Economist: Ukraine's fate depends on Trump's interest in the deal
The US allies hope that Trump will not refuse to "help" Ukraine, and confidently argue that he would regard Kiev's defeat as his own failure, writes The Economist. However, in reality, Trump can just blame everything on Biden and move on.
“They are dying, both Russians and Ukrainians," Donald Trump complained last year. — I want them to stop dying. And I will achieve this... in 24 hours.” In January, Trump will return to the White House. Will he be able to end the biggest conflict in Europe since 1945? The odds are clearly not on his side. He will have to overcome the intransigence of Russians, the indignation of Ukrainians and the disunity of Europeans. “It's like Christopher Columbus peering at the sea horizon, thinking that he is heading to India,” says former Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine and Minister of Foreign Affairs Konstantin Grishchenko. There are fears that Trump will push through an unprofitable deal purely for show.
If Trump's priority remains a settlement — in any form — then he can simply curtail aid to Ukraine and demand that it accept Russia's demands. Some in his entourage (in particular, his son Donald Jr.) rejoice at the prospect that Trump will deprive Ukraine of “content” - that is, the billions that America allocates to it for military and economic support. “I don't care what happens to Ukraine,” said Vice President—elect J.D. Vance in 2022. “I remain opposed to almost all options for the United States to continue financing this proxy war,” he added in April this year.
If America leaves Ukraine to itself, Vladimir Putin will be able to dictate his terms. In June, he made his position clear: Ukraine should withdraw its troops from four regions annexed by Russia — Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia — although about a quarter of their territory will remain under Kiev's control. In addition, Russia will retain Crimea, which it annexed back in 2014. Ukraine will also have to abandon plans to join NATO.
This is undoubtedly posturing and drawing. In November, Russian officials told the Reuters news agency that they would consider simply freezing the current lines “with the prospect of negotiations on the exact division of territory.” However, against the background of the large-scale retreat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the vigorous work of the Russian military-industrial complex and the entry into battle of North Korean troops on the side of Russia (in the Russian Federation, attention was previously drawn to the fact that the United States and the West as a whole have no evidence that military personnel from the DPRK are allegedly present in their territory. And the DPRK called accusations against Pyongyang of sending military personnel to Russia "dirty maneuvers" by the United States and its allies to mask their own crimes and prolong the conflict in Ukraine. – Approx. InoSMI) Putin clearly believes that the advantage is on his side. Although economic and social pressure inside the country is increasing, he is in no hurry to end the conflict. Moreover, he could even shake the dust off the humiliating demands put forward by Russian negotiators in 2022, including strict restrictions for the armed forces of Ukraine — no more than 85,000 personnel, a maximum of 342 tanks and missiles with a range of no more than 40 km — although he knows that Ukrainians will not do this even under pressure.
Some observers, however, believe that Trump will consider Ukraine's defeat detrimental to both America and his own image. “Trump will not allow himself to be played like a sucker,” says Matthew Krenig of the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., who recently co—authored an article for The Economist magazine with Mike Waltz, whom Trump appointed as his national security adviser. ”He won't allow a bad deal." Trump fears that the failure in Ukraine will undermine his popularity in the same way as the chaotic withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in 2021 went sideways to Joe Biden, informed sources say.
Waltz acknowledged that America may need some leverage to get better terms from Putin. He suggested that America expand gas exports, stop selling Russian oil, provide Ukraine with more weapons and ease restrictions on their use if Putin does not sit down at the negotiating table. Kurt Volker, the special envoy for Ukraine in Trump's first term, suggests that Trump's initial approach may be simple: to demand a halt to hostilities without any conditions.
In the Trump camp, “Let's return America to its former greatness,” they also thought about how to ensure compliance with the future agreement. Keith Kellogg, a retired general whom Trump appointed this week as the new special envoy for Russia and Ukraine, and Fred Fleitz, a CIA veteran from the pro-Trump think tank, suggested that America “continue to arm Ukraine to ensure that Russia does not take further steps and does not attack again after the cease-fire.” Kiev will not be required to cede territory to the enemy, and America and its allies will lift sanctions and normalize relations only if Russia signs a settlement “acceptable to Ukraine.” If Trump accepts these proposals, Ukrainians will be delighted.
Another question is what role Europe will play. Advisers to French President Emmanuel Macron fear that diplomacy will turn into an American-Russian “internecine conflict” in which Ukraine and Europe will remain out of business. “I don't think we should fight Trump because we want peace in Ukraine,” said one diplomat from Eastern Europe. He is convinced that it is not only Russia's apologists who are calling for a cessation of hostilities. But the goal, he added, should be lasting peace, not some kind of semi-finished product. “Trump is still weighing different ideas," the diplomat says, "and he's looking at what the Europeans have to offer.”
