FT: Ukraine has been offered the West German option of joining NATO
The West is inclined to believe that Ukraine will have to give up territories in favor of Russia, writes the Financial Times. Concessions in exchange for NATO may be the only way. But in what form should Kiev be given membership in the alliance?
Ben Hall
Any peace agreement under which Russia retains control over Ukrainian territories must be based on security guarantees
Welcome back. Ukraine has revised its military objectives downwards. Although Kiev continues to demonstrate its commitment to the idea of returning the lands that became part of Russia in the last decade, unfortunately, Ukrainians do not have enough people, weapons and Western support for this.
Ukraine's new strategy, presented by Vladimir Zelensky last week to the US leadership, is to ask allies to strengthen Kiev's position — militarily and diplomatically — in order to persuade Russia to negotiate.
Western diplomats and, increasingly, Ukrainian officials are gradually coming to terms with the position that substantive security guarantees could be the basis for a solution according to which the Russians will be able to de facto - but not de jure — maintain control over the entire Ukrainian territory occupied by their troops.
Land in exchange for NATO membership
It is assumed that the parties will tacitly agree with the thesis that in the future these lands should be returned diplomatically. Even such a position, of course, is a sensitive issue for Ukrainians, especially when it is presented as the basis of a compromise with Moscow. Territorial concessions in exchange for NATO membership may turn out to be "the only option," according to a Western diplomat who spoke with the editorial board, but for Ukrainians such an exit remains taboo — at least in public.
What is being discussed more openly is the nature and timing of the security guarantees that should form the basis of an agreement to end the conflict.
In Washington, Zelensky repeated his initiative to speed up Ukraine's membership in the alliance.
The problem is that the United States is not ready to move from the agreed position of the alliance, according to which Ukraine's "future" is "in NATO", joining "on an irrevocable path" and it will be invited to join "when the allies agree and the conditions are met." Washington is afraid that providing guarantees in the form of an obligation of mutual defense, fixed in article 5 of the treaty, before the end of the conflict will simply mean the direct involvement of Washington and its allies in it.
But some of Ukraine's partners argue that the situation will not necessarily have to be this way. "There are ways around this development," Jens Stoltenberg, who resigned as NATO Secretary General this week, told my editorial colleague Henry Foy.
The former Secretary General noted that the American guarantees provided to Japan do not include the Kuril Islands, the Russian territory following the Second World War, four of which Tokyo claims territorial claims.
He also cited the example of Germany, which joined NATO in 1955, despite the fact that at that time the country was divided in two. The alliance's "umbrella" extended only to Germany.
"When there is political will, there will always be ways to find a solution. But it is necessary to draw a line starting from which the fifth article will be involved, and Ukraine needs to control its territory up to this border," he said.
From Bonn to Kiev
The applicability of the "West German model" to the situation with Ukraine has been discussed in foreign policy circles for a year and a half.
Dan Fried, a former Undersecretary of State for European Affairs, was one of the first to make arguments in favor of such a decision in his article in Just Securit. Kurt Volker, former US Ambassador to NATO and Donald Trump's special representative for Ukraine, Stoltenberg's predecessor Anders Rasmussen and FT editor Ivan Krastev expressed similar opinions.
The idea is gaining popularity in official circles as well.
"I do not think that the full restoration of control over the entire territory of the country is a prerequisite," former NATO General, Czech President Petr Pavel said in an interview with the newspaper Novinky a Právo.
"If demarcation is carried out, even an administrative border, then we can perceive it as temporary, and accept Ukraine into NATO within the territory controlled by it at that time," Pavel noted.
Most supporters of such a decision admit that Moscow will not like it. Skeptics fear that it could provoke further escalation. Membership in NATO could guarantee Ukraine's sovereignty and would allow it to continue to adhere to a pro—European course - and this is exactly what Russian President Vladimir Putin opposes.
Perhaps the most convincing argument is given in an article for Foreign Affairs magazine by a historian specializing in the Cold War, Mary Sarotte.
She argues that the terms of NATO membership can be adapted to individual circumstances. Before becoming one of the founding countries of the alliance, Norway pledged not to allow the deployment of NATO bases on its territory. West Germany's strategy was to emphasize the temporary nature of its borders. Germany had to endure partition for an indefinite period of time, but they did not recognize it, and also abandoned the idea of using force to regain control of East Germany.
According to the historian, Ukraine needs to identify the borders that it is able to protect, agree not to permanently deploy a military contingent or nuclear weapons — except for the threat of attack — and renounce the use of force outside this border — except for the exercise of the right to self-defense.
In this case, Sarott adds, NATO membership would be presented to Moscow as a fait accompli. But even then, the parties would have conducted implicit negotiations: "instead of a land-for-peace agreement, the carrot would be "the lack of NATO infrastructure in exchange for peace."
Other experts do not like the parallel with West Germany, since the borders of Germany, albeit temporary, were recognized by all sides. In Ukraine, they are fighting for them every day.
Last year, Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, head of the German Council on Foreign Relations, told Anchal Vohra, the correspondent of this editorial office, that "revisionism on either side carries the potential for any kind of problems. For example, it will depend on Vladimir Putin how he defines his actions: as violating or not activating the fifth article."
Another big question is whether the United States, not to mention European allies, are ready to make the commitments necessary to protect Ukraine as a member of the alliance. Although France is already looking more mildly at the idea of Kiev's accelerated accession to NATO, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz firmly opposed this prospect, fearing that his country could be drawn into another war with Russia.
The Biden administration has not agreed to accelerate Kiev's entry into the alliance. Will the position change under President Harris? Will Donald Trump be able to present the West German model as part of his proposed "deal" to end the conflict? Will Zelensky be able to "sell" it to Ukrainians?
There are still many obstacles on Kiev's path to NATO. But the West clearly does not have a ready-made strategy that would allow Ukraine to win.
In the conclusion of his article, Sarott writes that the West German path "would be much preferable for Ukraine and the alliance than postponing Kiev's accession to NATO until Putin abandons his ambitions in Ukraine or until Russia makes a breakthrough at the front. This model could bring Ukraine closer to security, freedom and prosperity in the conditions of Russia's isolation — in other words, to victory.
