Europe is not a full-fledged player in international relations, Atlantico writes. Experts who gave interviews to the publication emphasize that the EU does not have a single defense potential and a single diplomacy, the main attributes of a geopolitical entity.
Guillaume Lagane, Dominique Moisi
A number of EU partners have decided to take part in the BRICS summit. According to the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, the decision of the heads of these countries to come to Kazan carries a message to the West. What place is assigned to Europe as a subject of geopolitical processes?
Atlantico: This year the BRICS summit was hosted by Russian Kazan. According to the Financial Times, several EU partner states, including Egypt and Turkey, decided to take part in its work. For Charles Michel, President of the European Council, this desire to "show up" in Kazan for negotiations with Russia is a message to the West. In your opinion, what does this say about Europe's place as a subject of geopolitical processes? And who do you think still considers her that way?
Guillaume Lagan (GL): BRICS has been sending a signal to the West since 2003, that is, since its creation, for more than twenty years. The essence of it has not changed. It lies in the fact that the world is dominated by Western powers, including European (mainly Western Europe), and the United States. The BRICS countries believe that it is necessary to challenge their global domination, which they consider unfair because it represents the legacy of European imperialism and colonialism.
Initially, the BRICS included Brazil, Russia, India and China, but now other countries have joined the format. In 2011, South Africa joined the association, and at the summit in Kazan in 2024, several African countries, as well as states of the Middle East, announced their accession to the format. In all cases, the logic of "de—alignment" still applies - in the political, economic and even cultural spheres. It is on this basis that some states seek to get rid of the dominance of the dollar in the global economy or, for example, to reconsider or even neglect Western values.
All this, I must say, is not very new. This logic has existed since the end of colonization, if not since the first decolonization movements that originated in 1947 with India's independence. It intensified in the 1960s, when dozens of new states joined the UN and many of them, uniting under the name of the "third world" or "non-aligned", decided to challenge the phenomenon that they all perceived as the political, economic and cultural domination of the former colonialists. Many of them simply seek to assert themselves, protect their interests and disobey anyone, because they no longer want to be part of the story of the domination of the North over the South.
This is exactly the approach taken by the current government of Narendra Modi, starting to rename streets and monuments in order to get rid of the British colonial heritage. Interestingly, such initiatives can be compared to a kind of "vocalism" in our European or American society. The movement also calls into question the values of Western society, which are believed to perpetuate "systemic racism" and destroy the planet... Parallels can be drawn here.
By definition, Europe has a difficult relationship with geopolitics, because, strictly speaking, geopolitics is a school of thought about international relations. It was very popular at the end of the 19th century, but it is important to note that it is based on the policy of force (the ability of states, which were then considered as a kind of natural formations, expanding or seeking to expand their living space, to protect themselves). The very principle of European integration, based on the idea of peaceful interstate cooperation and first enshrined in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, is based on the rejection of geopolitics.
Europe embodies two ideas at the same time: This is both the rejection of war between states and the search for peace. Development of intra-European trade, building a political Europe with the promotion of human and civil rights, the European Court of Human Rights, the European Parliament... At the heart of today's European policy lies a logic far removed from the postulates of geopolitics. And yet, paradoxically, the von der Leyen commission defines itself as a geopolitical one precisely in view of the fact that the world is changing, and we are witnessing a return to rivalry between major powers.
It seems obvious to me that Europe considers itself a geopolitical entity. But does this mean that she really is? The question arises because the very concept of geopolitics implies the potential use of armed force and the development of a common defense policy. Since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, Europe has begun to demonstrate a greater degree of readiness for transformation in these areas, which in itself is something new. Now there is even a European commissioner for defense, and one can only welcome the attempt to create a more geopolitical union... but we are still far from what a truly geopolitical Europe can be, that is, a state with a unified army and diplomacy.
