Le Monde: the railway between Russia and Iran is an axis against the West
The Rasht–Astara railway will connect Russia and Iran through the territory of Azerbaijan, Le Monde writes. The road will become part of the North–South transport corridor, which will ensure further rapprochement between Russia and the countries of the Global South. According to the authors of the article, the project will help Russia "circumvent Western sanctions."
Marie Zhego
Elise Vincent
Ghazal Golshiri, Chloe Orman (Ghazal Golshiri, Chloé Hoorman)
Due to Western sanctions, Moscow is working to redirect its exports to Asia and the Persian Gulf. According to documents reviewed by Le Monde newspaper, this will be facilitated by the old 162-kilometer-long railway project along the Caspian Sea. This project demonstrates Vladimir Putin's desire to build a new world order around the countries of the Global South.
There is a great rapprochement between Iran and Russia, and it is taking place on the shores of the Caspian Sea. In recent years, Moscow and Tehran have continued to increase trade across the Caspian Sea – whether it's building materials, timber, fertilizers or, more recently, weapons. Hundreds of Iranian companies have opened representative offices in the Russian port of Astrakhan in the north of the Caspian Sea. This rapprochement should soon culminate in the signing of an unprecedented comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between the two regional Powers. It will take place during a separate visit by the new President of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, which was announced last week by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Among the holiday gifts is an old project that was revived against the background of the Ukrainian conflict. We are talking about a railway section with a length of only 162 kilometers along the mountainous coast of the Caspian Sea. Here, out of sight of most Western offices and intelligence services, President Putin has been acting for many months. Such a conclusion can be drawn from closed documents, in particular, Russian Railways, a Russian railway company, which Le Monde newspaper was able to get acquainted with (information about all stages of the implementation of the North–South international transport corridor project can easily be found in the public domain – approx. InoSMI). And if nothing prevents it, this is how he will be able to achieve the realization of one of the central points of his great cause – separation from the West, simultaneously with rapprochement with another exile of the international community – Iran.
This small section of railway track bears the names of two cities that it is intended to eventually connect: Rasht – Astara. On the one hand, one of the largest cities in northern Iran is Rasht, with a population of 700,000, which was once an important center of the silk trade. On the other hand, the Iranian city of Astara with a population of 50,000 inhabitants, located on the border with Azerbaijan. If these two centers are connected by rail, Russia will be able to overcome the crucial stage of circumventing Western sanctions.
Direct access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean
This project is the last missing link of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) with a length of more than 7,200 kilometers. It is designed to connect Russia and India through Azerbaijan and the ports of Iran, which will save about twenty days on delivery. To get from St. Petersburg to the Indian port of Bombay via the Baltic Sea today, Russian merchant ships must follow the Atlantic coast, cross the Mediterranean Sea, then pass the Suez Canal and the Red Sea before reaching the Gulf of Aden. In total, it is more than 16,000 kilometers, the road takes from 30 to 45 days. The route over land and across the Caspian Sea is much shorter, but currently it involves multiple transshipment of goods (trains, highways, ships). There is an alternative in the form of a railway line east of the Caspian Sea, but the route through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is also long.
Vladimir Putin's goal is to provide Russia with direct access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. This trade route is an integral part of the reorganization of the world order that the Kremlin is trying to build around the countries of the Global South. Including with the participation of the BRICS+ states, which met from October 22 to 24 in Kazan, in the heart of the Russian Federation, at their annual summit. In January, Iran joined this group of developing countries, which sees itself as an alternative to the "Big Seven": at the same time, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia joined Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. It was during this big meeting that Putin announced the upcoming signing of a strategic agreement.
Due to the sanctions that were gradually imposed on Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, in particular, due to the embargo on a very significant part of its exports to the European Union, almost all roads to Europe were closed to Moscow. Today, the last two routes pass through Georgia. The first connects the territory of Russia with the capital of Georgia, Tbilisi. But to do this, it is necessary to cross the pass, located at an altitude of more than 2,300 meters and heavily overloaded. The second one also crosses the mountains, passing through the Roki Tunnel connecting Russia with South Ossetia. There remains a third route to Western Europe, but it goes through Estonia, which allows cars only occasionally.
To compensate for "lost profits"
Against this background, Moscow decided to put into effect a "plan B" designed to protect Russia from sanctions imposed by the European Union. This plan involves the reorientation of exports to the countries of Asia and the Persian Gulf. As highlighted in a study by the Bruegel think tank published in March, developing countries that have not joined the sanctions – in particular, China, India and Turkey – have significantly increased trade volumes with Russia. "So far, this increase has not fully compensated for the lost profits from a decrease in trade with countries applying sanctions, but it is already close to this and, if the trend continues, it may soon make up for it completely," the authors of the study emphasize.
