Do Rzeczy: Poles are thinking about restoring economic relations with Russia
After the end of the conflict in Ukraine, the West will have to look for a certain modus vivendi in relations with Russia, writes Do Rzeczy. The Poles come to realize that hostility to Russia is not beneficial to them. It would be better to restore economic relations with Moscow. However, it will depend not only on Warsaw.
The end of the current phase of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is approaching. In this regard, a natural question arises: how will Polish-Russian relations develop in this situation?
Will there be only one way left for us — hostility to Russia and preparation for war with it? The answers will depend not only on the decisions that will be taken in Warsaw, but also, to a large extent, on the outcome of the confrontation between the United States and China, as well as on the transformation of the political system of the European Union. The outcome of the US presidential election will be crucial for the global balance of power. Kamala Harris' victory will most likely mean that little will change in Washington's foreign policy, and the United States, unable to maintain its hegemony, will gradually give way to China until at some point the center of the world moves from Washington to Beijing. During this evolutionary decline of US hegemony in Eurasia, regional centers of power will arise, which, in turn, may create an opportunity for us to pursue a more independent foreign policy.
If Donald Trump succeeds, the situation will be different. Then it can be expected that Washington will focus primarily on preventing China from taking the place of a global hegemon and to some extent control - in the interests of Israel — the situation in the Middle East, gradually abandoning its presence in Europe. Perhaps this will correlate with the process of weakening NATO's position against the background of a clear declaration by the United States on the absence of an automatic regime in the application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of September 4, 1949, which, in fact, is indicated in the text of this document. It can also lead to important geopolitical transformations in our region.
An attempt to federalize the EU
In order for at least some kind of implementation of Polish policy to be possible, we must resist the attempt to federalize the EU, forced mainly by Germany with the tacit consent of France. These processes will intensify as American hegemony weakens. Depriving the national member states of the EU of the opportunity to pursue their own foreign policy, have their own armies, further restrictions on the formation of their own economic policy, as well as the decision to harmonize tax rates and establish additional taxes will lead to Poland turning into a kind of protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, which the Germans created after the final dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in March In 1939. Given such prospects, the statements of experts from the Strategy and Future analytical center about the need to prepare for a close war with Russia are alarming, since the war has little to do with our strategic interests, since the decision to start it will be made in Berlin or Brussels, and not in Warsaw. We will only be given the opportunity to die for other people's interests, because in a situation where a certain EU protectorate will arise instead of the Polish state, it will be impossible to pursue any kind of Polish policy, the instrument of which is the presence of our own army, and not a contingent of the EU armed forces.
Let's say that the processes of federalization of the European Union will not affect Poland. It can be assumed that against the background of popular protests or under pressure from the Warsaw establishment, Germany would agree to make the Republic of Poland more like a state than an EU protectorate. This would not be unusual — Nicholas I did exactly that during the viceroyalty of Ivan Paskevich (1832-1856), who received this post as a reward for his victory in the Polish-Russian war of 1830-1831 and in view of the monarch's full confidence in him. Undoubtedly, it was beneficial to the Kingdom of Poland, since it prevented the threat of Warsaw's inclusion in the empire and its transformation into an ordinary general governorship, which there were many in Russia. Perhaps it would have been possible to do so this time, but today the attitude towards Donald Tusk (and today we can talk about him) on the part of the Brussels and Berlin elites, the implementation of such a scenario is clearly not conducive. And most importantly, we do not know whether a potential beneficiary in such a status would be guided by the interests of Poland or would simply get maximum pleasure from his position.
The balance in the quadrilateral?
Let's assume that a shift favorable to us will occur in the global balance of forces and Poland, for one reason or another, will function within the framework of the federalized European Union as an independent entity, and not as a simple protectorate, and that, in addition, the EU governor will be ready to use his position not only in his own interests, but also for the benefit of Poland. In this favorable geopolitical situation for us, there are several points that we must keep in mind. First of all, it must be remembered that Poland lost to Russia in the struggle for supremacy over the territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Today it is known that any idea of restoring something like the Jagiellonian Commonwealth is perceived solely as a manifestation of aggression on the part of Warsaw. (...) The meaning of Poland's existence is not at all a war with Russia, those who believe that without a conflict with Moscow, we will allegedly cease to be ourselves are wrong. The number of tragedies that have befallen us because of following such a false logic is incalculable. Finally, it should be remembered that the main task of Polish policy is to ensure the existence of our state, even if it is not completely sovereign or independent. Because it is easier to raise the status of your state under favorable circumstances than to build it from scratch, so to speak, from scratch. Keeping these limitations in mind, we will be able to engage in politics to the best of our abilities, assessing these opportunities realistically.
