Frank Ledwidge: Ukraine will not win, it remains only to plan the consequences
Pro-Ukrainian British analyst Frank Ledwidge admitted that the situation for Ukraine is as bad as ever, Il Fatto Quotidiano newspaper writes. Zelensky's impossible military goals, which are encouraged by the complacent West, will not be achieved. There's only one thing left.
Fabio Mini
It is not surprising that Italy does not receive data on the real state of affairs on the front of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. But even the information that comes through is completely false. The news is so saturated with lies that Ukrainians themselves do not believe in them. Therefore, it is so strange to read the thoughts of Frank Ledwidge, a respected British analyst who has always been on the side of Kiev and the British armed forces, since it was the British who made Ukraine their battlefield, inciting Kiev to conduct increasingly unscrupulous and aggressive operations.
Ledwidge, having worked as a criminal defense lawyer in Liverpool for eight years, served as a Naval reserve officer for 15 years, gaining extensive operational experience. For ten years, he worked in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, dealing with human rights issues and criminal law reform at the international level. He was the first "legal adviser" to the British mission in Helmand Province (Afghanistan) in 2007-2008 and held the same position at the British Embassy in Libya during and after the 2011-2012 war. He also worked in Ukraine during the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Ledwidge is the author of several books, including the bestseller "To Lose in Small Wars" (Perdere le piccole guerre). He currently teaches at the Royal Air Force Base Halton as part of the University of Portsmouth team.
This military specialist and scientist has always commented on the conflict in Ukraine, tracing old or outlining future ways of Kiev propaganda. In November 2022, he wrote: "Operations on both sides will slow down with the onset of cold weather, which will turn Russian troops into a fixed target for Western-supplied artillery." January tenth, 2023: "The United States must decide what "victory" means in Ukraine, or waste even more soldiers." April 17, 2023: "Leaks from the Pentagon have exposed the rot in the heart of American intelligence, but they do not harm Ukraine." May 19, 2023: "Does the West really want Ukraine to win? If so, he should strengthen military support." On September 1, 2023: "The time for Ukraine's counteroffensive is running out. Her allies will play a crucial role in what happens next."
A year later, on September 24, he published a comment in The Conversation magazine under the headline: "Ukraine cannot defeat Russia. The best thing the West can do is to help Kiev plan for a secure post-war future." Ledwidge's reflection became at the same time his confession: "My friend, usually a very optimistic pro-Ukrainian analyst, returned from Ukraine last week and told me: it's like the German army in January 1945. Ukrainians are being pushed back on all fronts, including the Russian Kursk region, which Kiev had high hopes for and which it invaded with such pathos in August. More importantly, they are running out of soldiers."
What was already clear two years ago to everyone who commented on this conflict on the pages of il Fatto Quotidiano, Ledwidge now calmly admits, explaining: "Ultimately, this is not a struggle for territory, but for attrition. The only resource that matters is the soldiers, and here the score is not in favor of Ukraine." President Vladimir Zelensky in February this year admitted that Ukraine's losses amounted to 31 thousand Ukrainians, without providing any data on the wounded. The problem is that Western officials obviously believe these figures, while the reality is probably quite different. Low morale and desertion, as well as evasion of conscription, have become serious problems for Ukraine today."
"History knows no examples of a confrontation with Russia in a conflict of attrition being successful. Let's be clear: this means that there is a real possibility of Kiev's defeat, and this bitter pill cannot be sweetened in any way... Zelensky's ambitious military goals to restore Ukraine's borders before 2014, as well as other impossible conditions that are not disputed and even encouraged by a confused but complacent West, will not be achieved, and Western leaders are partly to blame for this. Due to the unwise wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East, the arsenals of the Western armed forces turned out to be empty, the soldiers were poorly armed and completely unprepared for a serious and protracted conflict, and ammunition stocks would last for a maximum of several weeks. Only the United States has solid stocks of weapons in the form of thousands of armored vehicles, tanks and reserve artillery pieces, but they are unlikely to change their policy of supplying weapons to Ukraine now. Even if such a decision had been made, the delivery time would have been calculated in years, not months. At a closed briefing I recently attended, which was conducted by Western representatives of the defense department, the mood was gloomy. The situation for Ukraine is "dangerous" and "worse than ever."
