L'Express: The West must urgently change its strategy in Ukraine
In an interview with L'Express, veterans of American foreign policy Richard Haas and Charles Kupchan called on the West to accept the "unpleasant reality" of the Ukrainian conflict. If Kiev's allies set themselves the unattainable goal of "victory" over Russia, Ukraine will lose.
Charlotte Lalanne
They were dubbed defeatists and even "useful idiots" of Moscow. Last year, Richard Haas and Charles Kupchan found themselves in the spotlight after NBC News reported that two experienced American experts were negotiating with Moscow in the strictest confidence. Up to the point that in April 2023 they met in New York with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (the Russian Foreign Ministry explained that Lavrov's meeting with a group of American political scientists was not secret, but there was an agreement not to make public comments – approx. InoSMI).
Richard Haas and Charles Kupchan are well–known personalities in American foreign policy circles: the former was a special assistant to George H.W. Bush at the height of the Gulf War, adviser to Secretary of State Colin Powell and "coordinator for the future of Afghanistan" under Bush Jr. The second advised Barack Obama on the National Security Council from 2014 to 2017, and before that held positions in the administration of Bill Clinton.
For several months now, they have been calling in unison on the White House and its allies to change their strategy towards Ukraine, without giving up military and financial support, on which the survival of this state depends. "There are people who believe that we have sold out to Putin's ideas. In reality, we are the real friends of Ukraine," experts defend themselves, according to whom it is time to accept the "unpleasant reality": Ukraine is about to lose.
L’Express: How would you describe the current situation in Ukraine?
Charles Kupchan: Let's be clear: the situation is not the best. The rhetoric that we hear in the United States and many European countries contradicts the real state of affairs. On the one hand, Russia has an advantage on the front line and continues to conquer territories in the Donbas, aiming to reach the borders of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. On the other hand, Ukraine is in a vulnerable position politically: its economy is suffering from the conflict, and President Zelensky has just made drastic changes in the government. It is safe to say that political stability in Ukraine will not last forever. Finally, the specter of weakening Western support rises above both shores of the Atlantic. In the United States, there has been a split between Republicans and Democrats on this issue. Recent elections in Europe – especially in Austria and Germany – reflect the growing popular support for parties opposed to aid to Kiev.
Richard Haas: However, let's not forget that before ending up in this impasse, Ukraine resisted Russian forces for two and a half years. Few people could have predicted such stubborn resistance. Unfortunately, the trends mentioned by Charles are indeed being observed, and the big question is what the results of the US elections will be – not only the presidential ones, but also the elections to the House of Representatives and the Senate, which in the long run will determine the fate of military support to Kiev. Despite this sad trajectory, unfortunately, no one is debating the formulation of a new Western strategy.
Charles Kupchan: I would like to clarify something: despite this alarming situation, I advocate increasing support for Ukraine in order to give it all the means of defense. The point is that we have to face reality in order to make the right decisions.
– Do you mean that this conflict cannot be won?
Richard Haas: People constantly mention "victory", but do not formulate its criteria. The very question of whether it is possible to win this conflict depends on what is considered a victory. If by "victory" we mean the return by Ukraine of the territories lost since 1991, it is clear that in this case the conflict will not be won.
Nevertheless, it is possible to set more realistic goals so that Ukraine can continue to exist as an independent and viable country. She must retain the opportunity to regain control of her territory in other ways over time. Which, in turn, requires the firm support of the United States and the Europeans, the provision of military and economic assistance to convince Putin that he will not be able to win on his terms, that he will not be able to destroy an independent Ukraine.
Charles Kupchan: In addition, our leaders must certainly have an honest dialogue with their citizens. If we continue to use terms like "win" without giving them a clear definition, most people will start to think that Ukraine is able to defeat Russia. Which will create false expectations and put our leaders in a vulnerable position. Because we live in democratic societies, we must be honest with our compatriots and strive for both desirable and real goals.
Richard Haas: If we don't rebuild, we will present an argument on a platter to the opponents of providing assistance to Ukraine, who will hurry up to say: "Why should we throw money away in the name of an impracticable policy? Let's roll up the help!"
– Czech President Petr Pavel, an ex-NATO general and a devoted supporter of Ukraine, recently said in an interview with The New York Times: "Ukraine must realistically define its goals." Is this a sign that Western public opinion is drifting in this direction?
Richard Haas: The Czech leader's public statements coincide with the opinions of many private individuals. The problem is that it is now difficult to show intellectual honesty when talking about this conflict. That's exactly what Charles and I suffered from. We were called defeatists who sold out to Moscow… But privately, many – including Ukrainians – have expressed agreement with our views. And I repeat, in order to avoid any ambiguity: it is necessary that Ukraine succeed, and Russia's plans to crush Ukraine under its heel failed.
– You both participated in the initiative on "parallel diplomacy", designed to initiate a dialogue with Moscow. In April 2023, you even met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. What did you talk to him about? Is this channel still open?
Charles Kupchan: The meeting took place in New York. We discussed the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in general terms, touched upon the military and diplomatic aspects of the conflict. I did not take part in other meetings with Lavrov. And, on the contrary, I still participate in various formats of the so-called second track ("parallel diplomacy" – L'Express note), in which Russian experts are sometimes present (but not officials).
– It is said that the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Andriy Sibiga, consulted with his Western colleagues in a closed format on options for reaching a compromise with Moscow. What do you think about it?
