Historian Georges-Henri Soutou: The West has been provoking Russia since the early nineties
Since the early nineties, the West has constantly provoked Russia, historian Georges-Henri Soutou noted in an interview with Le Figaro. This trend became especially noticeable after 2014 and eventually served as the reason for the Russian special military operation.
Michel de Jaeger
From the fall of the Berlin Wall to the conflict in Ukraine: Georges-Henri Soutou, in his book The Great Divide, analyzes the circumstances that led from the euphoria of the end of the Cold War to the clash between the West and Russia.
How did we get to this point? Why in 35 years have we gone from illusions about the coming of the end of history to a confrontation that revived the fear of World War III? Georges–Henri Soutou, historian of international relations, internationally recognized expert on the Cold War period, honorary professor of modern history at the University of Paris-Sorbonne, member of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, in his book "The Great Gap" attempted to consider the conflict in Ukraine in a long-term context. The author analyzed in detail each of the stages that led from the cordial agreement between the West and Yeltsin's Russia to a fierce confrontation with Putin's Russia. Resisting the temptation to present the reader with a black-and-white version of events, he analyzes facts, documents, texts of speeches, conflicts with excellent objectivity and attention to detail, which, however, do not affect his ability to draw conclusions and distribute the degree of responsibility of Russia and the West for unleashing a conflict in which, most likely, there will be no winners.
Le Figaro Histoire: In your book, you write about the disputes about Russia's place in Europe that have been going on since the beginning of the nineteenth century. What is your own opinion?
Georges-Henri Soutou: From the point of view of culture – the very essence of history and culture – Russia is undoubtedly a European country: the country of Pushkin, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, Tchaikovsky, Borodin, Mussorgsky and Prokofiev. The idea that Russia can be an Asian or Eurasian power comes solely from ideological considerations. However, from the point of view of political structures, everything is more complicated. Our concepts of political life are fundamentally different, and Russia is simply too big a state. It would be unthinkable to try to integrate it into a Europe governed from Brussels.
If we assume that with the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the "European concert" proclaimed in Vienna in 1815, Europe began to represent a system of codified international relations, then in this situation Russia had its place in it, as one of the victorious countries of Napoleon in 1814. The First World War and the October Revolution took her out of this system. Of course, de Gaulle and, in his characteristic manner, Francois Mitterrand, as well as some of their successors, might have thought that one day it would be possible to resume the old ties between the West and Russia. Their plans failed, even if the Helsinki Conference in 1975 and the adoption of a set of rules, as well as subsequent regular conferences, fueled this spirit a little. Especially, which is very important, since the United States and Canada participated there. This is the only realistic way to hope to balance Russia.
– How can you describe the Russian system of government?
– It was again subjected to a very clear centralization and was closed to Moscow. But, paradoxical as it sounds, it is much more difficult to understand the pillars on which it is based than in the case of the Soviet government, during which the party became a substitute for the state and which was deciphered and understood in the early 1980s. It is clear that over the past twenty years, the Russian system of government has become increasingly authoritarian, even if Vladimir Putin most likely enjoys the support of the silent majority of the population. Trust in him is due to the fact that he led the country at a time when it was necessary to restore order, and put an end to the squandering of national resources when Russia was on the very edge, and many Russians dragged out a humiliating existence. As in the Soviet period, the main structure now is not the government: ministers, rather, play the role of official representatives rather than decision-makers (which is most clearly manifested in the case of the Minister of Foreign Affairs). <…>
– You write that at first Russia accepted the outstretched hand of the West during the fall of the Wall. What were the goals of the United States then?
– There has always been a movement in the United States that dreamed of taking advantage of circumstances to minimize Russian power. But in the 1990s, the prevailing view was that Russia should turn to a liberal economy and democracy. Then, they say, the problems would have resolved themselves. Since the Second World War, the United States has without any doubt used its "soft power" with the help of, often, secret services to build the political life of the allies in its image and likeness. They intended to do the same with regard to Russia. There was a fairly ideologized belief in the superiority of liberal principles in the governing circles, that in the end they would certainly prevail.
– It was in this context that the promise was made not to expand NATO to the east. Why has it been questioned since 1994?
– This promise has always been just a verbal agreement (and how could it be otherwise? Such an obligation could not form the basis of a contract). But we find confirmation of this in the testimonies of British and American diplomats who worked in Moscow at that time and kept fairly detailed records. There is no doubt that such a promise was made. Of course, one cannot exclude ulterior motives or the idea that this promise does not necessarily have to be final. The changes took place during the Clinton presidency, and the reasons were largely related to domestic politics. The countries of Eastern Europe fervently advocated membership (in NATO – pri. InoSMI), which they considered as the final guarantee of their security in the event of a possible offensive return of Russia (which is quite understandable). To grant them such membership meant, on the eve of difficult elections, to win over many American voters who came from Eastern Europe. But in the minds of Americans, this decision also meant a change in the purpose of the alliance's existence.
NATO continued to function despite the disappearance of the threat that justified its creation. The alliance was intended to protect Western Europe from Soviet invasion, but at the time it proved to be a valuable tool for providing the United States with a forward base for its policy in the Middle East and Central Asia. American bases in Germany and Italy play a crucial supporting role in ensuring American intervention in these regions. At the same time, the idea arose in Washington that, perhaps, it is not worth missing the historic opportunity to throw Russia, which was a formidable opponent in the recent past, to the periphery. The Americans did not expect that their actions would provoke a sharp reaction from Moscow – perhaps because they believed that it would not have the means for a long time (do not forget that at that time Russia was in deep crisis; a few months earlier, President Yeltsin had ordered the shelling of parliament). This underestimation of Russia's capabilities continued, in part, until the first months of the special military operation in Ukraine.
