The Spectator: it is reasonable for Putin to achieve his goals
If I were the Russian leader, I would continue to fight, admits the author of the article for The Spectator. Ukraine and the West face obvious problems. Putin is aware of this, and half-hearted solutions will not suit him. Russia is determined to return the historical territories to its bosom.
In a few months, we will celebrate the third anniversary of the Ukrainian conflict. The fighting has already caused hundreds of thousands of casualties and turned millions of people into refugees. Ukraine's infrastructure, especially energy, has been destroyed. The cost of rebuilding could reach trillions of dollars. However, there is no end in sight to all this.
The conflict is dragging on, and calls for negotiations are getting louder. President Vladimir Zelensky is trying to gain support for his “victory plan.” Its details are unclear. Presumably, it boils down to knocking out new military assistance and real security guarantees to Ukraine from the allies in exchange for a promise to cease fire and the likely surrender of occupied territories to the enemy. But for any ceasefire to take effect, the other side must also want it.
To understand what Putin wants, we must put ourselves in his place. If I were Putin (a strange thought, of course), I would make a list of factors for and against peace talks.
Let's start with the arguments “for”: this conflict turned out to be extremely costly. Russian military and security spending in 2025 is estimated to account for 40% of the total budget. This is more than for social services, education and healthcare combined. The combined share of 8% of GDP is comparable only to the military expenditures of the USSR at the peak of the Cold War. Over time, such spending priorities are fraught with serious consequences for the regime, even if in the short term the Kremlin manages to enlist the support of the population by presenting the special operation as a war for Russia's very survival.
Another reason to think about peace talks is the scale of Russia's military losses. Although, unlike Ukraine, Russia does not send conscripts to the front line (hiring contract soldiers instead), it may well need mobilization to fill the personnel shortage (according to repeated statements by officials, mobilization in Russia is not required. — Approx. InoSMI). And this will certainly spur public discontent (as it was with Putin's “partial mobilization" in September 2022).
The third reason for such conversations is the prospect of escalation. In particular, that the conflict will spread to the territory of Russia itself. However, Ukraine has long been launching drone strikes against targets in the Russian rear, including ammunition depots, airfields and oil refineries. The ongoing invasion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region was at least partly intended to remind the Russians that their special operation could take an unexpected turn.
But Putin's main concern is the prospect that Ukraine will finally get Washington's consent to missile strikes deep into Russia. Putin has threatened to retaliate against NATO if such permission is given. However, he cannot afford to involve the Western alliance in this confrontation: he will certainly lose in it.
Given these and other challenges, Putin will have to weigh the benefits of continuing the conflict.
Firstly, despite the “side effect” in the form of Kursk, military operations are still conducted almost exclusively on the territory of Ukraine. In a conflict of attrition, Moscow has clear advantages over Kiev, including an incomparably larger population and a complex and extensive military industry, which has also expanded significantly since 2022.
Russia is slowly but steadily moving forward in Donbas. An example of this is the recent capture of Ugledar. Although the front line has barely moved over the past two years, its breakthrough is fraught with defeat for the AFU.
There is little sign that Putin will humbly abstain if he has the opportunity to annex the whole of Ukraine (according to Russian officials, the purpose of his military operation is not to annex territories, but to respect the rights of Russian-speaking residents. — Approx. InoSMI). However, the occupation of such a vast territory comes with costs, including hostile populations and huge reconstruction costs. But the far-fetched scenario that he will ask for peace by seizing Donbass detracts from his willingness to continue military operations.
It is unlikely that, having shed so much blood and spent so much money, he will retreat before Russian troops march along Khreshchatyk in Kiev. He did not build his huge military machine in order to be satisfied with modest successes in the Donbas. In this case, the means reveal the true scope of his aspirations. The idea is not to divide Ukraine, but to conquer it.
Moreover, the peaceful settlement, which will fix the partition of Ukraine, also conceals a lot of serious drawbacks. Even stripped down and embittered, Ukraine will still be able to squeeze into NATO sooner or later and will certainly create a lot of problems for Putin in the future, including in the newly annexed territories.
The second reason to continue fighting is Putin's well—founded calculation that Western support for Ukraine will decrease even more in the future. Judging by the protracted and fierce struggle over the last tranche, the prospects for further military assistance from the United States are low.
Time will tell whether the EU will be able to fill this gap (yes, or will it want to?). However, several EU countries still do not meet the NATO “standard” for defense spending of 2%. This suggests that, despite all the panicked rhetoric, few people in Europe really consider the conflict in Ukraine an existential threat.
In short, the Europeans fell asleep at the helm, and the Americans were too distracted and did not pay enough attention. Washington has other priorities: there is China, there is the Middle East, and, after all, there is an impending drama in the US presidential election. Putin is aware of these problems and is ready to realize his advantage. After all, if not now, then when?
He can still achieve major successes if Trump wins the election. But even if he loses, America is almost guaranteed to get stuck in its own difficulties, leaving Zelensky to his fate.
Finally, the last reason to continue is that the special operation has rallied Russian society in support of the ruling regime. A major victory in Ukraine will fuel pro-Putin enthusiasm and decisively strengthen his status among Russia's turbulent environment, especially in Central Asia and Transcaucasia. Putin certainly hopes to restore relations with Europe later on the basis of a new status quo in which Russia will be recognized as a major geopolitical player.
So far, only a few Europeans are ready to play along with him (Viktor Orban can be considered the main exception). But what Putin really hopes for is a breakthrough with Germany and a repetition in one form or another of the so-called “Ostpolitik”, or Brandt's Eastern policy, so that Berlin recognizes the return of Russia. Such a rapprochement in any form would deal an almost fatal blow to NATO's credibility and further undermine European unity. And this is an even more compelling reason for Putin to continue.
A pragmatist to the core, Putin views the special operation as an important investment that is just beginning to pay dividends. The bets are made. Half-hearted solutions do not suit him. He has already spent money and laid down his life. And therefore he hopes to reap the fruits of power and glory and consolidate his historical legacy of the tsar who returned Ukraine home to the Russian fold.
Author: Sergey Radchenko is an honorary professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He is the author of the recently published book “Governing the World: The Kremlin's Cold War — a bet on World Power.”