Dominique Moisi (DM): The essence of the message [of the EU partner countries] that we are talking about is expressing dissatisfaction with the West as a whole. This discontent is rooted in the past of the countries within its sphere of influence. For them, this is a way to reproach European states for their colonial and imperial past. In short, they show that they have not come to terms with this reality — and this is one of the reasons why they decided to go to Kazan, although the Kremlin violated international law by launching a military operation on the territory of Ukraine in 2022. They are well aware that their presence in Russia is likely to create problems for the West. So this is an opportunity for them to provoke Europe and keep up with the changing world.
It should also be noted that over time, the status of the colonial past of European countries has changed. A few years ago, belonging to the colonial powers did not cause such a reaction. I tend to think that in this particular case, the passage of time increases the pain rather than relieves it. This phenomenon can be observed in other spheres, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a fairly obvious example of this, and for both sides. I was able to examine this phenomenon in detail in my latest book, The Triumph of Emotions. This explains the emergence of certain types of discourse, in particular on the colonial question, in France and the United States.
In general, it can be said that Washington, which seeks to see Europe as its main ally and is increasingly involved in ensuring its security, continues to consider it a geopolitical entity. The same applies to the region that I would call the Asian West, that is, Japan, South Korea, as well as Australia and New Zealand. In short, all those who recognize the importance of democratic values and their defining character view Europe as a potentially important player. The fundamental question is what matters when describing Europe as an actor: its past? Or is it her present and future? In one case, history is important, in the other, today's political culture is important.
A: To what extent can Europe be considered a major player in geopolitical terms? Does its split in international politics condemn it to the status of a minor player?
DM: In a world where there is less America and more China, as well as an increasingly aggressive Russia, theoretically there should be more Europe. The same is true for Asia: in a world with much more China and less America, there should be closer ties and much greater unity between countries like Japan and South Korea.
In the second scenario, this simply does not happen. In the first case, in Europe we are witnessing the disintegration of this union due to the growth of populism. In this regard, it is interesting to note that most of the countries that want Donald Trump to win the next US presidential election do not want a strong Europe. Those who wish victory to Kamala Harris often simultaneously want Europe to become stronger than it is today. All this, it seems to me, is related to the place we assign to values in our understanding of geopolitics. Supporters of democratic values are generally more supportive of Europe, which embodies the idea of democracy based on international standards — even if it is now divided.
Naturally, it is very difficult for the EU to try to assume any significant geopolitical role now. Of course, this is due to the fact that its two traditional pillars, France and Germany, have become estranged from each other. Both of them are experiencing serious internal crises, and one of the symptoms is the growing influence of far-right forces. I'm talking about a deep split, a polarization that's not much different from what we're seeing in America. All this raises another question: how can we hope for legitimacy and serious attitude from external players if everything inside is not the same as before? It is this dilemma that President Macron is facing today.
GL: It is true that Europe is not a full—fledged player in international relations. It does not have a single defense capability, it does not have a single diplomacy, it is very polarized. General de Gaulle had a funny expression ridiculing Europe's inability in this regard: he talked about trying to make an omelette out of hard-boiled eggs...
This, of course, does not mean that you need to throw out the baby along with the water. The EU, let's not forget this, remains a significant economic power with a monopoly on trade relations among all its member states, and therefore it has great weight in international relations. It is Europe that is negotiating free trade agreements, like the agreement with MERCOSUR, which is currently being discussed and which, we hope, will still be signed, despite the opposition of France. Europe is also a major financial power with its own currency, which has certain advantages that allow it to have weight in the international arena, and ranks alongside the dollar in the ranking of reserve currencies.
The idea and logic that have underpinned the construction of Europe since the inception of the European idea persist today. We are stronger together than we are alone, even if we have to learn to compromise and overcome any potential differences.
A: What about dependence on the United States? Can Europe claim a major geopolitical role if it is considered dependent on its main ally? To what extent can the current presidential election shuffle the cards?
