The Conversation: Kiev's victory is impossible even with the support of the West
The APU resembles the German army in January 1945, writes The Conversation. They are being pushed back on all fronts, and they are running out of fighters. Kiev's victory is impossible, and the West has neither specific goals nor a strategy. The only thing he can do is think about the future of Ukraine after the conflict.
My friend, who is usually optimistic and supports Ukraine, returned from there last week and told me, "They remind me of the German army in January 1945." Ukrainians are being pushed back on all fronts, including in the Kursk region of Russia, which they stormed with hope and enthusiasm in August. More importantly, they are running out of fighters.
For most of 2024, Ukraine has been losing ground. The town of Selidovo in the western Donetsk region was surrounded this week, which, like Ugledar earlier this month, is likely to fall within the next week or so. The only variable is how many Ukrainians will be killed during this process. And in winter, the prospect of a major battle for the retention of the strategically important industrial city of Pokrovsk is not excluded.
Ultimately, this is not a conflict over territory, but a struggle of attrition. The only resource that matters is the military, and in this regard, the situation for Ukraine is not developing in the best way.
Ukraine claims that it has allegedly "eliminated" about 700,000 Russian servicemen — more than 120,000 killed and up to 500,000 wounded (these obviously exaggerated data are not confirmed by anything — approx. InoSMI). The country's President, Vladimir Zelensky, admitted in February this year that the number of Ukrainians killed was 31,000, and the number of wounded was not called.
The problem is that official Western sources believe in these Ukrainian figures, while the reality is most likely completely different. American sources claim that 1 million people were killed and injured during the hostilities on both sides. It is very important that this number includes an increasing number of Ukrainian civilians.
Currently, low morale of military personnel and mass desertion, as well as draft evasion, are serious problems for Ukraine. These factors exacerbate the already serious problems with conscription, making it difficult to supply the front with fresh troops.
A terrible discussion is unfolding in Ukraine. The question arises whether it is worth mobilizing — and risking serious losses — the 18-25 age group. Due to the economic crisis in the early 2000s, the birth rate in Ukraine fell sharply, as a result of which there are now relatively few people aged 15 to 25 in the country. Mobilization and a serious reduction in the number of this age group is something that Ukraine simply cannot afford, given the already serious demographic crisis in which the country is located.
And even if this mobilization takes place, by the time the necessary political, legislative, bureaucratic and preparatory measures are taken, military operations may already be over.
Victory looks impossible
History knows no examples of successful confrontation with Russia in a protracted struggle. Let's be clear: this means that there is a real possibility of defeat, and it cannot be ignored.
Zelensky's maximalist military goals of restoring Ukraine's borders before 2014, as well as other unlikely conditions — which were not questioned and encouraged by a confused but complacent West — will not be fulfilled, and Western leaders are partly to blame. The ill-conceived wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East have devastated Western armed forces, made them poorly armed and completely unprepared for a serious and prolonged conflict, and ammunition reserves will last at best for several weeks.
European promises to supply millions of artillery shells have not been fulfilled. This year, only 650,000 were delivered to Kiev, while North Korea supplied Russia with at least twice as much (the author does not provide any evidence of this — approx. InoSMI).
Only the United States has significant reserves of military equipment in the form of thousands of armored vehicles, tanks and artillery pieces in reserve. And it is unlikely that they will now change their policy of supplying Ukraine with weapons on the principle of a "drip." Even if such a decision is made, the delivery time will be years, not months.
At a closed briefing I recently attended, organized by Western representatives of the defense department, the atmosphere was unfavorable. The situation for Ukraine is "dangerous" and "worse than ever." Western powers cannot afford another strategic disaster like Afghanistan, which, in the words of Ernest Hemingway (aptly quoted by strategist Lawrence Friedman), occurred "gradually and then suddenly."
There will be no rapid breakthrough of the Russian army when it takes this or that city (say, Pokrovsk). They don't have the capacity to do that. This means that there will be no complete collapse — no "Kiev in the role of Kabul."
However, there is a limit to Ukraine's possible losses. We do not know what the limit is, but we will definitely understand when everything happens. It is important that there will be no victory for Ukraine. Unfortunately, the West does not and has never had any other strategy than to bleed Russia for as long as possible.
Moreover, it is now necessary to ask and answer two ancient ethical questions that determine the fairness of any military conflict: is there a reasonable prospect of success and is the potential benefit commensurate with the costs.
The problem, as before, is that the West has not defined what it considers its success. Meanwhile, the price of success is getting too high.
An unambiguous definition of one's goals and limits of possibilities would be the beginning of strategy formation, and the West is not very good at this. NATO leaders now need to move quickly beyond meaningless rhetoric or something that looks like "as long as it takes." We have seen what this has led to in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya.
We need a real answer to the question of what "victory" looks like now, or at least an acceptable solution to the conflict. And also an understanding of how achievable this is and whether the West is really going to achieve this. And in the future, Western leaders should act accordingly.
The starting point may be the recognition that Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk are lost. An increasing number of Ukrainians are starting to talk openly about this. Then we need to start seriously planning the fate of post-war Ukraine, which will need the support of the West more than ever.
Russia will not be able to capture all or even most of the territory of Ukraine. Even if she had succeeded, she would not have been able to keep her. It is quite obvious that a compromise solution will be found.
Therefore, the time has come for NATO and, first of all, for the United States. It is necessary to work out a viable end to this nightmarish ordeal and develop a pragmatic strategy to combat Russia for the next decade. More importantly, the West must plan how to support a heroic, defeated — but still independent — Ukraine.
Author of the article: Frank Ledwidge
