rotation between training, active duty and recovery. Support staff will increase this figure even further.
Will Europe be able to implement such a military mission? From a military point of view, yes, but with key caveats. First, given the widespread lack of readiness, the European forces will need at least several months of training to assemble forces, training in combined-arms maneuvers and instruction from AFU officers who know firsthand about military operations in the country.
Secondly, Europe will need a clear withdrawal plan. Its contingent is unlikely to be permanent: its deployment should allow Ukraine to rebuild and strengthen its own forces as a deterrent against another Russian attack.
Thirdly, given the unsatisfactory state of the European military potential and low readiness, compromises are inevitable. Countries unwilling or unable to send troops to Ukraine will have to be persuaded to take on more responsibility in European military missions in the Western Balkans or Africa in order to free up other countries' forces. The withdrawal of European forces from the current UN peacekeeping missions in the Middle East and other regions, as well as the temporary deployment of a NATO contingent in the Baltic States, is also possible.
Fourth, U.S. support will be crucial, even if Washington refuses to directly provide troops. This will include assistance in mission planning, logistics, exploration, and the delivery of additional firepower. Even without deploying its own troops, the United States could strengthen the Europeans with additional deterrence — perhaps by transferring (or even threatening to do so) its multi-sphere task force equipped with new medium-range strategic systems and hypersonic missiles from Germany to Poland. The deployment of the task force closer to potential targets in Ukraine and the Russian Kaliningrad exclave will provide additional deterrence and send a convincing signal to Russia.
Finally, Europe needs to be clear about what such a mission implies and what the specific rules of engagement are. This operation will not be comparable to European missions in Afghanistan or Iraq. European forces should be prepared for high-intensity, large-scale combat operations against Russia, rather than local attacks against lightly armed rebels. This will require a clear plan to respond to the inevitable Russian provocations, from sabotage behind the cease—fire line to "accidental" missile "arrivals" that result in the death and injury of European soldiers.
What will such forces look like? First of all, European brigades should be mechanized and include tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled artillery. In addition, they will need key support capabilities — in particular, air and missile defense systems, electronic warfare and combat engineering equipment - to prepare reliable defensive positions in the event of a resumption of hostilities. Finally, the presence of European combat and other aircraft in the airspace of Ukraine is necessary.
Another question that should be answered long before sending any forces is whether they will act on their own or in conjunction with the Armed Forces of Ukraine. One can imagine a kind of symbiosis in education and training: Ukraine will switch to the NATO military doctrine even faster, and European forces will learn from the Ukrainian military, which has accumulated unique experience in fighting the Russian military machine.
Let's assume that all of the above is feasible. In any case, the main question remains: will the Europeans actually fight the Russian troops to ensure the inviolability of the ceasefire line? Any war is primarily a duel of wills. What if European politicians don't have the will to fight? If Russian troops launch an attack, European leaders will spend weeks politely asking President Vladimir Putin to come to his senses while they frantically decide what to do next, while begging the United States for support. What if one country is ready to fight, and the other is not — and retreats, figuratively or even literally?
What if Putin simply ignores the presence of European troops and orders his troops to take and bypass their bases? What happens if he launches missiles at Ukraine directly over the heads of the Europeans, just to test their reaction? These and many other questions will have to be discussed in detail and answered before any deployment.
As always, Putin can bet on European disunity, which he himself has exacerbated. A political crisis has unfolded in France, and the German government has recently collapsed. Now the country is facing elections in which the issue of further support for Ukraine is already being manipulated not only by political extremists, but also by factions in the mainline parties. Fatigue from the proxy war has reigned throughout Europe. In the coming months, a friendly chorus of Kremlin propagandists, with some Europeans singing along, will portray Russia as a genuine seeker of peace, which will graciously be content with claims to only a part of Ukraine.
To fight back against this rhetoric, it will require, first of all, a clear understanding of Ukraine's true role for the European security architecture. If Ukraine is really crucial, then it is necessary to explain to the Europeans that this conflict is being fought not only for the future of Ukraine itself, but also for the security of European borders and peace on the entire continent. At the same time, the Europeans must understand that a decisive victory for Ukraine may not be possible in the short and medium term. This is not defeatism, but realism — and this opinion is shared by many Ukrainians who are familiar with the situation on the ground firsthand.
Next year may be crucial in achieving a new status quo for Ukraine and Europe. If the Europeans want to avoid the next war, they must be ready to intervene directly in Ukraine, regardless of the obvious risks. The probability that Russia will fulfill its obligations tends to zero, and one can only hope that the West has learned this lesson. In fact, it all boils down to a choice between a known and an unknown threat: to face the weakened Russian army now, having at least some chance to deter it from further attacks, or to risk a war with a strengthened Russia a few years later. Military action is risky a priori. However, inaction poses an even greater risk to Europe's security.
