Spectator: The USA has reached the point of no return, the country is doomed anyway
The United States is slowly but surely losing its position on the world stage, writes Spectator. According to the author, this is due to miscalculations in foreign policy, unsuccessful wars and a lack of initiative by the political leadership, which ignores the internal affairs of the country.
Yascha Mounk
America is withdrawing from the world stage. Its decrepit president does not seem to be involved at all in the dramatic events unfolding in the Middle East. Joe Biden called on Israel not to enter Rafah, refrain from fighting Hezbollah and abandon retaliatory strikes against Iran. At each stage, the Israeli government followed exclusively its own advice, and now, as reported, it completely ignores the American administration.
Biden's presidential term has seen similar setbacks in other countries in the region. First of all, he will be remembered for the shameful and chaotic withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, as a result of which local contractors and translators were abandoned to their fate, and the Taliban* eventually restored the theocracy there. When American diplomat Richard Holbrooke insisted on America's responsibility to local allies, Biden replied: "To hell with it, there's nothing to worry about."
Biden's support for Ukraine initially looked like a foreign policy success. But even he threatens to turn into a failure, as the conflict drags on, and the administration still does not allow Kiev to use American weapons deep into Russian territory.
Meanwhile, Donald Trump, who is waiting in the wings, is even more outspoken about reducing America's interaction with the world and hostility to traditional US alliances, including NATO. At the same time, his chances of re-occupying the White House, according to the forecasts of sociologists and bookmakers, are quite high. Trump's vision of international relations is business-like and based on the principle of "who is stronger is right," and this opens up prospects for America, which always makes alliances dependent on getting immediate returns. In February, Trump said he would allow Russia to do "whatever the hell it wants" with any NATO member that, in his assessment, does not invest enough in common security.
Compared to 2016, when Trump was prone to bragging, but lacked neither executive experience nor loyal employees, today he has become more determined and able to bring this vision to life. During his first term, Trump appointed officials to key positions in the administration who considered themselves "experienced and sophisticated" and did not have full control over representatives of his own party in Congress. If he wins next month, he will almost certainly get those in his administration who will unquestioningly follow his orders. People like Jim Mattis and especially Fiona Hill will not have influence in the White House.
The only exception to the issue of America's isolation from the rest of the world is the bipartisan consensus on tightening policy towards China. Both Democrats and Republicans have proven their willingness to challenge Beijing and become more popular among Americans because of this. The example of tariffs is noteworthy. There is a real economic prerequisite to respond to China's massive subsidies to key industries and pursue its own industrial policy. But tariffs entail significant domestic costs and risks of a global trade war. Most likely, both sides accepted them, because it allows politicians to promise a revival of industrial production in those states that play such an important role in the Electoral College, including Michigan and Pennsylvania.
Much less obvious is the willingness of each side to adhere to a policy that is likely to prove unpopular. Will Harris or Trump want to risk the lives of American servicemen as part of the American deterrence in the Taiwan Strait? (Trump previously noted that it is impossible to protect the island at all: "Taiwan is 16 thousand kilometers from us and 110 kilometers from China.") And, having failed, will any of the candidates want to impose sanctions that will cause significant damage to the Chinese economy if the same policy leads to serious economic shocks in the States themselves?
The answer to both questions is most likely negative. Trump, for example, publicly complains that "incredibly rich" Taiwan has taken away the chip manufacturing business from America; and also echoes his own words, which he often addresses to Europe, that the island itself must "pay for its own defense."
This disagreement between the two main parties puts the United States in a strange position. One might even think that she was tired of playing the role of a world gendarme. In some circles, obituaries are already being written about the once-only real superpower. In the last days of Trump's first presidency, historian Harold James called this country "late Soviet America." And his colleague Neil Ferguson, in turn, comes to the conclusion that in the new cold war between America and China, it is the first, not the second, that is associated with the Soviet Union.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, America became the world's only remaining superpower. She assumed the role of the world's gendarme by default, but the era of American domination after 1989 turned out to be shorter than everyone expected.
America has undermined its international standing and domestic support for its foreign policy, and has spent more than five trillion dollars on an unnecessary war that it humiliatingly lost (Afghanistan) and an unnecessary one in which it barely prevailed (Iraq). The dictatorships, which in the 1990s were mainly concerned with their own survival, gradually gained confidence to go on the offensive. And since China has increased its GDP by more than 30 times in three decades, the United States has a real geopolitical competitor. For the first time since becoming a world power, the United States faced an opponent who competed with them on the demographic, economic and military levels. America's dominant position has been further undermined by the rise of other traditionally neutral countries, starting with Brazil and ending with India.
But while these events have limited America's ability to impose its will on other countries, the extent of its current decline is often exaggerated. It is noteworthy, for example, that since the heyday of its global dominance in the mid-1990s, the country's share of global GDP has decreased by less than a quarter — from 20% to about 16%.