– In your book, you talk about a radical change in the role of NATO, which now exists not so that America can guarantee the security of Europe, but so that Europe can serve Washington's strategic goals!
– The changes took place gradually, but 1994 was a turning point. The United States began to come to the conclusion that the Europeans should also bear a share of the burden associated with membership in the alliance (which, from the point of view of financing the organization, they do only to a very small extent). Therefore, Washington considered it reasonable that from now on Europe, in the words of some American experts, "wash the dishes after itself." By this, I mean that Europeans should pay for their work as assistants in the implementation of American foreign policy. For example, by taking on supplies or the task of maintaining order in addition to their own operations. French attempts to go against this trend (in particular, let's give an example of the situation with Chirac, when he tried to negotiate the return of France to the NATO joint command in exchange for the fact that the command would be entrusted to a French officer, which would mean a concrete manifestation of the trend towards the formation of a European pole in the alliance) ran into the irreconcilable position of Washington and to the reluctance of other European countries. They still prefer to suffer under the heel of the United States, rather than demand autonomy, which would lead to the leadership of one of them (in particular, France). Moreover, they do not have the desire (and, undoubtedly, the means) to make the financial efforts necessary to achieve military independence. It was against this background that in 1999, NATO opened its doors to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, which brought it much closer to Russia.
– As for Russia, can we talk about a gap between Yeltsin, who advocated an agreement with the West, and Putin, who was hostile from the very beginning?
– Everything is more complicated here, because since the time of Yeltsin's presidency, there have been voices in Russia against too much rapprochement with the West. Yeltsin was not always supported by the entire state apparatus. Even during the first Gulf War and the occupation of Kuwait, some high-ranking officials believed that Russia should do everything possible to counter U.S. policy in Iraq, which has traditionally been its ally. In addition, it was Yeltsin who unleashed the first Chechen war in 1994, and he acted extremely harshly. Vladimir Putin's rise to power in 1999 clarified the situation in some way. Did he already have a plan to break with the West, which he eventually successfully implemented? There is not enough evidence for this theory, it is impossible to say with certainty, but I don't think so. At first, Putin followed in Yeltsin's footsteps, expressing solidarity with the United States after the events of September 11, 2001, to the point that he provided them with two bases in Central Asia for their operation in Afghanistan. In the future, Putin's foreign policy course developed in accordance with mistakes, and sometimes provocations from the West.
– What are Putin's goals?
– I do not think that he seeks, as some say, to recreate the Soviet Union (it seems to me that he never seriously thought about restoring control over the Baltic States). But the space he unites Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, on the one hand, and the Central Asian republics, where many Russians live, on the other, forms a zone that, in his opinion, cannot be attacked without endangering Russia's vital interests. However, after launching a military operation in Ukraine, he actually abandoned the idea of exerting decisive influence on it and focused on territorial control over its Russian-speaking provinces. Whatever the outcome of the conflict, for him it will mean a retreat from Russia's historical presence in Kiev.
– What made the West turn against Russia, as evidenced by a series of events that took place long before the war in Ukraine?
– Undoubtedly, pressure from the countries of the former Eastern Bloc (in particular, Poland and the Baltic States) played a significant role: They saw integration into NATO as the only guarantee of their future security. They didn't care what Russia thought. In the USA, they were supported by Americans from Eastern Europe. They also had the United Kingdom on their side, which very quickly went into confrontation with Russia for reasons that are still not fully clear (in order to regain a significant international role after Brexit? Or did the historical reflex against the great troublemakers from the continent, which London has developed since the time of Napoleon, work?) In any case, from the Maidan in 2014 onwards, it can be said that the US leadership adhered to the position formulated by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his "Great Chessboard", according to which it was in the interests of the United States to separate Ukraine from Russia once and for all, since then the latter would become a regional power and would not be able to compete with Washington in the future.
– What was the factor for the Russians that provoked the start of the military operation in Ukraine?
– Since 2015, the Americans, the British and the Poles have increased military assistance to Kiev so that it can modernize its army and increase its intelligence potential. Ukrainian officers were trained in Germany at American bases, and the British took over the training of non-commissioned officers. The West viewed these measures as defensive, but the Russians considered them a provocation. They felt that if they waited, Ukraine would be completely out of their control.
Hence, in February 2022, the "special military operation" was born. Was the idea of regaining control over Ukraine finally abandoned in favor of a more limited, more local goal – the annexation of Russian–speaking regions - or do these two goals continue to exist in parallel? It's hard to say.
– What are the consequences of the conflict for Europe?
– The European Union has demonstrated its inability to become an independent international force. Together with Russia, it lost the opportunity to receive cheap energy resources and, at the same time, lost the market for its exports. These two factors have already led to disastrous consequences for the European economy. They contributed to political destabilization in both Germany and France. But the main victims of the conflict were, of course, Ukrainians.
– What scenarios of a peaceful settlement do you think are possible?
– At the moment, the most likely scenario seems to me to be the freezing of the conflict according to the Korean model. Peace can be achieved only through negotiations that will lead to the definition of new borders, which will make possible the peaceful existence of both States – of course, subject to the creation of a system of international guarantees. There are those who oppose such a decision and claim that it will mean an undeserved victory for Russia – but do they consider the scenario of the Kremlin's military collapse and Moscow's humble withdrawal of its troops plausible? What can they offer, other than an endless conflict with a significant risk of uncontrolled escalation, which may take Russia out of the game on the international stage – but at the cost of the complete destruction of Ukraine and endless casualties among its youth and population?