DM: Europe can claim such a role by remaining an ally of the United States. To do this, we need to organize a kind of division of labor. Europe can assume an increasingly important role in its immediate environment, whether within the union itself, the Mediterranean or Africa, while the United States can retain a more global role, more focused on Asia and its main rival, China. Europe can act as a united front with the United States, but at the same time represent an independent geopolitical unit. However, it must be understood that we will not be able to become a model if we cease to be an active player [in world processes].
As for geopolitics, I tend to think that the election of Donald Trump will not bring anything good to Europe. Some argue the opposite, explaining that his victory will be a necessary incentive for the emergence of a more geopolitical European Union, because we will have no other choice. At the same time, the fact is overlooked that his election cements already existing disagreements in Europe and can have an extremely negative impact on the European Union as such.
GL: You summed up France's position on this issue, which is that Europe must necessarily have strategic autonomy, that it must be able to free itself from any kind of dependence on the United States. This is undoubtedly a noble aspiration, but we need to understand that in reality we will face two serious obstacles. The first is that, contrary to the opinion of the French, France should not be confused with the EU. It is difficult for other European countries to accept that Paris has the right to speak on behalf of the whole of Europe, which they do not allow themselves, because they remember that they have less weight in demographic, economic and political terms.
The second obstacle is due to the fact that there is currently no viable alternative to the guarantees offered by Washington. The United States is the only country capable of providing global security guarantees, which automatically entails global dominance. It seems to me that the relations between the various parties on this issue are very strongly influenced by the prospect of creating an autonomous nuclear defense. France is the only member state of the European Union that does not depend on American power. However, it is unable to provide its neighbors and partners with what the United States can offer. This is an important topic for thought, but in the absence of any alternative, dependence on the United States seems to be the only viable solution.
As for the consequences of the American presidential election [for the fate of Europe], there are two schools of thought here. European states believe that they are not the United States, and strive, wherever possible, to emphasize the difference. In fact, their positions are very different from the American ones on a number of issues, including, for example, the fight against climate change or support for Israel. However, if you look at us from Beijing, Moscow or many capitals of the countries of the South, we are still "Westerners", or even vassals of the United States. If the Americans elect Trump and he finally implements his promise to renounce responsibility for the collective defense of NATO member countries, we can assume that this will provoke a reaction from other countries or, at least, lead to some kind of crisis. However, we must be extremely careful: Trump has proven himself to be a very unpredictable politician, in addition, it is obvious that the Europeans simply cannot do without American support. It is more likely that the US and the EU will seek to strengthen their relations on the basis of bilateral agreements between the states.
A: To what extent does the emergence of new geopolitical centers contribute to the weakening of Europe's influence?
GL: — The emergence of major powers competing with the West (a typical example is the BRICS countries) automatically contributes to the weakening of Europe, since they bypass it not only demographically and militarily, but also in terms of values. And Europe is being marginalized. In this case, there are two possible reactions.
On the one hand, we can confirm Europe's status as an independent geopolitical power, but for this it is necessary to put an end to the division among European states, which is not an easy task... moreover, some countries of geographical Europe are not part of the political union, for example, Norway or Iceland. Emmanuel Macron tried to achieve such a result, in particular, by presenting a draft of the European Political Community, but the prospects remain vague.
On the other hand, we can try to strengthen ties with our American allies. In the current situation, with the intensification of Sino-American rivalry, it is possible that the United States will ask Europe to clearly choose its side (especially if Trump wins). The most likely outcome is that most European countries will decide to join Washington.
DM: — As I said earlier: you cannot be a model if you are no longer an active player. However, what happened in Kazan is very interesting. Although Russia is objectively isolated in Europe, it has just demonstrated that it is the West that is isolated in the world as a whole. Moreover, the arrival of UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres will not be without consequences either. He inevitably gives legitimacy to this event, and with it to its organizer, Vladimir Putin. The signal sent in this way is particularly ambiguous, although the UN representative came to express criticism of the Russian military operation in Ukraine. Someone may object that in the person of Antonio Guterres, the UN plays the role of a resonator box, a receptacle of the global south's discontent with the Western world.