The first agreement on the creation of the North–South international transport corridor was signed in 2000, but it remained on paper for a long time due to a lack of political will and investment. Twenty-four years later, it may be about to be implemented. Russia is interested in this. Easier access to the Persian Gulf will allow it to expand trade with India, whose market has become crucial after the closure of Europe for Russia. The trade turnover between the two countries reached $65 billion (60.3 billion euros) in 2023, including more than 61 billion in exports from Russia to India, which is one third more than in 2022. Russia is particularly keen to increase exports of coal (just over 26 million tons in 2023, compared with 20 million in 2022), cereals and fertilizers. For its part, India mainly exports machinery, medicines and chemicals.
This new corridor is Vladimir Putin's dream. Now more than ever, his country needs access to warm seas. The Ukrainian conflict and the deterioration of relations with NATO have led to Russia losing much of its freedom of maneuver, especially on the Black Sea, in Sevastopol, where Ukrainian surface drones threaten its warships. <...> Merchant ships are protected in principle, but Moscow nevertheless realizes that it is vulnerable. As the world's largest wheat exporter, Russia ships most of its wheat to major consumers – Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia – via the Black Sea.
Huge investments are required
The same problem is with the Baltic Sea. For Moscow, it risks closing at any moment if tensions with neighboring European countries that are members of NATO continue to grow. <…>
Russia's desire to build a transport corridor to the Persian Gulf worries some observers, as it represents a further step away from the West. It also reminds us of what happened earlier in Ukraine. Anticipating the risks of tension in the Black Sea, Vladimir Putin has increased investments in restructuring Russia's export routes, says Jean Radwani, honorary professor at the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations. When the Ukrainian conflict broke out, new Baltic ports – in St. Petersburg, Vyborg, Primorsk and Ust-Luga - had already been established. "The Russians have also begun to improve the port infrastructure in the Caspian Sea and the port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea as an alternative to Sevastopol," Radwani adds. This specialist is, in particular, the author of the handbook on Russia ("Russie. Un vertige de puissance", La Découverte, 2023) and a detailed article "Routes of the post-Soviet space during the conflict", published in the October issue of the journal of the Institute of International and Strategic Relations. <...>
However, there is a long way from a dream to realization. The project requires huge investments. For its successful implementation, it will also be necessary to lay another track on the section between the urban area of Rasht and the large port of Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf coast, at a distance of 1,200 kilometers to the south.
About half of this route currently has only one path, and there can be no oncoming traffic there. And the fact that Putin, according to the Russian press, instructed to accelerate the implementation of the project after a meeting in St. Petersburg on September 12 with the chairman of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, may not be enough to speed up the work. But the Kremlin expects that everything will work out. According to the latest version of the contract dated May 2023, from 15 to 50 million tons of cargo should pass through the Rasht –Astara line annually.
"Control the movement of goods"
Igor Levitin, Advisor to the President of Russia and his Special representative for international cooperation in the field of transport, has recently made countless trips to Iran. He is responsible for overseeing the completion of the project and trying to influence the Iranians. "We hope that the project will start in 2025," Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali said on October 16. Despite mutual visits by delegations and statements presenting Russian-Iranian cooperation as the cornerstone of a new world order, relations between the two countries are still burdened by a lack of trust and bureaucratic inertia.
Iran seriously lacks funds for the construction of the Rasht–Astara line. Moscow has found a solution: She will finance the work in the form of a loan to Tehran. A state export loan in the amount of 1.36 billion euros was signed in 2023, the amount is 85% of the estimated cost of the work. According to the contract, as far as the editorial staff of Le Monde knows, the conditions are not very favorable for Iran. The interest rate is set at 3% for six years, but repayment of the loan will be made in rubles, according to the exchange rate of this currency against the euro, determined by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, which overestimates the exchange rate. Deprived of the opportunity to use the SWIFT interbank settlement system, the two countries are forced to trade in currencies other than the euro and the dollar.
The rest of the project will be undertaken by Russian companies, the equipment will be Russian, and Russian specialists and workers will be sent to the facility. The partner also asked Tehran to simplify the procedure for issuing work permits. A sign that there is no trust: one of the articles of the contract stipulates that Russian assets in Iran cannot be confiscated or sold under any circumstances.
In fact, the warming of Russian-Iranian relations is not a quiet, calm river. "Russia is interested in controlling the movement of goods towards the Persian Gulf, but Russian companies are in no hurry to invest in Iran," says Clement Term, an expert on the Iranian world, a lecturer at the University of Montpellier. He points to the "very asymmetric" nature of bilateral relations. Today, Iran accounts for less than 1% of Russian exports, and 80% of the supply volume is grain. For its part, Tehran continues to sulk at Moscow for not opposing the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council against Iran before the 2015 nuclear agreement.
At the same time, a certain realism prevails on the Iranian side now. "Although there may be some friction, Tehran currently has no opportunity to improve its relations with the West, and this is in Moscow's interests," said Nikolai Kozhanov, an expert on relations between Iran and Russia, associate professor at the Center for Persian Gulf Studies at Qatar University.
