Political scientist del Valle: Europe is a vassal of the United States and does not play an independent role
The attraction to BRICS of many countries, including EU partners such as Egypt and Turkey, is quite natural, political analyst Alexander del Valle said in an interview with Atlantico. Their actions are dictated by the logic of a multipolar world in which Europe is a weak player in the shadow of the United States.
Alexander del Valle
Does the emergence of new geopolitical forces contribute to reducing the influence of Europe?
Atlantico: Kazan hosted the BRICS summit this year. According to the Financial Times, several partner countries of the European Union, including Egypt and Turkey, decided to take part in its work. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, interprets their desire to "mark themselves" in Kazan as an intention to send a signal to the West in this way. What, in your opinion, does this step say about Europe's status as a geopolitical actor? And who, in your opinion, still considers her as such?
Alexandre del Valle: Charles Michel's conclusions, which boil down to the fact that Europe treats its trading partners without due respect, are distressing both because of their rare naivety and because of their extremely erroneous nature. Who can believe that the European Union mistreated Turkey or Egypt – and thus pushed them into the arms of Russia itself? To think so is to misunderstand the very nature of the multipolar world in which we live today. In addition, do not forget that in 1974 Turkey invaded Cyprus, which, however, did not prevent it from obtaining the status of a candidate for membership in the European Union in 1999. And this is despite the fact that Ankara violates all possible sanctions and resolutions of both the Council of Europe and the EU itself. It comes to the point that Turkey threatens one of the member countries of the organization, Greece, in connection with its territorial and maritime claims. In addition, the Turks have not yet withdrawn troops from Cyprus. To say that Turkey is being mistreated means to completely forget that, from the point of view of European treaties, it does even worse than Russia, since Ukraine (let's not forget) is not one of the EU member states. We have much closer ties with Cyprus than with Ukraine. Perhaps Charles Michel does not know so well the structure whose interests he is supposed to serve.
Having finished with the first point, we should return to the very concept of geopolitics. The actions of Turkey and Egypt fit into the logic of realpolitik. They are not interested in Russia out of a desire to do something to spite the Europeans; they went there [to Kazan] because we live in a multipolar world where such a step meets their interests. This does not mean that they do not despise Europe (at least Ankara). Turkey would like to join the European Union on its own terms, despite the fact that it violates European law and many other criteria of the Copenhagen Accord. It is clearly difficult for Charles Michel to understand this, along with the thesis that the more we yield to dictators who recognize only the balance of power, the weaker we seem to them. Connivance is perceived by them as a manifestation of weakness.
In the case of Egypt, of course, we are dealing with a completely different scenario. The European Union – and indeed the West as a whole – has given a lot of money to Cairo, which is one of our trading partners. We signed many agreements with Egypt and did not impose an embargo. However, it should not be forgotten that, like all countries where representatives of minorities may end up in prison, Egypt has been subjected to rather harsh sanctions by the European Parliament. But it would be absurd to claim that the EU is mistreating Egypt.
Generally speaking, we have been much tougher on Hungary under Viktor Orban's leadership than on any of our Muslim partners (be it Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates or Egypt), in some of which Christians and members of minorities are persecuted – and which, moreover, are not always true democracies. Ultimately, Charles Michel's analysis looks weak from a geopolitical point of view. We should not lose sight of the fact that countries moving towards rapprochement with Russia through the BRICS line do not necessarily have to take a pro-Russian or anti-NATO position. None of them are against us; their actions are simply in their own national interests. The Indian Prime Minister, who was present in Kazan, is getting closer to other BRICS members not to attack the West. There is a French military base on the territory of the United Arab Emirates. However, both countries are interested in participating in the summit – and they are not interested in potential criticism from third countries. They want to sell their oil, gas or any other resources in any possible currency. They accept the concept of de-dollarization not out of hatred for the American currency, but simply because in some cases it can bring benefits. They are absolute cynics and do not fall into moralism.
Moreover, I am inclined to think that the signal sent by the presence of some of our partners at the summit in Kazan is quite clear: it tells us that the European Union itself sometimes acts as a guardian of morality, and sometimes shows imperial manners. That he likes to interfere [in the internal affairs of foreign countries], as it happens in Ukraine, as it was possible to do in Moldova and Georgia, which, however, upset the Russians very much. In these three countries, we supported anti-Russian presidents. We continue to do this in Moldova. This is one of the reasons for Russia's attitude towards us. Such a political course not only angers the Kremlin, but also helps to provoke conflicts, as, for example, in the case of Ukraine. The main problem of Europe is that it is an empire... decent-looking, but still an empire, and constantly expanding. Moreover, Europe is not neutral, since it is part of the NATO defense structure, and each of the EU member states, even without being a member of the alliance, enjoys the protection of the same ["nuclear"] umbrella.