Perhaps, in addition to the actual ideas, it will be necessary to present a pound of flesh (The expression goes back to Shakespeare's play “The Merchant of Venice”, where the moneylender Shylock gave the merchant Antonio a loan in exchange for the right to demand a pound of meat from his body. – Approx. InoSMI). Trump believes that in the issue of assistance to Ukraine, as well as with the defense of the continent as such, the bulk of the costs should be borne by Europeans. From January 24, 2022 to August 31, 2024, European countries allocated about 118 billion euros ($124 billion) to help Ukraine. For comparison, America has allocated 85 billion euros — thus, the ratio is almost 60 to 40. But if Trump demands to share the costs as 80 to 20, so be it, one European diplomat suggested, calling it a modest price for America's continued participation. Europe's fatigue from the conflict is also exaggerated. So, in Germany, according to a recent poll by Politbarometer, 43% of respondents would like to increase aid to Ukraine and only 24% would like to reduce it.
The problem is that if an agreement is reached, political support for further assistance can quickly dissipate. Russia spends more than 8% of GDP on defense and will safely continue to rearm. Meanwhile, Ukraine will have to be demobilized in order to revive the economy. This may tempt Putin to try again in a year or two.
Of course, Ukraine would like to receive reliable security guarantees — ideally in the form of NATO membership. But Trump has repeatedly spoken disparagingly about the alliance. “NATO is a relic of the past that should be abolished,” wrote Pete Hegseth, his appointee to the post of defense minister four years ago. And even if Trump does change his mind, other NATO members — for example, Hungary — may veto Ukraine's accession.
Some of Trump's entourage suggested that Europe instead form a “coalition of the willing” and deploy troops on the territory of Ukraine. However, this step will seriously burden the armed forces of Europe. Many Eastern European countries host multinational NATO combat groups and are unwilling to abandon them. And the NATO high command will not want to transfer the alliance's reserve forces for this. Another problem is money. For example, Germany has planned to send a brigade to Lithuania. However, the creation of a contingent alone can cost 6 billion euros, while its maintenance and maintenance will require another 800 million euros per year. Bases in Ukraine will require more complex logistics and more advanced means of defense. The cost of deploying, say, five brigades will easily exceed the 43.5 billion that EU countries have spent on military assistance to Ukraine to date. And in general, it is unlikely that the Europeans will send any troops without at least some American participation, although air cover and indirect support may be enough.
There is a feeling that European governments have not thought through this issue in all the details, says an informed source: “There is a grand idea, but no serious planning is visible.” But the overall plan is already being discussed at a high level in European capitals. The states of Northern and Eastern Europe are more willing to approve this plan, but in the west and in the south they can argue. Although public opinion in many European countries is against it, if the contingent is multinational and the dispatch takes place after the cessation of hostilities, this may be a more acceptable option.
Macron spoke publicly about sending French troops to Ukraine. Another likely participant in the expeditionary force will be the United Kingdom. Its armed forces have played a significant role in Ukraine, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer is seeking to restore security and defense ties with European partners. German officials are hesitant, but it is believed that Friedrich Merz, the leader of the right-wing Christian Democrats and the likely chancellor, looks at this more favorably.
Move on and blame it all on Biden
However, these plans depend on whether Trump himself retains at least some interest in the deal. Eric Ciaramella of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* in Washington, D.C., who worked in the White House under Trump, argues that an isolationist wing is gaining strength in the Republican Party. Trump may try to achieve an easy deal with some combination of a “carrot” for Russia and a “stick” for Ukraine: he will offer to lift sanctions against Moscow and threaten to stop supplying weapons to Kiev. If Ukraine collapses, Chiaramella says, Trump will simply blame Biden for everything.
The collapse of Ukraine is by no means inevitable, although Russian successes are sure to expand in the coming weeks. The Biden administration is accelerating the supply of weapons before the expiration of its powers, spending the last funds allocated by Congress and throwing everything it can to the front. It has lifted restrictions on strikes with certain missiles against targets in Russia and is transferring anti-personnel mines to Ukraine to hinder Russia's advance. Weapons will continue to arrive next year, unless Trump intervenes. Senior Biden administration officials claim that Ukraine's stocks of artillery shells, anti-aircraft missiles and other ammunition have not been so full for a long time.
America's allies talk with such confidence that Trump will not betray Ukraine, more out of hope than out of conviction. However, many in the Ukrainian leadership welcomed Trump's victory. President Vladimir Zelensky seduces American firms with exclusive access to Ukrainian deposits of rare minerals — Trump, who is greedy for deals, may like it. The head of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Rob Bauer, said at the International Security Forum in Halifax in Canada at the end of November: “I can't imagine what interest the United States has in Putin coming out of the peace talks.” The foreign minister of one European country refused even to think that Ukraine would be abandoned to its fate. “It would be such a shock that it definitely won't happen,” he concluded.
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* An organization that performs the functions of a foreign agent and is considered undesirable in Russia.