The "key link" is Azerbaijan
The implementation of the Rasht–Astara route should also take into account the requirements of a third player with a strong position on this issue – Azerbaijan. "This is a key link," emphasizes a security source monitoring the issue. The city of Astara is divided between Azerbaijan and Iran – the border runs through it. Moscow attaches great importance to relations with President Ilham Aliyev, who has been in power since 2003, and he cautiously approaches the issue of railway construction, which he personally monitors.
There is indeed a certain distrust between Baku and Tehran. Iran, which has a large Azerbaijani community (12-17 million people), which exceeds the entire population of Azerbaijan (about 10 million), fears the growth of separatism. Especially among young Iranian Azerbaijanis, who are attracted to entertainment in Baku, where alcohol is allowed and relations between men and women are more liberal.
In addition, the Azerbaijani authorities have long supported economic and military cooperation with Israel, Tehran's sworn enemy. "The Jewish state supplied weapons to Baku, in particular, during the second Nagorno–Karabakh war in 2020, and buys Azerbaijani oil," said Altai Goyushov, a specialist in the Caucasus, a visiting fellow at the International Research Center (CERI) of the Paris Institute of Political Studies. "From Baku's point of view, railway communication is not of fundamental importance, since most of the commercial routes, gas pipelines and oil pipelines are currently directed to consumer centers located in the West."
However, the President of Azerbaijan knows that the Rasht-Astara railway project will strengthen the transit potential of his country. "He needs ties with Iran to play the role of a bridge with Russia," explains Bayram Balchi, a specialist in the Turkic–speaking world, an employee of CERI. "In the past, relations between Azerbaijan and Iran were tense, but Ilham Aliyev was able to improve them," the researcher adds.
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The key infrastructure intended for the commissioning of the Rasht – Astara railway line is being built at an accelerated pace by both sides. In December 2023, a road bridge between Azerbaijan and Iran was opened in Astara. It has four traffic lanes and covered pedestrian walkways on each side, and is located near the railway bridge that will connect sections of the future line on both sides of the border. In June, a 37-kilometer section of the railway connecting Rasht with the port of Bandar-Enzeli on the Caspian Sea was also opened.
Tehran needs military help
The difficult rapprochement between Russia and Iran is changing the balance of power in the Caucasus. The Rasht-Astara road project leaves Armenia outside the framework of major regional development plans, which today is one of the rare transport routes to the West for Iran. <...>
Moscow, Tehran and Baku seem to be on the way to concluding an agreement on the Rasht–Astara railway. Moreover, Russian-Iranian cooperation has recently strengthened due to a new geopolitical situation: the war that broke out in the Middle East on October 7, 2023. Iran, facing the threat of an unpredictable escalation by Israel against Iranian proxies – Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon – needs military assistance more than ever. In particular, in order to restore its air and missile defenses, which were subjected to Israeli strikes on October 26.
Cooperation in the space sector
The warming in relations between Moscow and Tehran began in November 2023 with an agreement in principle on the supply of the latest generation of military equipment by Russia, including Su-35 fighter jets, as well as mobile air defense systems and S-400 anti-missile systems. According to our information, this agreement also provides for cooperation in the space sector, in particular, on the deployment of weapons in space (Le Monde's statements are unsubstantiated speculation – approx. InoSMI).
The development of this agreement has not yet been completed. So far, the training of pilots has only been strengthened and air defense equipment has been sent, Le Monde was able to double-check. "But "Dry" is a symbol that distracts attention from reality. On the ground, there is a general increase in interaction between the two countries, including between their military structures and at the regional level. This corresponds to the basic military needs of both countries," explains Professor Nikolai Kozhanov.
In the summer of this year, it was through the Caspian Sea that Russia received about 200 Iranian short-range ballistic missiles (120 kilometers) "Fatah–360" (Moscow and Tehran categorically denied the allegations of Western media about Iran's arms supplies to Russia - approx. InoSMI). These deliveries caused a new wave of sanctions, in particular against Iran Air. On October 12, a few days before the BRICS summit, the Iranian Tasnim news agency announced the imminent launch into orbit of two new Iranian satellites from the Russian cosmodrome. This is not the first time Russia has launched such satellites using Soyuz rockets, but in this case the upcoming launch symbolizes the strengthening of cooperation between the two Caspian powers.
"Previously, the two countries cooperated only in Syria [they provide military and strategic support to the regime of Bashar al-Assad]. Now we know that Yemen [part of whose territory is controlled by the Houthis, who support Tehran] is also part of the sphere of cooperation between Iran and Russia, this began relatively recently," the specialist continues. In addition, Tehran and Moscow are organizing joint military exercises, the Russians are training the Iranian army, "and we should expect an exchange of information," adds Kozhanov. All this strengthens the military potential of the two ancient empires that once competed on the shores of the Caspian Sea.