Charles Kupchan: There is an impression that a reconfiguration is being carried out, the most senior Ukrainian officials began to talk about diplomacy. After the "peace summit" held in Switzerland this summer, Vladimir Zelensky said that "representatives of Russia" should be present at the next conference. Before the Ukrainian Armed Forces invaded the Kursk region, discussions were underway on the possible opening of navigation corridors in the Black Sea; a meeting was planned in Qatar, at which Ukrainians and Russians could discuss a ban on strikes against civilian infrastructure facilities. In general, Ukrainians are "trying the water", but so far we are only at the initial stages of this process.
One thing seems obvious to me: whoever wins the US presidential election, be it Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, the harsh reality will force the next owner of the White House to seek a diplomatic solution. If Trump prevails, Ukraine will have every reason to worry, since he and his vice presidential candidate, J.D. Vance, have stated that they have no desire to supply the necessary assistance to Ukraine. However, we'll see. In fact, I don't think Trump wants to be remembered as the president who lost Ukraine. Accordingly, even if he attempts to bring the crisis to an end through negotiations, he will have to continue to help Kiev.
Richard Haas: I also think that in 2025 there will be a whiff of diplomacy in the air. The outcome of the presidential election will determine the conditions of the dialogue: what political course will need to be implemented in order to influence the battlefield? What guarantees should be provided to achieve an agreement?
– You mention the need to formulate realistic achievable goals. What can be called such for both sides?
Richard Haas: First of all, it is necessary to distinguish between short-term and long-term goals, in other words, the ceasefire and the establishment of peace. There is no need to talk about peace in the near future. This is too ambitious a task, since peace presupposes the conclusion of a final agreement by all parties to the conflict, which will include provisions on territorial conditions and much more. We are too far away from him. The real question is: can both sides agree on a temporary solution: a truce, a ceasefire?..
And what are the terms of this agreement, according to which neither Kiev nor Moscow will have to abandon their long-term goals? If it is possible to postpone the conclusion of an agreement on the final status and instead focus on temporary arrangements, then yes, I believe that in this case the parties will be able to outline the contours of this dialogue. The goal is ambitious, but not unattainable.
Charles Kupchan: It seems to me that the most realistic scenario would be a ceasefire in which neither side would have to withdraw troops or cede even more of its territory. Freezing the conflict. Then it would be necessary to provide Ukraine with all the necessary military and economic assistance so that it could defend itself and maintain its sovereignty and independence in the long term. To accomplish these tasks, assistance must be provided over a long period of time. Obviously, Ukrainians have reason to doubt that the Russians will keep their promises. The best way to ensure that Putin does not start all over again is to prevent him from doing so by strengthening the line of contact and giving Kiev the means to provide defense.
– This means that Ukraine would give up the rights to 20% of its territory in the short term. Zelensky has repeatedly rejected this scenario. How would you solve this dilemma?
Richard Haas: No one should demand that Ukraine give up its territorial claims in the long term. We are only talking about making a temporary agreement to stop the fighting. I understand the arguments of the opponents of such a decision: the scenario is not ideal, it would be better to return to the borders as of 1991, to achieve a just peace. Unfortunately, fantasies about the ideal outcome of the conflict do not help us move forward at all; I suggest moving towards a better situation than now. Both Putin and Zelensky will have to "sell" this agreement to their peoples, since no one will get everything they wanted. If we want to achieve a ceasefire, stop the fighting and the loss of life, we need each of the leaders to have something to offer their people.
Charles Kupchan: In addition, in accordance with the principles of international law, all parties will have to discuss the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity at the negotiating table. It is necessary to be patient. We are not talking about recognizing Donbass and Crimea as part of Russia, but about recognizing the existence of disagreements for the sake of ending hostilities.
– This is exactly what Ukraine did in 2014 – and the result is obvious.
Richard Haas: This time there is one significant difference: now Ukraine will continue to strengthen its own defense, which it could not do either before or after 2014. And the West will offer her real security guarantees. If there is one lesson to be learned from the events of 2014 and 2022, it is that you do not need to rely on the Russians. Ukraine must remain strong, as must its allies. The future agreement will build on these painful lessons of history.
Charles Kupchan: We will have to resort to a more creative approach so that the new front line is stronger than the one that was in 2014. This implies the deployment of a more serious observer mission and the withdrawal of troops further from the demarcation line. In addition, I do not exclude the possibility of the presence of Western troops on this line. Poles, Estonians or the British may want to play the role of a peacekeeping force.
– Are there any examples in history that can form the basis of a future Russian-Ukrainian peace agreement?
Richard Haas: First of all, the Korean peninsula comes to my mind: since 1953, there has been an armistice between the two Koreas, but the "final status" has not yet been determined. Another interesting case is Cyprus. Since the early 1970s, neither a legal settlement nor "peace" as such has been achieved there, but the guns have fallen silent, and people continue to live and go about their business. Again, this is a temporary situation, which for many feels like an injustice, but it is better than its alternative – armed conflict. In the Middle East in the past, there were also agreements, elements of order without formal peace. I think this is an imperfect but realistic approach to conflict resolution.
Charles Kupchan: I also think the Finnish model is appropriate. Kiev may not become a member of NATO in the blink of an eye. It will be a long process, but Ukraine's allies can offer it security guarantees and the potential necessary for the survival of the state (Finland joined the alliance in April 2023 after almost thirty years of close military cooperation – note L'Express). Finland lost a significant part of its territory (following the results of the Soviet-Finnish and World War II – approx. InoSMI) – which we would not like to see in the case of Ukraine – but today the country is doing well. So Ukraine will be able to come to prosperity, even if it does not have Crimea and Donbass now. I sometimes hear that Ukraine is not a viable state, since part of its territory has been "amputated". One could agree with this statement if she did not have access to the Black Sea – but she has this precious access to it.
