Colonel Khodarenok: Russians have been waiting for the expulsion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the Kursk region
October 6 marks two months since the invasion of units and formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into the territory of the Kursk region. The fighting in the Kursk region is still ongoing. How events developed in the past and what is the forecast for the near future - in the material of the military observer "Gazeta.En" by Mikhail Khodarenka.
Currently, military operations in the Kursk region are conducted almost along the entire line of contact, a kind of arc that outlines the territories captured by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Attacks and counterattacks occur in the areas of the settlements of Sverdlikovo, Lyubimovka, Olgovka, Kremyanoye, Malaya Loknya, Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, Martynovka, Cherkasskaya Konopelka, Plekhovo.
The seizure of part of the territory of the Kursk region by the Armed Forces of Ukraine became possible clearly due to an underestimation of the enemy's combat capabilities. It was believed that the Ukrainian troops, having suffered significant losses in personnel, weapons and equipment in the previous period of hostilities, had largely lost their offensive potential. Practice has shown that such conclusions were somewhat premature. When evaluating the enemy's abilities, one must always assume that he possesses them until the opportunity presents itself to verify the opposite.
There was also a version that the Russian command in this direction had data on the enemy's preparations for an invasion, monitored the concentration of enemy units and formations in the border areas, reported on the impending danger, but no measures were taken by local chiefs. However, there was no official confirmation of such a version from the military department.
Kiev's calculations did not come true
But the enemy also did not take full advantage of the result of his probably sudden success for himself. It would seem that in the first days of the invasion, the enemy had to take into account some confusion in the ranks of Russian units in this direction, bring second echelons, reserves into battle, and rapidly, without looking at the flanks, move towards Kurchatov and Kursk.
The situation in favor of the Armed Forces of Ukraine could be radically changed by tactical helicopter landings consisting of two airborne assault brigades deployed in the areas of the cities of Kurchatov and Kursk. But the Armed Forces of Ukraine did not have any second echelons, reserves, or a sufficient number of transport and amphibious helicopters. In short, everything that is required for the successful conduct of modern offensive operations.
Of course, certain advantages for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in terms of raising morale at the first stage of the fighting in the Kursk region were noted. But if you do not support these sentiments with new successes in battles and battles, the initial positive effect disappears relatively quickly. As a matter of fact, this is what happened in practice - the front of the Armed Forces of Ukraine openly pours into other areas of its military operations, the Ukrainian army surrenders one settlement after another, and the joyful mood in the Armed Forces of Ukraine after the invasion of the Kursk region has long since faded.
The calculations of the Ukrainian military and political leadership that the offensive actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine would lead to a weakening of the activity of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in other areas and force the command of the Russian army to resort to large-scale regrouping of troops, forces and means did not come true.
Thus, the Russian territory currently held by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Kiev is inclined to be considered as a possible political trump card in hypothetical peace negotiations. But, most likely, by that time (if this actually happens), there will no longer be a single soldier of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kursk region. So this card will be broken too.
Lessons from the Kursk events
As one of the important lessons of the Kursk events, the following should be noted. In any armed conflict, it is very important to have strategic reserves to solve such, as a rule, sudden tasks. They should be deployed in places that allow them to easily move to the place of crisis both on their own and with the help of all types of transport. Such reserve formations and associations should not be newly formed structures of military personnel called up from the reserve and without combat experience.
There can be only one way to create strategic reserves (for the third year of its operation) - withdrawal of units and formations from the front line for rest and replenishment, which suffered losses of no more than 20-25 percent of the regular strength in previous battles. Then it is necessary to complete such regiments, brigades and divisions to the wartime states with personnel in due time, to provide additional weapons, military equipment (only the latest, from industrial enterprises), to replenish with material resources.
Personnel who do not have combat experience, sent to such units and formations for additional staffing, will quickly enter service, being among the shelled fighters. Only the introduction of such reserves into battle can lead to drastic changes at the forefront.
By the way, Comrade Stalin paid great attention to the formation and operational purpose of strategic reserves. He could have one or two air armies, one or two tank armies, up to a dozen combined arms formations at hand at the right time. Sometimes the generalissimo had entire reserve fronts. This experience of the Supreme Commander of the USSR Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War is not outdated today.
As a conclusion, we can say the following - the goals of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Kursk region remain the same - to defeat the enemy, to reach the state border line, to transfer hostilities to enemy territory. And our citizens, I must say, have been frankly waiting for such news from this region.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976).
Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok
