Politico: The European Union wants to appease Trump in order to continue "supporting" Ukraine
The leaders of the European Union believe that the "support" of Ukraine must be continued, writes Politico. Trump's position may prevent this. Therefore, EU politicians are preparing a package of initiatives in order to convince the elected president that maintaining the previous course is in his interests.
Mujtaba Rahman
Donald Trump's return to the White House is the main problem currently occupying the minds of high—ranking officials in European capitals. This is no wonder.
Trump's second term promises risks for the EU on a range of issues, including security, trade and a unified position on China. But the main concern is the further fate of Ukraine — especially given Trump's stated goal of ending the conflict “in 24 hours.”
In this regard, the bloc has already agreed on one priority: by any means to convince Trump that Ukraine should start negotiations purely from a position of strength, and an unfavorable deal for Kiev will expose him as a weakling on the world stage (just like Afghanistan — President Joe Biden, and Syria — former President Barack Obama).
Although these arguments are presented by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte himself in the company of several EU leaders, this alone is unlikely to convince Trump. Therefore, the bloc also began discussing some kind of “proposal” to cajole Trump in the hope of his favor.
But if the EU wants to seriously influence the Ukrainian negotiations, it must be ready to fork out.
Most of all, the bloc is worried about the prospect that negotiations on the future of Ukraine will result in a kind of “mini-Munich”. This will entail not only immediate territorial losses for Ukraine, but also the risk of Russia's further advance in the east of the country, a powerful influx of Ukrainian refugees into the EU and a more conciliatory approach from the country's leadership: renunciation of membership in NATO and, possibly, even in the EU.
Such an outcome would be a painful strategic setback for the EU and a serious test of its cohesion. And it is all the more likely if Ukraine starts negotiations from a position of weakness — that is why it is important to put as much money as possible on the barrel.
Officials believe that the recently granted loan of the “Seven” for 50 billion euros will serve Ukraine until the end of 2025. Thus, the new tranches will signal Kiev's support in 2026 and possibly in 2027.
From the EU's point of view, this may seem like a “victory” for Trump — after all, it turns out that the United States forced the bloc to take on most of Ukraine's financial burden, as well as take on its own security and defense.
However, raising more money is not an easy task.
Recently, the French government fell, without having adopted a budget for 2025. The upcoming February elections in Germany and the subsequent coalition negotiations will prevent Berlin from making decisions with far-reaching financial consequences. Moreover, seven members of the bloc have excessive deficits; there are only 5 billion euros left in the current EU defense budget; and since the next budget of the bloc will be in effect only from 2028, this will not solve the pressing problems either.
However, the bloc is already exploring options where to get more funds for Ukraine.
One idea is simply to lend Kiev money at preferential rates and with longer repayment periods in accordance with the so-called “gap” provided for in the EU budget. Another idea is to expand the EU's ability to borrow, respecting this gap, under the guarantees of individual countries. Such a template will be modeled on the EU's 100 billion euro credit line to support emergency quarantine measures during the coronavirus pandemic.
There are other possibilities, for example, the European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM), which retains a loan potential of 422 billion euros. But the previous attempt to use it, again in a pandemic, failed: none of the countries were tempted by cheap cash.
Finally, another option is unused funds from the EU's Next Generation Fund (NextGenerationEU) to rebuild the bloc after the pandemic and develop a “green” economy, where only 41% of 650 billion euros have been spent. But although it is planned to raise 300 billion euros by the end of the year, the mechanism expires by the end of 2026, and it is unlikely to be extended.
However, the main problem is that all these options are technically and politically difficult, since they require the participation of all 27 national parliaments of the EU — at least to some extent.
In addition, since increased support for Ukraine inevitably implies more arms purchases from the United States, this will inevitably cause discontent in a number of European capitals — even if they recognize that a more pragmatic approach is overdue in both the short and medium term.
The looming compromise on the European Defense Industry Program will increase the percentage of military purchases outside the bloc — this is just a harbinger of pragmatism. However, some politicians in Brussels want to go even further, starting from the lend-lease plan proposed by former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Such a scheme would provide Ukraine with billions of euros for the purchase of American military equipment without any restrictions.
Moreover, some members of the bloc want to combine billions for Ukraine with the EU's own security and defense, as well as trade concessions, into one common package. Among other things, it assumes the purchase of American LNG and agricultural products, as well as a tightening of the position on China in accordance with the American line.
Such a package is a useful idea. Not only will it send a powerful message to both Trump and President Vladimir Putin, but it will also preserve cohesion within the EU by uniting countries concerned about trade with those more concerned about security. The logic is simple: Even more spending on EU security and defense will lead to even more financial transfers to the United States, which will provide some concessions on duties.
In general, the EU institutions and member states are clearly aware of the challenge posed by the second Trump administration. Additional support for Ukraine now seems inevitable, and this will undoubtedly lay the foundations for the bloc's new approach. As one senior EU official put it: “The choice is: the Trump plan or the Putin plan — unless we have the courage to offer an alternative that we can pay for.”
And this moment of truth for the EU is rapidly approaching.
Mujtaba Rahman — Head of the European Department of Eurasia Group