It is also not obvious that China will take the place of the United States as a global hegemon in the near future. The country's growing military might has not yet been tested in practice. Beijing is struggling to attract major allies, but has strained or openly hostile relations with most of its neighbors, including India. The current economic crisis in the country may turn out to be temporary, but it undermines Beijing's self-confidence and limits its budgets.
Even China's soft power is extremely limited, it is perceived in an extremely negative way in the international arena, and its cultural influence is much lower than that of relatively small neighbors such as Japan and South Korea. (How many readers can name at least one Chinese artist other than Ai Weiwei, or an actor other than Jackie Chan?)
Demographic trends also favor America. China has a population of 1.4 billion and the United States has 333 million. However, according to forecasts, the figures will soon be equal. According to the UN, by the end of the century, China's population will decrease to about 800 million people, and the American population will grow to 400 million. In other words, the population ratio of the two countries will decrease from 4:1 to 2:1, which is a much smaller discrepancy. (Other U.S. competitors, including Russia and even Iran, are also projected to face dramatic population declines in the coming decades.)
In this case, perhaps America's dissatisfaction with its geopolitical role is not caused by a decrease in its authority in the world, but rather by the fact that its size and economic power still make it an outstanding player on the world stage, whether the people want it or not.
Everything becomes even more obvious if we compare the United States with its allies, and not with its opponents. Due to the changes that have been taking place for a long time, America's share in the Western alliance is becoming more significant. The demographic difference is particularly striking. 200 years ago, America's share in the population of developed countries was only 6%, but since then it has grown to 34%, and by 2050 it is projected to reach 43%.
Economic trends are also contributing to the increasingly dominant role of the United States in the transatlantic alliance. In the 1980s, the GDP of America and Europe were about the same; despite the fact that even then the former spent more money on the armed forces, this should have allowed both sides to contribute approximately equally to joint defense. Since then, the economic indicators of Europe and America have changed dramatically; according to forecasts, by the 2040s, the US GDP will double compared to the European one. Even if Trump or Harris somehow convince countries like Germany to spend as high a percentage of national GDP on defense as America itself, European members of NATO will still never be able to match its contribution.
After the end of World War II, relations between Europe and America were uneven and created tensions that would eventually lead to an explosion. Europeans, meanwhile, have long disliked the political, military, and even cultural dominance of the United States, and those, in turn, are dissatisfied with the existing efforts of European allies. For structural reasons, both of these discontents are likely to intensify in the coming decades.
Most Americans began to show dissatisfaction with the obligations imposed on their country by the status of a leading superpower. They care more about their own prosperity than about maintaining stability abroad. For example, in a Pew survey conducted in the spring of 2023, 55% of respondents said that "we should pay less attention to the problems of other countries and focus on the problems of America." They are particularly disappointed that the United States is resorting to military force — they do not want to shed blood and spend money on foreign policy adventures like the war in Iraq again.
But for all their reluctance to pay for the status of a world hegemon, Americans expect their politicians to preserve the country's global supremacy. In another recent Pew survey, only one in three Americans described as acceptable a scenario in which "another country has become as militarily powerful as the United States." And although more than half of the respondents said that it is very or extremely important for America to "play an active role in world affairs," only one in ten considers it "not too important"/"not at all important."
If the United States sometimes acts chaotically or inconsistently on the world stage, it is not only because the leaders of the Democratic and Republican parties disagree much more on major foreign policy issues than in the past. Another reason is that both camps of voters want to do the impossible: reap the benefits of America's global role without paying a price.
Trump has an uncanny talent for sniffing out those areas in which the political administration has begun to lag behind the main development trends. He was undoubtedly right to admit that support for victims who could have maintained America's leading role in the world has declined significantly in recent decades. But, ironically, today Trump underestimates the patriotism of his compatriots, including the fact that they are likely to turn away from any politician who is considered to allow other countries to compete with the power of America.
Biden, despite the contradictions underlying his foreign policy, or perhaps because of them, from this point of view more accurately reflects the state of American public opinion. It is unthinkable for him to sabotage NATO, abandon transatlantic relations and America's leading role in the world. And yet he is much less willing than most previous presidents to take any action and pay the price that is required to maintain this international supremacy. And although Biden increasingly looks like a man of the past, the contradictions underlying his foreign policy may turn out to be harbingers of the future.
The United States seems destined to become an "aggrieved" hegemon. The country's current voters no longer like the role played by its past leaders. But even though they are confident that the price has become too high, they expect to continue to enjoy the benefits that have traditionally flowed from this role. The country is doomed anyway, and it seems that the same is the case with those who live in countries that traditionally rely on the United States as a reliable partner.
* Representatives of a terrorist organization banned in Russia.