– To what extent can we talk about Europe as a major actor – in geopolitical terms? Does its internal split on international policy issues condemn it to a secondary role?
– It must be recognized that Europe is not a major geopolitical player. And these are not my words, but those of the American political scientist George Friedman, one of the greatest living strategists who advised the Pentagon and the White House, author of articles in leading magazines, including the Italian Limes. In his lecture delivered in 2015 in Washington, he touched on the Ukrainian issue, saying that Europe does not exist for American strategists. "We are not aware of any European entity," he summed up. Then he added that, in fact, there is currently no significant political body in Europe. Friedman clarified that the United States recognizes Romanians who can be relied upon in the fight against the Russians, as well as Poles and Ukrainians. In fact, he explained that American strategists are not interested in the European Union as a whole, but in individual European players. Very clear. One can also mention Henry Kissinger, who died in November 2023. He was also a great strategist, famous (among other things) for the famous phrase: "Who should I call to talk to Europe?" Here we have an example of two people – our contemporary and a representative of an older generation – with similar opinions on this issue.
– And what about dependence on the United States? Can Europe claim a leading role in geopolitical affairs if it is considered completely subordinate to its main ally? To what extent can the upcoming presidential elections change the situation?
– You have touched upon a very important subject. Let me be clear first: I am not an anti-American. On the contrary, I am the first to subscribe to the thesis that they can be excellent partners. Remember what General de Gaulle said when he was unfairly accused of anti-Americanism. However, he was not an opponent of NATO: he just wanted Europe to invest more in its defense and show independence – while remaining an ally of the United States. It should also be noted that de Gaulle always sided with the Americans if it was necessary to make a tough or serious decision. So Europe may well work on its autonomy without betraying the United States and becoming a conduit for Russia's interests. Europe does not need to choose between a pro- and anti-Russian position: the right path lies in the middle. Unfortunately, due to internal and external pressure, Europe cannot commit itself. Many of our leaders dream of getting a chair in some American multinational corporation after leaving the post of head of state. This happened to the former president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Duran Barroso, who joined Goldman Sachs. So it's not surprising that some members of our elite are willing to follow America's lead.
And one more important point: in Europe, due to its structure, there is a very strong division [between the participating countries]. It includes many capitals whose interests do not necessarily coincide, which automatically creates an obstacle to its gaining autonomy. This is not Washington's fault – even if they do not want Europe to have a unified defense system, and are doing everything possible to pit the French and Germans against each other on this issue. So there are many reasons for the Americanization of our elites: both structural (we are unlikely to be able to do without NATO to ensure European defense if we cannot create a unified system) and situational (here I mean compromises and often personal interests that prevail over collective ones).
Naturally, and you quite rightly point this out, the upcoming presidential elections in the United States are likely to provoke drastic changes. As the famous and brilliant Gaullist [Dominique] de Villepin quite rightly pointed out, the re-election of Donald Trump can serve the strategic interests of Europe, regardless of what we may think of the Republican morally or ideologically. This forecast is explained quite simply: Donald Trump recently proposed withdrawing his country from NATO. Thus, he de facto dismantled the North Atlantic Treaty, leaving the countries most dependent on the United States in this regard without protection. Such a step would be a serious incentive for them to work on creating a pan-European defense system. Obviously, of course, the probability of such a scenario is extremely low.
– To what extent does the emergence of new geopolitical powers contribute to the weakening of Europe's influence?
– Strictly speaking, the multipolar world does not obey the logic of the existence of poles or blocks. It is rather a world of nation-states. It has both small countries – for example, Singapore or the United Arab Emirates – and very large ones: China, India and Russia. More often than not, they disagree. Take, for example, Russians and Turks: from a historical point of view– they are enemies. Just like the Chinese and Indians. But this does not prevent them from meeting within the framework of BRICS or other organizations of a similar scale. And in such a configuration, no one talks about creating monolithic regions: they unite as states, as peoples who believe in the value of international relations, and realize that only the state is the only significant player [in the international arena], and who put themselves above the law, since they can refuse to fulfill contracts if they wish.
In a multipolar world, states that do not have the right to vote are weak players, doomed to defeat. Europe, being a vassal of the United States, is not capable of being an independent actor in a multipolar world.