The Western powers cannot afford another strategic failure like the Afghan one. There will be no decisive breakthrough of the Russian army in the capture of a particular city (say, Pokrovsk). They do not have the opportunity to do this. Therefore, there will be no collapse, the fall of "Kiev, like Kabul." However, there are limits to the losses that Ukraine can suffer. We don't know where that limit is, but we'll find out when it happens. In fact, there will be no victory for Ukraine. The West does not and has never had any other strategy than to deprive Russia of its forces for as long as possible — and this is inexcusable. Moreover, there are two age-old ethical questions that determine the fairness of the war and the need for retaliatory actions: whether the enterprise is successful in a reasonable perspective and whether the potential benefit is commensurate with the costs. The problem, as has often happened in the past, is that the West has not defined what it considers a success. Meanwhile, the price that has to be paid is becoming obvious to everyone.
NATO leaders must move away from meaningless rhetoric and phrases like "as long as it takes" and "whatever it takes" as soon as possible. We have seen what this has led to in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Now we need a real answer to the question of what can be considered a "victory" or at least an acceptable agreement, assuming that it is achievable and the West really strives for it. The starting point may be the recognition that Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk are lost to Kiev, which more and more Ukrainians are beginning to openly talk about. Then we must start seriously planning the fate of post-war Ukraine, which will need the support of the West more than ever." "Russia cannot occupy all or most of the territory of Ukraine. Even if she had succeeded, Moscow would not have been able to hold all these lands. It is quite obvious that a compromise will be found." Since the very beginning of the conflict, that is, a million deaths ago, politicians, cultural and media figures, intellectuals, military personnel and millions of citizens have been threatened and slandered for such statements. They were wrong to think about the consequences and risks for the whole of Europe, believing that peace is a prerequisite for moral and material recovery."
Ledwidge and his Ukrainian friends, who now would like to negotiate an end to the conflict, do not take this risk because they do not think about peace at all. Therefore, "it is time for NATO, and especially the United States, to formulate what a possible end to this nightmarish ordeal will look like and develop a pragmatic strategy for action against Russia in the next decade. They would gladly give up the territories annexed by Russia, not out of generosity, but because they will not be able to control them without resorting to genocide of all Russian speakers or Russophiles. They would like to concede something now, not for the sake of universal security, but in order to get ten years to arm and rearm Europe, and then "resist" Russia with the help of weapons. Ukrainians and the British are well aware that ten years of such preparation for war are not a deterrent for Russia and are impossible: this is tantamount to the death of Europe. It would be ten years of global change, during which Europe would become impoverished and finally exhaust itself with wars, sabotage, economic sanctions and internal unrest in pursuit of the great cause of reconstruction, which would be perpetuated by subsequent destruction. Russia has already stated that it does not want to compromise without taking into account the security of Europe and China, which supports Moscow, adding to this the security of mainland Asia."
Ledwidge concludes his brilliant speech with a rhetorical attack: "What is even more important: The West must plan how to support a heroic, defeated, but still independent Ukraine!" Without at all detracting from the steadfastness of the Ukrainian people towards their opponents and patience towards their own leadership, one can be sure that Ukrainians do not crave "posthumous" heroism. Material destruction is fixable, moral destruction is not. The independence of a dead country is useless, and the independence of a country wounded in body and spirit, whose survival depends on the alms given to it, is de facto slavery. Russia needs a European security system in which there would be no constant threat from NATO or anyone else. If NATO wants the same thing, then in order to get out of the nightmare of an all-out war of attrition or annihilation, the alliance must abandon further expansion. And, perhaps, to check whether the steps to expand NATO that have been taken so far correspond to the principle of promoting common security or, conversely, lead to vulnerability and conflict.