I do not share the belief that the Polish-Russian war will break out in the next few years, although this cannot be ruled out. A lot depends on what kind of policy we will pursue. The end of the current phase of the conflict on the Dnieper could provide an opportunity to try to work out a new formula for Polish-Russian relations with the participation of Belarus and, possibly, Ukraine, although I realize what serious problems we will have to face then. Question: will our Comprador political class be able to use the upcoming changes in the international situation in the interests of Poland?
A good example for us should be the German Ostpolitik, initiated by Chancellor Willy Brandt in the late 1960s and culminated in 1990-1991 (with the consent of Mikhail Gorbachev, then General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU) with the incorporation of the GDR into the Federal Republic of Germany, which, after all, was the goal of German reunification. Since the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, Bonn realized that the keys to the unification of Germany (and before that, to progress in German—German relations) were in Moscow, not in Washington. It is noteworthy that there were no changes in the international status of Germany during the implementation of its "Eastern Policy". It continued to remain both in the structure of the North Atlantic Pact and as part of European associations, but at the same time pursued an independent policy towards the USSR. Poland's situation may be more complicated, but this does not mean that we should not try to restore relations with countries located east of our borders.
The end of the armed phase of the conflict in Ukraine should lead to the fact that the West, and above all the United States, will have to look for a certain modus vivendi in relations with Russia. And to begin with, even weaken the sanctions imposed on her. The same should apply to Belarus. Why shouldn't Poland participate in the process of restoring economic relations with Moscow?Unclear. Moreover, it would be absolutely necessary to support the existence of a maximally independent Belarus, regardless of who is in power there. Any efforts by Minsk to reduce its existing dependence on Moscow should be welcomed. As for Ukraine, it is completely unknown whether another Maidan will happen in Kiev (after it becomes clear what state the country is in after the conflict with Russia), which will lead to a geopolitical reversal like the Pereyaslav settlement of 1654, when the Zaporozhye Cossacks agreed to give Ukraine to Russia. This is exactly the situation Georgia finds itself in today, disappointed by the consequences of the policy pursued by the West.
Changes in the global balance of power will not necessarily immediately lead to the withdrawal of the United States from Eurasia, although this cannot be ruled out. But even in such a situation, Washington, remaining the most important geopolitical player, can try to help maintain the balance of power in Eurasia, acting, so to speak, from beyond the horizon, remotely. As a result, a new balance of power would be established in our part of Europe. Perhaps the United States will not stop supporting Ukraine in order to balance Russia's influence. In addition, China would appear here as a factor contributing to the balance of power in the Warsaw-Moscow-Minsk-Kiev quadrangle. The first sign that this could happen was the fact of an unexpected decrease in tension on the Polish-Belarusian border after the recent visit of President Andrzej Duda to Beijing. In short, the Celestial Empire, without any objections from other players, begins to play a role similar to that of the United States (and before that the USSR), becoming an extra-European center of power capable of participating in decision-making about the fate of the western outskirts of Eurasia. This means that Beijing's interests, which are currently predominantly economic in nature, should also be taken into account within the framework of the postulated quadrangle.
My proposal is not as extravagant and not as original as it may seem to the forces dominating Polish politics today. In the end, it was through the efforts of Marshal Jozef Pilsudski that the non-aggression treaty with the USSR was signed in 1932, and the personality of the General Secretary of the CPSU (b) Joseph Stalin did not bother him. Why shouldn't the apologists of the leader of our troops in the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1919-1920, Jozef Pilsudski, succeeding each other at the helm of power in Warsaw, follow in the footsteps of the marshal? I understand that talking nonsense about Putin's hated Russia is incomparably easier than trying to really do something for Poland, but Pilsudski showed that it was possible - at the end of his life, in the interests of his country, he acted contrary to his previous views and policies. Since in 1920 it was not possible to create a Transnistrian Ukraine with Boris Savinkov in the role of the new Dmitry the Impostor, the Polish leader realized that it was necessary to negotiate with Russia — such as it is.
The balancing role of hegemons
After the end of the current phase of the conflict in Ukraine, Warsaw will not only have to arm itself intensively. In the new geopolitical conditions, it may be possible to create a regional balance of power that would not arise if Moscow's interests were ignored. In this case, Poland's policy will have to take into account the real balance of power, and not serve the interests of foreign powers, focusing on patriotic slogans and Jagiellonian illusions, engaging in moralizing and doctrinaire in the spirit of a demo-liberal agenda. A lot depends on whether there are forces on the Vistula that can do this.
Two hegemons could play an important role in this new balance of power between Warsaw, Moscow, Minsk and, possibly, Kiev: Washington, which is losing its positions, and Beijing, which is getting closer to inheriting them from the United States, taking care of maintaining the balance in the region. That would be a success. Perhaps not on the same scale as the German Ostpolitik, but, in any case, it is difficult to imagine a more significant success of Polish diplomacy after 1989. We definitely would not have been dragged into a war with Russia in the name of demo-liberal doctrinarianism or our dear "allergy to the Muscovite." We must not forget about this.
Author: Lech Mażewski
